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Abstract 
 
There have been calls the world over for academic institutions to adopt 
corporate forms of management.  Unisa Council declared its commitment to 
corporate governance in the Annual report 2009.  This study aims to determine 
whether Unisa Council activities and decisions comply with corporate 
governance as per the King III Code and identify any area(s) of improvement.  
Case study research was undertaken to investigate compliance with the 
principles of good governance as recommended in the Code.  A checklist was 
used to collect data from university documents and this data was analysed by 
pattern matching.  Unisa performance was then compared with that of 
University of KwaZulu-Natal.  Unisa Council performed 91% of recommended 
practices and thereby complied with 87% of principles of good governance as 
per the King III Code on Corporate Governance.  Unisa did not comply with 
three principles and neither complied nor not-complied with five principles as 
the level of performance of corresponding recommended practices was below 
the threshold of 75%.  
 
UKZN achieved 91% performance of the recommended practices and thereby 
obtained 87% compliance.  The study also showed that practicing corporate 
forms of management to improve academic governance does not necessarily 
relegate academic interest to lower levels.  This means that these institutions 
delivered on their mandate from the Higher Education Act, 1997 (as amended).  
Unisa and UKZN are primarily public institutions of higher education and not 
profit driven, despite them embracing corporate forms of management. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Academic institution, Academic 
governance, Unisa Council, UKZN Council, King III Code, Higher Education Act, 
1997 (as amended), Compliance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 Scope of the study 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The Unisa Council, through its Statement on Corporate Governance contained 
in the Annual Report 2009, declares its commitment to good corporate 
governance as recommended in the King III Report on Corporate Governance. 
This commitment is further underscored by the institution‟s Corporate 
Governance Manual 2005 (Revised, 2010), aimed at informing the university 
community of corporate governance.  Unisa is a public higher education 
institution legislated by the Higher Education Act of 1997 (as amended).  As an 
academic institution, Unisa is recognised as a national resource, which should 
contribute directly to general economic development and social welfare, 
Ncayiyana and Hayward (1999: 4).  Unisa is therefore, not a business entity.  
This is pointed out in the Corporate Governance Manual and by Ncayiyana and 
Hayward, (1999: 4).   
 
In certain countries, universities were urged to embrace a more corporate form 
of management and thereby deal adequately with the demands of a knowledge 
society (Henkel, 2007:89).  Ncayiyana and Hayward (1994) and the Unisa 
Council maintain that Unisa should adopt corporate governance, despite being 
a non-commercial enterprise.  Other commentators strongly opposed this 
notion, arguing the inappropriateness of corporate governance as a model of 
governance in an academic institution.  They pointed out that the primary 
functions of the two types of entities differ sharply because a commercial entity 
needs to create wealth for its shareholders, whilst an academic institution‟s is 
teaching, research and serving the needs of society.    
 
Despite the concern from some quarters, there has been gravitation towards 
this direction.  Australian universities have heeded the calls according to 
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Harman and Treadgold (2007:13), adopting a governance model closely aligned 
with business corporations to achieve greater efficiency and accountability and 
well managed financial and human resources.  Toma (2007:68) reiterates the 
same trend in the US, where power has shifted away from faculty towards 
managers in the governance of higher education institutions.  In South Africa, 
the Higher Education Act, 1997 (as amended) designates the Council of a 
public higher education institution as the supreme governing body of such 
institution.  The Council is responsible for quality education and research, the 
institution‟s financial affairs, general reputation and standing within the country 
and internationally.  Therefore, the Council is the focal point of governance 
within the university.  
 
Traditionally, academic institutions have enjoyed academic freedom and 
sovereignty.  This entailed academic rights of self-governance and non-
intervention.  Recently, “knowledge societies” (which insist that a university is 
embedded in society and should therefore, contribute directly to general 
economic and social welfare), threaten academic freedom, (Henkel, 2007).  In 
Britain, the widely held view is that”… scientific knowledge can no longer be 
regarded as the concern primarily of academic organisations”, (Henkel, 2007).  
This view emanates from the premise that theoretical knowledge drives 
technological advance and innovation, which in turn, result in national economic 
growth. 
 
The dawn of the 21st century has seen unprecedented corporate collapses in 
the United States (US) - (Enron, World Com), Health and Racquet (Leisure Net) 
in South Africa, and elsewhere in the world.  These corporate failures and the 
recent global financial crisis resulted in public dissatisfaction and lack of trust in 
corporations.  Loud calls came from NGOs, activists and those not benefiting 
from the current economic order, for a change in the conduct of corporations, 
(Waddock and McIntosh, 2009:296).  Visser (2009:1) argued that the corporate 
failures largely ensued from poor governance practices.  These groups bemoan 
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incongruence between the interests of those charged with organisational 
governance and various stakeholders. 
 
Consequently, various initiatives such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the 
US, King Commission on Corporate Governance in South Africa and the 
Organisation for Economic and Development (OECD) in the UK, were set up to 
enforce good corporate governance in the global economy (Visser, 2009).  The 
Cadbury Report (1992) describes corporate governance as the system by which 
organisations are directed and controlled.  The King III Code which replaced 
earlier King I & II Codes, was published in September 2009 as a result of the 
new Companies Act no. 71 of 2008 and changes in international governance 
trends (Institute of Directors, 2009). 
 
The King III Report comprises a code of principles and practices based on an 
apply or explain approach.  This means that the board, or those charged with 
governance of an entity, could decide to apply the recommendation differently 
or apply another practice and still achieve the objective of overarching corporate 
governance principles such as fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency, (Institute of Directors, 2009).  The code principles are such that 
every entity, whether in the public, private sector, or non-profit sector, can apply 
them to achieve good governance.  Though the Report uses terminology such 
as company, board, and directors, it also refers and applies to the functional 
responsibilities of those charged with governance in any entity, even if different 
terminology is used, (Institute of Directors, 2009).  
 
The concepts of leadership and corporate citizenship are cornerstones of the 
King III Report (Institute of Directors, 2009).  Citizens are morally committed to 
contribute to common good with an expectation to benefit in the end, (Jeurissen, 
2004:88).  Jeurissen asserts that the metaphor of corporate citizenship implies 
the same basis for corporations as well.  Social movements demand 
corporations to contribute extensively to public good, such as a clean 
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environment, the provision of health care or the quality of neighbourhood, (Grit, 
2004:98).  Corporations are expected to go beyond philanthropy and 
volunteerism to consider the impact of business operations on stakeholders and 
the environment.  However, it will take great leadership to harmonise business 
and society interests, (Darigan and Post, 2009).  They state that it requires 
leaders who can identify challenges and opportunities as well as recognise the 
pivotal role of business in this process.  This breed of leaders wants first, to 
serve other people‟s highest priorities, (Waddock and McIntosh, 2009).  These 
leaders need to develop a new mind-set and reflect on the consequences and 
implications of their decisions.  Waddock and McIntosh (2009) add that such 
leaders need to value relationships, shared power, co-operation and 
collaboration to bridge the gap between business and societies.    
 
Unisa council‟s expressed commitment to corporate governance appears to be 
in line with calls around the world for academic institutions to adopt corporate 
forms of management.  Corporate governance will - according to existing 
literature - help plug the gap between management and all stakeholders.  This 
gap represents one of the causal factors of recent corporate collapses around 
the globe.  Unisa council is charged with governance of the institution by the 
Higher Education Act, 1997 (as amended) and therefore, a custodian of 
corporate governance.  Its decisions and activities should therefore, line up with 
its commitment and comply with the principles of corporate governance as set 
out in the King III Code.  This involves performing the recommended practices 
of good governance embodied in the code.  The council‟s commitment should 
be underscored by visible manifestation, such as structures in place, documents 
and management policies of good governance.  The question of supporting this 
commitment has resulted in the problem that this study investigated: Whether 
Unisa council‟s decisions and activities comply with the King III Code on 
corporate governance. 
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1.2  Problem statement 
 
The current information era reinforces knowledge as the driving force behind 
global economic and social prosperity (Henkel, 2007:89).  Societies demand 
universities - as centres of higher education and research - to become socially 
useful.  Universities have engaged in commercial activities, including forging 
strategic alliances and contractual relationships with the private sector.  These 
alliances increase their financial resources following new challenges such as 
reduced public funding, increasing operating cost and increased competition 
(from both existing competitors and new entrants).  Consequently, these 
institutions adopted a revenue-driven and market responsive approach to deal 
with this spate of new challenges.  It has therefore, become necessary for 
academic institutions to start adopting corporate forms of management to 
enhance accountability. 
 
The researcher believes that such forms of governance should feature good 
governance, sustainability and corporate citizenship,  to be more accountable to 
societal needs.  In the South African higher education landscape, the burden of 
governance resides within the realm of the Council as legislated by the Higher 
Education Act, 1997 (as amended) and the institutional statute.  It then follows 
that the Council, as custodians of corporate governance, should lead this 
process, and ensure it is embedded within the institutional system of 
governance.  The Council has a duty of care to attain quality of teaching and 
research, adequate staff and student participation and good governance, 
(Goedegebuure & Hayden, 2007:50).  
 
This study therefore, investigated whether the Unisa Council adheres to the 
principles of Corporate Governance as outlined in the King III Report.  This 
involved evaluation of Council activities and performance against the principles 
of good governance as per the King III Report.  The researcher broke down the 
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evaluation into the following nine research questions, in line with the King III 
Code principles: 
 
 Did the council comply with the principle of ethical leadership and 
corporate citizenship? 
 Did the council comply with the principle of the role and function of the 
board and directors? (Board and directors mean council and members 
respectively). 
 Did the audit committee perform its oversight role effectively? 
 Did the council comply with the principle of risk governance? 
 Did the council comply with the principle of the governance of information 
technology (IT)? 
 Did the council comply with laws, rules, codes and standards? 
 Was there an effective audit function (IA) at Unisa? 
 Did the council manage relationships with stakeholder groupings 
effectively?  
 Did the council produce a sustainability report (triple-bottom reporting)?  
 
The performance of Unisa Council was then compared with that of University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) Council to determine any similarities or differences in 
the governance model.  The aim of the comparison was not to consider Unisa in 
isolation but, to relate its governance to another institution in South Africa.  
UKZN unlike Unisa, is a residential university based in Kwa-Zulu Natal province.  
 
1.2.1 Motivation for the research 
 
The Council is charged with the governance of an academic institution as 
legislated by the Act.  It thus follows that the Unisa council is responsible for 
good governance in the university as custodians of governance.  Unisa Council, 
in the Annual Report 2009, expressed commitment to the King Code.  It should 
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therefore, provide collaborative and integrated leadership that minds the 
consequences of their actions and activities on others because of its 
commitment.  The King III Report recommends that directors should consider 
the impact of their decisions and company operations on the community and 
environment, (Institute of Directors, 2009).  Waddock and McIntosh (2009) 
related /referred to this understanding as the essence of wisdom.  Businesses 
have been urged to strive to serve the interests and expectations of all 
stakeholders and not only focus on shareholders.  The Institute of Directors 
(2009) advocates an “inclusive approach of governance”.  
 
1.2.2 Importance of the research 
 
The inclusive approach will enable the Unisa Council to foster an effective 
relationship among all the role players (Council, the University community and 
the community at large) as stipulated by the Higher Education Act, 1997 (as 
amended).  The Council will also achieve the institutional mission, vision as well 
as the needs of its community.  Taylor (2000: 111) wrote that according to 
Carver (1990a) and Bradshaw et al (1992), modern research has demonstrated 
a strong relationship between strategic planning and organisational 
effectiveness.  The King III Report stresses that there is always a link between 
good corporate governance and the law.  The Council of a public higher 
education institution is required by the Act to provide the Minister (of Higher 
Education) with an annual report on overall governance of the University and 
audited financial statements.  The evaluation of the Council‟s compliance with 
the King III Code will help identify good corporate governance practices and 
areas that need improvement.  
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1.2.3 Research objectives 
 
The research aimed to investigate whether the Unisa council adhered to the 
principles of Corporate Governance as outlined in the King III Report.  This 
included determining any similarities or differences in the Unisa governance 
model and that of University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN).  
 
1.3 Research methodology 
 
Salkind (2006:2) describes research as”…a process through which new 
knowledge is discovered”.  Salkind (2006:2) continues, “research is work based 
on work of others”, as researchers review work already done to provide a basis 
for the subject of their research.  
This study employed a case study methodology to gather empirical evidence 
regarding compliance of the Unisa Council activities and decisions, with the 
principles of corporate governance as per the King III Report. This involved 
collecting data from various documents such as the Annual report 2009, 
Corporate Governance Manual and the Strategic Plan 2015. The researcher 
then checked the data against all the principles and corresponding 
recommended practices set out in the King III Code.  This pattern matching was 
performed to identify links between Unisa governance and the code, i.e. 
compliance or apparent compliance.  In addition, the study included a 
comparative analysis of Unisa governance and that of UKZN to have a view of 
governance practices at Unisa in relation to another academic institution‟s 
activities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 Literature study 
2.1 Evolution of Corporate Governance 
 
In this chapter, the researcher examined the corporate form of business in an 
attempt to examine the origin of corporate governance, its raison d’être and its 
principles.  Since literature on the development of corporations often focuses on 
developed economies such as England and the United States of America 
(USA), this study briefly explored the origin of corporate governance in these 
economies. The researcher examined significant reports such as the Cadbury 
report (United Kingdom) and the King III Code (South Africa) to discuss the 
evolution of a corporate governance system in these countries. The origin of an 
academic institution, academic freedom and academic governance were also 
discussed to understand the loud calls for these institutions to embrace 
corporate forms of management. 
 
Corporate governance is defined by the OECD (2004) as”a set of relationships 
between a company‟s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders”.  The definition has continued to evolve against the backdrop of 
corporate crises and issues to encompass the whole process of managing a 
business (Grant, 2003:925).  Public interest in the discourse of corporate 
governance intensified in the 1990‟s, following a number of corporate failures in 
the world.  Goedegebuure and Hayden (2007) attributed the collapse of Enron 
to the failure of corporate governance, arguing that corporate structures were 
not at fault, but the values and behaviour of the individuals operating within 
them.  
 
The proponents of the inclusive governance approach complain that managers 
focus on maximizing shareholders‟ wealth at the expense of other economic 
and social interests (stakeholders and environment).  Friedman (1970) retorts 
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that managers are employees of business owners, which should conduct the 
business according to the owners‟ wishes. Current literature in corporate 
governance reiterates the need for structural and behavioural change in 
corporate structures.  In this dissertation, the researcher discussed the agency 
theory in an attempt to examine the origin of corporate governance, its raison 
d’être and its principles. However, one cannot begin to discuss the development 
of corporate governance without examining the corporate form of business.  
 
2.1.1 Origin of a corporate form of business 
 
According to Grant (2003), corporations originated in England in the nineteenth 
century.  Corporations were accorded a right to engage in business to derive a 
profit.  Legislation was passed, giving shareholders limited liability for the 
actions of corporations.  This legislation effectively designated a corporation as 
a legal persona and thus protected the shareholders‟ personal assets from the 
consequences of the corporation.  Grant explains that the system of free 
enterprise and capitalism accelerated the growth of corporations in the USA.  
During the industrial revolution, the growth of these entities fuelled the need for 
capital and led to a marked change in the ownership structure.  Companies 
(both public and privately owned) grabbed the opportunity to raise capital 
through the public sale of stock resulting in widely held ownership.  At the turn 
of the twentieth century, companies featured passive business owners, 
separate from executive management.   
 
The arms-length ownership of business hit Britain much later, as the founding 
family retained significant influence in companies, (Cheffins, 2001).  Share 
offerings to the public diluted family control, resulting in Berle-Means 
corporations.  Berle and Means (1932) noted that dispersion of share ownership 
resulted in the loss of control by shareholders, as ownership was separated 
from control, (Aglietta & Reberioux, 2005:23).  The separation of ownership and 
control meant that only managers with business credentials were hired to run 
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the corporations.  The financial muscle or family connection was no longer a 
prerequisite to run a corporation.  The corporate form allowed individuals to 
consolidate their resources to earn profit.  However, as corporations grew, 
future business activities were financed through retained earnings or 
borrowings.  Therefore, a corporation became a legal owner of capital assets 
entrusted to managers (Grant, 2003).  Since a corporation is by law a legal 
entity separate from its owners and managers, it must comply with the law(s) 
that established it.     
 
2.1.2 Agency relationship 
 
The system of separate ownership and control created a power struggle 
between owner and management.  In a Berle-Means corporation, corporate 
power rests with management, creating an agency relationship.  An agency 
relationship is a contract that confers some decision-making authority to the 
agent by the principal(s) to perform some service on their behalf, (Grant, 2003).  
Corporate managers are therefore, agents for owners and should always strive 
to achieve owners‟ interests.  In reality, managers do not always act in the best 
interest of the owners, resulting in agency problems.  
 
Cheffins (2001) underlines widespread shareholding as the source of agency 
cost for investors. Insufficient financial stake generally discourages 
shareholders from actively participating in the affairs of the corporation.  This 
lack of interest allows management scope to further their personal interests.  It 
is therefore, important that agency problems are managed effectively for the 
sustainability of a corporation.  Aligning management interests with those of 
owners are achieved when the investor, management and board of directors of 
a company, communicate effectively, (Grant, 2003).   
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2.1.3 Developments: Corporate governance system 
 
The twentieth century was - according to Grant (2003) - abuzz with activity to 
develop a corporate governance system to resolve agency issues.  A legislation 
and regulatory framework was laid down in the US, to make the corporate 
responsible to its shareholder.  He quotes a ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts in 1881, which restricted corporate activities to the objective that 
the corporation was established for.  This implied that managers should 
primarily create profits for owners.    
 
The US stock market crashes in 1929 and 2001 raised the ire of investors who 
protested against mismanagement, exorbitant packages paid to executives, and 
misleading accounting policies (Grant, 2003).  There were calls to protect 
investors from what was described as “gross lack of morality” on the part of 
corporate management (Grant, 2003:927).  Consequently, the Securities Act 
(1933 & 1934) laid down regulations that stipulated registration with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), full financial disclosure and 
audited financial statements, in a bid to prevent false and misleading 
statements.  In 2002, Congress passed The Sarbanes-Oxley Act to instil the 
ideals of corporate governance into the US system.  This Act aims to protect 
investors by making provision for accurate and reliable corporate disclosure.  It 
stipulates new measures such as stringent requirements for auditor 
independence, increased corporate responsibility for financial reports and stiff 
penalties for securities fraud.  Law protects potential investors and gives them 
confidence to participate in public share offerings, (Cheffins, 2001).  The 2008 
global economy meltdown wreaked havoc in the US economy and decimated 
the Lehman Brothers.  It lends credence to calls for a new approach, which 
should go beyond corporate laws  and consider the impact of business activities 
and decisions on society and the environment.   
 
Friedman (1990) believed that a company should be run solely in the interest of 
its general shareholders and there should be no state interference with 
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corporations, lest they fail to uphold the charter of profitability. Friedman‟s 
contention is consistent with the property and nexus-of-contracts theories which 
maintain that shareholders as capital providers and bearers of residual risk are 
ultimate beneficiaries in a corporate form of organisation (Mason, Kirkbride & 
Bryde, 2007:287).  According to Mason et al, corporate governance research 
produced three theories to explain the concept of an organisation, viz. property, 
nexus-of-contracts and the third conception, which views an organisation as a 
social institution.  Stohl and Townsley (2007) criticise the primacy of profitability, 
and describe it as “short-term thinking” which disregards the impact of business 
activities and decisions on other stakeholders (society and environment).  
 
Aglietta & Reberioux (2005) disagree with the notion that a firm‟s primary 
objective is to maximise profit.  The notion that profits compensate shareholders 
as capital providers for the risk assumed, emanates from capitalism.  The two 
authors first describe the listed company (managerial firm), as the means of 
production, which pays the residual earnings to the shareholders as dividends.  
They argue that these earnings are paid as dividends to shareholders - and 
maybe employees if they are part of an incentive scheme - or reinvested.  Profit 
therefore, belongs to the corporation (Bernstein, 1969) and is not reserved for 
the exclusive remuneration of shareholders, (Aglietta & Reberioux).  In 
conclusion, the principle of profit maximisation does not imply that the firm must 
be conducted in the exclusive interest of its shareholders.  In agreement, Berle 
and Means (1967) argued that established companies are sustained more by 
retained earnings, external borrowings and market share, than capital inflows 
from them (Grant, 2003).  This therefore, means that shareholders cannot claim 
to be sole creators of corporations. 
 
Continuing with the case for other stakeholders, Aglietta & Reberioux (2005) 
maintain that the risk component of the profitability argument does not hold 
water, because the law incorporating companies, stipulates limited liability for 
shareholders.  Therefore, the liability of shareholders to losses sustained by a 
14 
 
 
company is limited to the value of their capital contributions.  In addition, the 
potential to trade stock in the equity markets provides shareholders with an 
avenue to exit and diversify their risk.  This reduction in risk incurred by 
shareholders fuel the scepticism of these authors about the validity of risk as 
justification for the profit argument.  Their argument succeeds in raising the 
need to broaden the approach of corporate management and does not 
necessarily discount the shareholders‟ interests.  Besides, one cannot disregard 
the fact that shareholders put their resources together to conduct a business 
and therefore are entitled to profits generated.      
 
The third view argues that a broader spectrum of business constituents 
(stakeholders) other than shareholders must be considered in decision-making, 
(Mason et al. 2007).  These include parties affected by corporate activity with or 
without financial interest in the company.  The stakeholder theory advocates 
proper stakeholder management as organisations exist as part of society (not 
isolated).  The board of directors and managers should communicate openly 
and honestly with stakeholders and have leverage to pursue stakeholders‟ 
interests most effectively.  Importantly, managers should be held accountable 
for their actions.  Mason et al (2007) advise that the degree of stakeholder 
inclusion and involvement in board decisions should be determined by value 
adding potential to the organisation.  Similarly, Young and Thyil (2008:95) 
criticise corporate governance for focusing largely on achieving financial goals 
and compliance with codes of practice and neglecting critical relationships with 
other stakeholders and well as neglecting long-term shareholder value.   
 
Young and Thyil (2007) doubt the ability of corporate accountability laws to 
restore the moral fibre in the corporate world.  Companies should incorporate 
ethics as a significant component of culture, values and decision-making.  They 
should therefore link ethics to social responsibility and stakeholders.  This is 
underscored by the third principle of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council (2003): 
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 To “actively promote ethical and responsible decision making”,  
 “…and clarify the standards of ethical behaviour required of company 
directors and key executives. 
 “Encourage the observance of those standards…”  
 
Organisations should develop a culture of ethics, empower employees to raise 
ethical concerns and reward ethical behaviour.  Ethics is “concerned with moral 
philosophy, values and norms of behavior that guide a corporation‟s behavior 
within society”, (Young & Thyil, 2008).  Organisations should therefore, link 
ethics to social responsibility and stakeholders.  Legal strictures are considered 
as minimum standard only, which may limit the corporation‟s ability to be 
socially responsible, (Seeger and Hipfel, 2007:164).  Ethics on the other hand, 
sets aspiration standards and thus complement the law.  
 
2.1.4 Summary of corporate governance principles 
 
Taylor (2000:109) summarised literature on corporate governance by examining 
nine principles of good organisational governance: 
 
Knowing what governance is  
Bohen (1995) defines governance as “the responsibility and accountability for 
the overall operation.”  The board (of one type or another) is always charged 
with such responsibility and governance.  Taylor (2000) lists the following as a 
board‟s responsibilities: 
 Developing corporate policies and plans. 
 Monitoring and measuring organisational performance against those policies 
and plans. 
 Acting as a voice of the ownership of an organisation. 
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Taylor (2000) cites Sinclair‟s (1996) explanation of the role of a Canadian 
hospital board, which was identified as threefold.  First, the board has to 
determine the hospital‟s mission and vision, values and policies.  In addition, it 
should ensure that the corporation‟s affairs are in good order, and that it meets 
the community needs.  Finally, the board should hire a competent Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) who will manage the hospital according to the purpose, 
goals, objectives, values and policies as determined by the board, (Taylor, 
2000). 
 
Achievement of strategic ends 
The board should develop a strategic plan to achieve the organisational 
performance objectives.  Modern research has shown a strong relationship 
between strategic planning and organisational effectiveness.  Carver (1990a) 
emphasises that the board should in its strategic plan, clearly define quantifiable 
performance objectives  to hold the CEO accountable for achievement thereof. 
 
Board - CEO relationship 
This is considered as the key relationship in the organisation as it is the focal 
point of governance.  Carver (1990a) suggests the CEO and board of directors 
should develop a governance partnership.  The CEO is appointed by the board 
and therefore accountable only to the board, (Taylor, 2007). 
 
Unity of direction   
Taylor (2007) refers to Fayol‟s (1949) original principles of management which 
observed that “the high performing organisation had only one board of 
governance, one chief executive and one strategic plan, mission or vision at any 
one time”.  Taylor considers it imperative that the CEO and the board should 
work in unison in the pursuit of a common goal with common motives, values 
and purposes and thereby achieve a strategic alignment. 
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Unity of command    
Existing research indicates that the decision-making process should flow 
vertically from the top to the bottom of an organisation.  This premise cautions 
that any violation thereof creates confusion, instability and anarchy in the long 
run, (Anderson, 1984). 
 
Unity of accountability/responsibility 
Anderson (1984) maintains that subordinates are responsible for their 
performance to their supervisors and vis-à-vis  themselves, (Taylor 2007).  This 
will improve performance as everyone is held accountable for the exercise of 
authority in executing his or her duties. 
 
Ownership needs 
A board of directors perform an oversight role in the interest of the owners of an 
organisation.  The board and its CEO need to identify their organisation‟s key 
stakeholders and communicate in a strategic fashion with their owner 
communities  to satisfy the new demands of governance, (Taylor, 2007). 
 
Self-improvement 
Board members should have expertise in business management, financial 
analysis and strategic planning  to perform optimally.  Competent members are 
quick students. 
 
Understanding the cost of governance 
Carver (1990b) lists cost involved in governance as  
 board members‟ opportunity cost 
 direct board meeting expense  
 the cost of staff supporting board activities 
 the cost associated with errors made by boards, and 
 the cost of ineffectively structured governance-management-organisation 
relationships. 
18 
 
 
 
An effective board will try to minimise these costs and avoid some of them 
altogether.  Carver (1990a) considers the cost of staff time spent in board 
support activities as the largest on-going cost of governance.  Taylor (2007) 
also discussed five generic benchmarks of excellence in governance in the 
realm of organisational governance. 
 
Clearly articulated mission and vision 
The boards and CEOs of top performing organisations understand and pursue 
their mission and core business activities as a unit.  This practice enables these 
organisations to evaluate their performance against the set objectives and 
goals. 
 
Achievement-oriented culture 
Well-governed organisations inculcate a culture that promotes and facilitates 
achievement, (Taylor, 2007).  This is facilitated by setting up quantifiable 
performance indicators for an effective CEO who then champions this 
achievement-oriented culture. 
 
Leadership partnership 
Arrington et al (1995) asserts that well governed organisations often have a 
strong CEO / board partnership that effectively communicates with all the 
stakeholders, (Taylor, 2007). 
 
Focus on improvement 
The boards of excellence continually assess and improve their governing 
processes  to achieve the performance goals. 
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Boards are a workable size 
Top performing boards usually comprise between seven and 15 members and 
tend to remain focused on the system and their role in it, (Taylor, 2007). 
 
2.2 Cadbury Report: Corporate Governance  
 
Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom (UK) experienced corporate 
collapses that reflected unethical conduct on the part of corporate management.  
These varied from simple theft of savers‟ funds by chief executives, to more 
complex cases of theft of over £1 billion in employee pension funds, (Boyd 
1996:168). According to Boyd, these corporate collapses together with payment 
of high salaries and bonuses to some corporate managers (often by financially 
distressed companies), necessitated mechanisms to deter and detect fraud in 
the business community.  Consequently, in May 1991, a Cadbury Committee 
was set up in response to the unethical scandals in business. The Cadbury 
Committee posited that the underlying cause of corporate ills in the UK was the 
“classic governance structure”, (Boyd 1996:170). It thus produced a Code of 
Best Practice embodying recommended practices for corporate governance.  
These are the main elements of the Cadbury Code recommendations: 
 
Separation of the Role of CEO and Chairperson - the Code advocates that 
the CEO and the board chairperson should have separate responsibilities and 
where the chairperson is the chief executive as well, the deputy chairperson 
should be independent of the company. 
 
Nomination of Directors - there should be a nomination committee that 
comprises of a majority of non-executive directors to nominate directors and 
make recommendations to the board. 
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The need for Outside Directors - the Code recommends that a board should 
comprise of at least three non-executive directors and create audit and 
remuneration committees that should include wholly or mainly non-executive 
directors. 
 
The Independence of Outside Directors - the majority of non-executive 
directors should be independent.  An independent director does not have 
shareholding in the company and / or business involvement with the company. 
 
Rotation of directors - executive directors cannot serve for more than three 
years without shareholders‟ approval.  
 
Pay and Bonuses - the board should annually disclose directors‟ remuneration, 
stock options, salaries and performance-bonuses separately. 
 
Nomination and independence of the Auditor - there is no prescribed 
process for appointing an external auditor.  The Code, however, requires that 
fees paid to auditors for non-audit work should be disclosed in the annual 
report. 
 
Flow of information to the Board - the board is responsible for the company‟s 
strategy. 
 
Expanding the Scope of auditing - the auditors should report on non-financial 
issues such as the effectiveness of the internal control system and compliance 
with the Cadbury Code.  (Source: Cadbury Report (UK), 1996) 
 
Boyd (1996:172) maintains that there was much discontent with the Code, as 
compliance therewith is voluntary.  The Cadbury committee does not favour 
legislation and external regulation, as it believes that shareholders as owners of 
these companies should enforce compliance.  The London Stock Exchange 
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however, requires listed firms to issue an annual statement of compliance with 
the Cadbury Code.  Though the large outcry was against a lack of code‟s 
enforcement, the potential of imprisonment did not deter corporate managers 
from committing fraud.  The Code detractors question the effectiveness of 
structural mechanisms advocated by the Cadbury Code in “...preventing future 
abuses of corporate power by an intimidating corporate boss”, Boyd (1996:173).  
Boyd continues that the scandal at British Airways and the financial fiasco at the 
Queens Moat House in 1993 did little to convince these critics otherwise.  The 
Cadbury Committee recognizes the challenge of having a foolproof system.  
The other criticism of the Code was its failure to make a distinction between 
large and small listed firms, as the latter could find it a costly exercise to comply 
with the Code, which might deter some from listing.  The Code was also 
criticised for focusing only on financial aspects of corporate governance.  The 
Code merely mentions the importance of companies to develop a code of ethics 
and fails to discuss non-financial aspects of corporate governance.  
 
2.3 The King III Code 
 
The dawning of the new dispensation in South Africa was preceded by major 
social and political transformation, (Naidoo, 2002:10).  According to Naidoo, the 
Institute of Directors of Southern Africa led the formation of the King Committee, 
which was - amongst others - tasked with the investigation of good practice 
concerning the responsibilities of directors and auditors, financial reporting and 
accountability of companies in South Africa.  This resulted in the creation of the 
standards of governance (King I & II Codes in 1994 and 2002 respectively) 
which applied to Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies and 
other defined entities.  These companies were required to disclose in their 
financial statements whether they complied with the Code and explain any 
areas of non-compliance.  The King II Code encouraged companies to go 
beyond reporting on financial performance, by considering social, health, ethical 
and environmental issues - ”triple bottom line reporting”.  This requirement is in 
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line with the corporate governance literature that implored companies to 
consider the impact of their activities and decisions on society and the 
environment. The King II Code revised the King I recommendations and 
became effective from 1 March 2002, replacing the earlier report, (Naidoo, 
2002). 
 
The Code‟s fundamental principles included fairness, transparency, 
responsibility and accountability, which are universally applicable.  The King III 
Code which supersedes the earlier codes (King I & II respectively), was 
released in 2009 as a consequence of the new Companies Act no.71 of 2008 
and new developments in the international governance realm, (Institute of 
Directors, 2009).  The Institute of Directors points out the primary focus of King 
III as integrated reporting, which encompasses the following: the impact of the 
company operations (both positive and negative) on the community it serves 
during the current year and how it “intends to enhance those positive aspects 
and eradicate or ameliorate the negative aspects in the year ahead”.  The 
philosophy of the code comprises leadership, sustainability and corporate 
citizenship as cornerstones.   
 
The Code maintains the following: 
 
 Good governance requires effective leadership; such leadership should have 
morals and ethical values (responsibility, accountability, fairness and 
transparency). 
 Sustainability - companies and directors should consider the impact of their 
decisions and operations on the community and environment. 
 Corporate citizenship - a company is a legal persona and should operate in 
a sustainable manner, (Institute of Directors, 2009). 
 
The King III Report cites a number of international developments that 
underscore the growing significance of sustainability issues:   
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 The United Nation‟s Global Compact and the Principles for Responsible 
Investment. 
 The German Commercial Code stipulates that companies should 
demonstrate that it integrates corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
company activities. 
 The Swedish and Norwegian governments require companies to disclose 
sustainability issues in line with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 
Guidelines. 
 In 2008, the United Kingdom included CSR in its Companies Act, to raise the 
importance of ethical, social and environmental issues. 
 
In 2008, the South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
developed a long-term mitigation scenario about climate change. 
 
The King III Code incorporates alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as an 
important element of good governance to preserve business relationships, 
(Institute of Directors, 2009).  The Institute of Directors promotes mediation and 
if it fails, advocates expedited arbitration when a dispute arises.   
 
2.4 Governance of universities 
 
In South Africa, universities are established in terms of section 20 of the Higher 
Education Act 1997 (as amended) as public institutions tasked primarily with 
providing higher education.  This means that these institutions are not revenue 
driven, but are expected to largely contribute to social welfare and general 
national economic development.  However, the contemporary university is 
confronted with a number of new challenges such as economic and political 
pressures, which threaten its sustainability.  Dwindling state funding forced 
academic institutions worldwide to seek alternative financial sources to augment 
their financial resources.  These institutions are implored to generate income 
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from the private sector and thereby reduce their financial dependency on the 
state, (Henkel, 2007:92). 
 
Universities now vigorously pursue strategic partnerships with the private sector 
in research, teaching and training to derive financial sustainability.  Such 
relationships often require delicate management as the parties thereto 
inherently differ in purpose.  Consequently, academic institutions need fancy 
footwork to strike a balance between achieving financial stability and their 
primary purpose of teaching, research and public service.  This revenue driven 
and market responsive approach seems to lend credence to suggestions that a 
university should be managed in a similar way to a business.  The rationale is 
that old forms of governance are ineffective and inefficient.  In Australia, the 
White Paper (Dawkins, 1988) characterised the „old‟ governance forms as 
obsolete and advocated the efficient and effective corporate model, (Harman 
and Treadgold, 2007:14). 
 
These suggestions, however, should be considered in the light of ubiquitous 
public dissatisfaction and lack of trust in corporations.  The public around the 
world has attributed recent corporate failures to poor governance practices and 
demands change in the conduct of corporations.  Furthermore, there are 
concerns that the business model could relegate basic academic decisions to 
lower levels and put focus on revenue generation and market criteria - a 
phenomenon termed academic capitalism (Toma, 2007).  The researcher 
therefore explored the arguments and counter arguments for the corporate 
model against the notion of traditional academic governance.  This involved a 
discussion of factors advanced in existing literature that could help academic 
institutions survive the new challenges.   
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2.4.1 Academic institutions 
 
An academic institution was traditionally accorded rights of self-governance and 
non-intervention in its knowledge development and transmission, (Henkel, 
2007).  This academic autonomy comprised individual academic autonomy and 
institutional self-governance.  Henkel quotes Berdahl (1999) in that an individual 
scholar is “… free in his/her teaching and research to pursue truth wherever it 
seems to lead without fear of sanction.”  This freedom therefore, protected 
scholars from possible sanctioning by sectarian, political, or economic interests, 
(Henkel, 2007).  This autonomy emanated from the value attached to 
knowledge produced and advanced.  
 
In South Africa, there was no standard form of governance in the higher 
education prior to the new political dispensation in 1994, (Ncayiyana and 
Hayward, 1999).  The apartheid rule afforded white institutions substantial 
autonomy with much power vested in the vice chancellor.  Governance was 
largely based on the British model, featuring governing boards (the Councils) 
that comprised members from the state and community, (Ncayiyana and 
Hayward, 1999).  Faculty, administration and broader university community 
were not represented in the Council and thus not part of decision-making.  In 
contrast, the government controlled black academic institutions to restrict black 
education as engendered by the apartheid rule.  This subsequently proved to be 
problematic as it led to continual student and staff uprising, Ncayiyana and 
Hayward (1999).  
 
Toma (2007) contends that in the US higher education, academic autonomy is 
not absolute but relative, as institutions need to balance autonomy with public 
accountability.  US academic institutions have a shared governance tradition, 
which features multiple level decision making.  Faculties deal with academic 
decisions while administration performs daily management activities, leaving 
accountability and stewardship to the governing board, (Duderstadt, 2009:140).  
Faculty governance entails authority within the academic unit, (a department, 
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school or college level where the chair of the department or dean exercises 
authority) and the university-wide faculty governance that deals with institution-
wide debates, e.g. the advisory role of the senate, (Duderstadt, 2009).  
 
Shared governance caused clashes between faculty and corporate cultures, 
which manifested in competition for power among the three key groups at the 
university - the trustees, administration and faculties, (Toma, 2007).  Other 
authors contend that shared governance impairs flexibility within institutions and 
stifles rapid decision-making, (Toma, 2007).  The cause of disagreement is the 
reliance of shared governance on broad consultation and consensus decision-
making.  This is one feature that many commentators blame for the inability of 
universities to cope with the fast-paced changes in their environments.  
 
The late twentieth century presented academic institutions with a plethora of 
changes in their external environment.  These included, amongst others, 
globalisation, knowledge economy, technology, expansions in tertiary 
education, and intrusion of market forces into the sector as the institution faces 
new challenges.  South African universities also had to contend with socio-
economic transformation issues with the new democratic dispensation.  The 
universities have to increase access by previously disadvantaged groups as 
enshrined in the new South African constitution.  There are complaints that 
weaknesses in the current governance structures  - faculties tend to waste time, 
guard turf or lack managerial expertise - render these institutions incapable to 
adapt, (Burgan, 2004).  Consequently, there are suggestions that the 
governance of higher education should be revamped  to manage the interplay 
with these external factors.   
 
As mentioned earlier on, a contemporary university needs to seek out new 
sources of funding, respond to increased competition and cater for various 
students, to remain sustainable.  In the same way, universities are embedded in 
community; any decision taken, will affect the broader community that the 
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institution serves. It then follows that a university should adopt a customer-
oriented approach in its outlook, (Duderstadt, 2009).  This complex situation 
resembles what corporations deal with all the time to remain sustainable.  The 
danger of business-like universities is the tendency to have decreased faculty 
roles and increased reliance on rational management which results in distrust 
and dysfunction, (Toma, 2007).  This effect ensues from so-called “academic 
capitalism” which downplays the significance of core academic activities.  
 
In business, key decisions are made as and when necessary to respond to 
market forces, whether to grab new opportunities or meet customer needs.  The 
essence of traditional academic governance, which protects individual freedom 
and promotes broader participation in decision-making, could be hindering 
universities to cope with fast-paced and profound changes affecting higher 
education, (Duderstadt, 2009). It is suggested that those charged with 
accountability and stewardship of the university should be taken to task for their 
decisions, (Duderstadt, 2009).    
 
Duderstadt (2009) shares Collis‟ (2009) sentiments that faculty members tend to 
be individualistic in their outlook and thereby cripple university-wide 
governance.  They mention that faculty members may not commit to broad 
institutional goals that are not in harmony with personal ambitions.  The conflict 
of interest of the role players in academic governance deals shared governance 
a hard blow.  This problem is exacerbated by academic freedom and tenure, 
which insulate faculty members from possible recourse for their actions.  
Duderstadt (2009) believes that faculty members are not conversant with 
externalities such as economic, social and technological forces beyond the 
campus.  The opposing view maintains that faculty members should spend their 
time productively on teaching and research, rather than play an advisory role to 
the administration and governing board.   
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The information era brought along new changes, that increases complexity in 
higher education, (Collis, 2006).  Student composition changed due to 
increased adult education and reduced full-time enrolment.  Corporate training 
conducted outside universities expanded as well.  The use of computers in 
higher education attracted new personnel such as PC technicians.  On-line 
education revolutionised the way of teaching courses.  The above factors 
dramatically influenced traditional core activities, pushing universities to extend 
their horizons and thereby, perform non-traditional activities, (Collis, 2006).  
Consequently, the sources of revenue had to be diversified to meet the new 
demands, requiring complex management.  For instance, the research and 
development funds brought in increased involvement of the private sector, 
which often imposes to universities the research agendas they will support, 
(Henkel, 2007).   
 
The Carnegie Commission (1973) defined governance in tertiary education as 
“the structure and processes of decision making”, Collis (2009).  It therefore, 
does not pertain to daily management or administrative activities of the 
institution.  Collis (2009) lists a number of responsibilities that according to the 
Carnegie Commission Report - the governing board should perform: 
 
 To safeguard, or hold in “trust”, the institution‟s mission and long run welfare. 
 To buffer the university from its external constituencies. 
 To oversee fiscal integrity and financial solvency. 
 To stand as final arbiter of internal disputes among stakeholders. 
 To act as an “agent of change” by enunciating major policy standards and 
long-range plans. 
 To select, monitor and review the president and the overall administrative 
structure of the institution.    
 
In an effort to show problems in academic governance, Collis (2009) enunciated 
five reasons that contrast with the private sector:   
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 The primary purpose of an academic institution includes teaching, 
research and public service.  There is no single predominant goal - unlike 
the private sector where creating wealth for shareholders, directs a firm 
behaviour, (Collis, 2009). 
 It is hard to appraise the performance of a university, as there is no output 
measure.  In the absence of a quantitative measure, it becomes hard for 
those charged with the governance of an academic institution to assess its 
performance.   
 The governing bodies of these institutions comprise various constituencies 
(faculty, administration, students, alumni, public funders, communities, 
etc.) with diverse agendas and diverse interests.  This goal divergence 
tends to impede decision-making.  This mirrors the notion of problematic 
cultural differences raised by detractors of shared governance. 
 Each constituency has veto power, in that it can choose not to implement 
the governing body‟s agenda.  This would create serious problems for a 
governing body that seeks to reach unanimous decisions. 
 
Unlike the private sector, universities have no hierarchical control, resulting in 
difficulties implementing a governing body‟s directives.  Administrators have no 
recourse against a faculty who may object to policies set by the governing body.  
Yet, all employees in the private sector are subject to employment contracts, 
which oblige them to respect policies or values of the firm, (Collis, 2009).   
 
In this study project, the above factors are considered as structural differences 
between public and private institutions‟ governance, rather than deficiencies in 
academic governance.  These do not begin to justify the calls for universities to 
be managed as businesses.  Collis (2009) believes that the arguments are 
generally applicable to all institutions though specific deficiencies may vary 
among countries.  Academic institutions, as all other organisations (whether 
public or private) are confronted with a dynamic external environment, which 
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requires effective and swift responses.  The intrusion of market forces on the 
higher education sector and increased competition, mean that it cannot be 
business as usual in these institutions.  
 
This study then proceeded to deal with suggestions advanced in existing 
literature to improve academic governance.  The suggestions, likely to intensify 
on-going debate in academic governance, should help ameliorate areas of 
weaknesses while preserving important academic traditions and values, 
(Duderstadt, 2009).       
 
Universities should move swiftly in adapting to the rapidly changing societal 
needs.  They must have small governing boards (more or less 12 members), 
which comprise outsiders with diverse skills and not just business people and 
be encouraged to independently set an agenda, (Toma, 2007).  In support, 
Duderstadt (2009) calls for members that possess the necessary expertise and 
experience, with a primary focus on the institution‟s interest and the community 
it serves.  The members should have expertise in areas such as business 
practice, finance or legal matters and be held liable for their decisions or 
university performance.  One could argue that similar fashioned governing 
boards could not save corporations such as Enron and Health and Racquet.  
Dreier (2005) responds that governing boards should embrace the principles of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation written in response to the corporate failures, 
(Toma, 2007).   
 
In 1995, the US Association of Governing Boards of universities and colleges 
(AGB), made a number of recommendations to address the quality and 
effectiveness of governing boards, (Duderstadt, 2009).  The AGB recommended 
that a governing board should comprise at least 15 members who have 
verifiable experience with large organisations in finance, social and political 
spheres.  It would be desirable that they have experience or show interest in 
higher education.  The AGB noted that board service should be limited to a 
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single term to pre-empt campaigning for future appointment, (Duderstadt, 2009).  
Collis (2009) believes that a governing board should have freedom to set its 
agenda and determine the strategic direction as it is entrusted with the 
accountability and stewardship of the university.    
 
Duderstadt (2009) suggests that a faculty should be provided with executive 
rather than merely advisory authority to encourage active participation of 
leading faculty members in university service.  Effective faculty governance will 
resolve the lack of alignment between administration and faculty interests.  
Duderstadt believes that such authority will develop a sense of institutional 
loyalty and service in the faculty.  The traditional culture of consensus decision-
making should be changed as it hinders universities in responding to fast-paced 
changes confronting academic governance.  Faculties should not get involved in 
areas where their competence is not sought though, cautions Duderstadt 
(2009).  In the same vein, academic leaders should have authority to take 
actions whether at departmental chair or senate level.  It is emphasised that 
authority commensurate with its responsibilities, brings about effective 
leadership. 
 
The factors between the private sector and universities (public institutions), 
listed by Collis (2009), signal the fundamental differences between the two and 
if anything, raise questions about the suggestions to run higher education as a 
business.  One of the basic tenets of corporate governance is to minimise the 
agency problem, the divergence of interests between the principal 
(shareholders) and the agent (managers).  Corporate boards are required to 
comprise independent and non-executive directors to govern effectively.  Collis 
(2009) maintains that this is already the case in higher education as trustees are 
mainly outsiders.  The Carnegie Commission (1973) went further and 
discouraged the faculty and students from serving on the governing board to 
avoid gravitation toward their interests. 
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Corporate governance codes such as the Cadbury report and the King III Code 
on corporate governance, recommend that the roles of chairperson of the board 
and the CEO should be separated.  The higher education sector is ahead here, 
as the governing board appoints the CEO and, does not serve on the board, 
Collis (2009).  In the private sector, the remuneration of managers is often 
linked with the performance of an organisation (say, market share price) to 
synchronise their goals with organisational objectives.  This would be very hard 
to achieve in higher education, as universities lack a quantitative measure of 
output to reward.  Higher education should learn from the private sector in this 
regard so that academic core activities and values permeate every sphere of 
university governance.     
 
In the discussion, the researcher dealt with the concept of corporate 
governance regarding its origin, development and the need for corporations to 
adopt the system.  Finally, a summary of its principles as put forward by existing 
literature was given.  The history of corporations dealing with the formation of a 
Berle-Means corporation first in the US during the industrial revolution and then 
in the UK during the late twentieth century was discussed to explain the origin of 
corporate governance.  Then, the discussion on agency theory explained the 
need for the alignment of owners and management interests.  Various events in 
the US such as stock market crashes, corporate failures, institutional investor 
vigilance and legal and regulatory framework all influenced the evolution of the 
concept of corporate governance.  The stakeholder theory was briefly touched 
on,  to discuss the importance of extending corporate governance beyond the 
financial focus and compliance with practice codes, by integrating corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities.  The researcher also dealt with the 
principles contained in the Cadbury report and the King III Code, as the two 
codes set a framework for corporate governance systems in these countries. 
 
What emanates from the discussion above is that the contemporary university 
faces a wholesale of challenges presented by the information era.  The ability to 
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adapt quickly could lead to sustainability of these institutions.  The new spate of 
challenges elicited calls to improve academic governance.  The debate that 
ensued is characterised by suggestions of corporate forms of management in 
academic institutions.  It is imperative though, that those areas of weaknesses 
in academic governance, should be identified and measures developed to 
ameliorate these and lastly, to also consolidate compliance with the King Code.  
Universities might benefit from adopting good governance practices from the 
private sector in the quest to improve their governance.  Recent corporate 
failures indicated problems in the way corporations are run.  This implies that 
blindfold implementation of the corporate model of governance in academic 
institutions could have unintended effects.  Collis (2009) stretches this notion by 
suggesting that governance is not the issue here, rather institutional strategy.  A 
proper strategic fit brings about effective governance.  In the light of stiff 
competition, universities should differentiate their offerings and thereby focus on 
specific consumer needs.  This will result in a wide variety of high-quality 
options available for society. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 Research design and methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 1 the researcher examined the origin and philosophy of corporate 
governance by discussing the agency theory,  an examination of the corporate 
form of business through a brief exploration of the origin of corporates in two 
developed economies, namely England and the USA.  The researcher also 
investigated academic governance in an attempt to establish whether there is a 
case in calling for universities to adopt corporate forms of governance.  This 
chapter discusses the research methodology employed to achieve the 
objectives of the study. 
 
3.2 Research design  
 
The study sought to investigate whether the Unisa Council complied with the 
principles of corporate governance as set out in the King III Code on corporate 
governance.  The researcher employed a case study research methodology and 
used a checklist to gather empirical evidence regarding the Unisa Council‟s 
performance and activities during the year ended 31 December 2009.  This 
method was appropriate as it enabled the researcher to understand governance 
at Unisa and it determined performance or non-performance of recommended 
practices.  
 
Case study research comes in handy when one undertakes an in-depth inquiry 
of an area of interest, (Noor, 2008:1602).  The researcher collected data from 
university documents such as the Annual report (2009), Corporate Governance 
Manual and Strategic Plan (2009) - secondary data to answer research 
questions. 
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3.3  Case study 
A case study is described as qualitative research that examines intensely, a 
particular participant or small group and drawing conclusions only about that 
participant or group <www.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm>. Yin 
(1994) contends that case studies are typically used:  
 
 To answer questions such as “how” or “why”, 
 when the researcher has little control over the events, and 
 there is a contemporary focus within a real life context 
 
In contrast to quantitative methods, a case study is not concerned with central 
tendency and therefore incapable of providing a generalised conclusion, (Tellis, 
1997). Yin (1994) rejected such criticism from the case study detractors, by 
emphasising that a case needs to meet its established objective. He continued 
that a case study achieves the three tenets of qualitative research namely, 
describing, understanding and explaining. 
 
Case studies can have single or multiple-case designs. As multiple cases 
replicate the pattern-matching, results are strengthened and thereby consolidate 
the robustness of the theory, Tellis (1997). Yin (1994) explained that regardless 
of the case study design employed, generalisation of results should be theory-
related and not statistical. According to Tellis, case study methodology was 
employed to investigate the effects of community-based prevention 
programmes. These studies explained the conditions through the eyes of the 
“actors” far beyond the quantitative statistical results.  
 
The basic tenet of case studies is a focus on a holistic understanding of 
activities of actors in a social situation and should therefore always have 
boundaries. Tellis (1997) states that all major case study researchers including 
Yin, Stake, Feagin, alluded to the fact that case study research is not a 
sampling research and consequently researchers should be driven by what can 
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be learned in the study when selecting cases, Yin (1994). The unit of analysis is 
thus fundamental in the case study. While the case represents the interest topic 
in the study, a unit of analysis is the actual source of information whether an 
individual, organisational document or an artefact, (Yin, 1994). Use of multiple 
sources of data ensures triangulation (accuracy and alternative explanations). 
Yin explains that triangulation confirms the validity of processes. 
 
Case study researchers can choose to use one or several methods to collect 
data - single or multi-modal methods. For instance, Tellis (1997) quoted a study 
carried out on a first year graduate student‟s initiation into an academic writing 
programme. The researchers observed the subject and collected linguistic data  
to evaluate the student‟s performance. There are - according to Tellis - six types 
of data collected in case studies; documents; archival records; interviews; direct 
observation; participant observation and artefacts. Use of multiple sources of 
data could render a case study more convincing and accurate. Cross-checking 
data from different sources involves increased analysis, verifying and confirming 
such data www.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm. 
 
Yin (1994) presented two general analytic strategies; namely theoretical 
propositions and case description. The former analyses the evidence based on 
such propositions, while case description organises the case study in terms of 
the general characteristics and relations of the case in question, Tellis (1997) 
Researchers are advised to employ an analytic technique as part of the general 
analytic strategy: 
 
 Pattern matching – involves comparing an empirical pattern with a 
predicted one and when the patterns coincide, internal validity is 
increased. Note that the predicted pattern must be defined prior to data 
collection in the case of a descriptive study. For an explanatory study, 
patterns may be traced to the dependent or independent variables. 
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 Explanatory building – a researcher uses case study data to build an 
explanation of the case and identify causal links. 
 Time analysis – identifying a theoretical trend of an event prior to the 
investigation and thereafter compare this trend with the trend of empirical 
data points. 
 
Yin (1994) put forward four principles that will ensure high quality analysis: 
 
 Show that the analysis relied on all the relevant evidence. 
 Include all major rival interpretations in the analysis. 
 Address the most significant aspect of the case study. 
 Use the researcher‟s prior, expert knowledge to further the analysis. 
 
3.4 Research Instrument 
 
The researcher employed a checklist, to gather evidence of Council 
performance and activity compliance with principles of good corporate 
governance, in line with the King III Report.  The checklist comprised all the 
principles of good governance and recommended practices, as set out in the 
King III Code.  The checklist was compiled after reviewing the existing literature 
on good practices in corporate, to ensure significant issues were not left out.  
The literature effectively provided a theoretical framework to assess whether the 
Council applied the King III Code principles.  The checklist therefore, included 
all the principles in the Code, to have a holistic approach.  The Institute of 
Directors (2009) maintains that all the principles have equal significance and 
together as a unit, provide a holistic approach to governance.   
 
The researcher employed desktop research to provide answers to the checklist.  
Published reports such as the Annual Report, Strategic Plan document and 
Corporate Governance Framework Manual were used to seek verifiable, reliable 
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and accurate information, which is open for public consumption.  The data used, 
was clearly not the researcher‟s views, but rather his interpretation of published 
information regarding compliance with the King III Code.  
 
A checklist is an information aid tool, which ensures consistency and 
completeness when performing a task.  It can simply be a to do list or a 
schedule outlining tasks to be performed according to a reference such as time 
or other factors.  A checklist is often used in the industry to check process 
compliance, code standardisation and error prevention, among others, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics>.   
 
This study sought to determine whether the Unisa Council complied with the 
principles of good governance as recommended in the King III Code on 
corporate governance.  It then undertook a comparative analysis of Unisa 
Council‟s performance and activities with those of the University of KwaZulu-
Natal (UKZN) to determine whether another South African university embraced 
corporate governance as well.  UKZN, though not a comprehensive open 
distance learning (ODL) institution, runs certain distance learning programmes 
and aspires “to be the premier university of African scholarship”, (Source: 
Strategic Plan, 2007-2016).  Unisa is a comprehensive distance education 
institution that aspires to be “… the African university in the service of 
humanity,” (Source: Strategic Plan 2015).    
 
Purposive sampling allows cases to be selected for specific purposes – 
because they have particular characteristics, Patton (1990).  It is described as 
non-probability sampling which entails judgment and targets a particular group 
of people.  Purposive sampling is easy to undertake and often used in 
qualitative research.  The disadvantage is its potential for inaccuracy in the 
researcher‟s criteria and resulting sample selections.  Purposive sampling is 
popular with marketing researchers as it typically starts with a purpose in mind 
and subsequently only people of interest are targeted, Patton (1990).  
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3.5 Data analysis 
 
Raw data was examined to find linkages between what the Unisa Council was 
or was not doing regarding the recommendations of the King III Code and 
pinpoint the outcomes in relation to the research questions.  The researcher 
compared the data with individual practices recommended, to determine 
compliance with the principles of good governance.  Yin (1994) contends that 
internal validity is enhanced when the empirical pattern coincides with the 
predicted one.  
 
The Council complied with the Code if the recommended practices of a principle 
as recommended in the Code, were significantly performed.  Compliance or 
non- compliance with a principle, was a function of percentage performance of 
the respective recommended practices.  
 
Partial performance was not regarded as compliance and recorded where 
material aspects of the practice were not performed. Partial performance 
recognised the institution‟s plans or existing measures to adhere to a principle.  
However, where a principle did not apply to the university based on its form of 
establishment and consequently not applied, this was not judged as non-
compliance.  It was also not considered when collating the number of 
performances for aggregation.   
 
Finally, compliance with a principle was determined regarding percentage 
performance (the number of recommended practices performed relative to the 
total number of recommendations).  Compliance with the Code was determined 
by the number of principles adhered to, in relation to the total number of the 
principles as per the Code.  The Institute of Directors (2009) maintains; “each 
principle is of equal importance and together forms a holistic approach to 
governance”.  
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3.6 The checklist questions  
3.5.1 Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
Socrates, a Greek philosopher, maintained that “(t)he truly wise man will know 
what is right, do what is good, and therefore be happy”, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics>.  He posited that people would 
automatically do what is good if they have the knowledge of what is right.  
Agents calling for change in corporations, regarded gross lack of morals on the 
part of corporate management as the major cause for corporate failure.  It was 
argued that corporate structures were not at fault, but the values and behaviour 
of the individuals operating within them, (Goedegebuure & Hayden (2007).  
Schemes such as off-balance sheet debt, capitalisation of corporate expenses, 
millionaire severance packages for executives and disposal of stock at peak 
value immediately before their sharp decline, marked corporate scandals such 
as Enron, WorldCom, Inc. and K-Mart in the USA, (Grant, 2003).  
 
Many researchers therefore implored organisations to integrate ethics in 
corporate culture, values and decision-making.  Young and Thyil (2008) believe 
a holistic, that incorporates behavioural and multi-disciplinary perspectives, 
could help restore the moral fibre in the corporate world.  The behaviour of 
corporate management mentioned above, is described by Aristotle‟s virtuous 
ethics as the conflict of interest that typify human condition, Dawson, 2005:59).  
Aristotle promoted moderate virtue where “…virtue denotes doing the right 
thing, to the right person, at the right time, to the proper extent, in the correct 
fashion, for the right reason‟, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics>.  Virtuous 
traits would therefore guide managers to pursue appropriately balanced action 
in such circumstances.  According to Dawson (2005), virtues include respect, 
trust, fairness, tolerance, loyalty, courage, honesty and integrity.  Dawson 
(2005), applying virtuous ethics in his work on business ethics and work ethic, 
posits that businesses need to value quality human relationships to create 
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ethical behaviour.  He quotes Hegel (1967)‟s ethical theory in that ethical 
behaviour ensues from a culture that marries the goals of management and 
workers.  This results in ethical business outcomes and good relationships 
between all stakeholders.  Empowering workers, by allowing them freedom of 
creativity in their activities, results in self-actualization.   
 
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Council Corporate Governance Council 
(2003) also recommends that corporations and directors should develop and 
promote standards that guide ethical and responsible decision-making, (Young 
and Thyil, 2008).  Businesses operate in society and as a result are urged to 
contribute positively to society.  Existing literature suggest that corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) should be integrated in a firm‟s overall strategy and include 
social and environmental issues.  Organisations should harmonise business 
and society interests, because business and society prosperity are interlinked; 
“doing well” connects with “doing good”, (Darigan and Post, 2009:42).   
The researcher considers an ethical leadership as essential in inculcating a 
culture of ethics in an organisation.  In addition, leaders need to dig deep in their 
moral values to consider the value in bridging the gap between business and 
society.  This basis therefore, informs the testing of compliance with the 
principle of ethical leadership and corporate citizenship. 
3.5.2 Boards and directors 
The need to manage the agency problem brought about the theory of corporate 
governance.  The primary focus of corporate governance is the alignment of 
management and shareholder interest.  A board of directors therefore, performs 
an oversight role in the interest of an organisation‟s owners.  The board is 
consequently the supreme body charged with responsibility and governance of 
the overall operation, (Taylor, 2000).  Taylor, in summarising the literature of 
corporate governance, lists the following as a board‟s responsibilities: 
 Developing corporate policies and plans. 
42 
 
 
 Monitoring and measuring organisational performance against those policies 
and plans. 
 Acting as a voice of the ownership of an organisation. 
 
The researcher considered these three responsibilities important to test 
compliance with the above second principle in the King III Code: the role and 
function of the board and directors.  The test dealt with the responsibility 
and accountability of the board. 
 
3.5.3 Audit committees 
In response to US stock market crashes, institutional investors pressured 
companies to protect their interest and put forward the following corporate 
governance measures: corporate boards should comprise of independent 
members, annual appraisal of board performance and regular board meetings, 
(Grant, 2003).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) stipulates that auditors should 
report directly to the audit committee.  The objective is to make companies 
produce accurate financial statements and impose penalties for board 
misconduct.  It is clear that the audit board committee has an oversight role over 
the corporate audit function.  The audit committee is an important one, as it 
seeks to ensure the integrity of information (both financial and non-financial) 
provided to stakeholders.  Hence, the determination of whether the audit 
committee performs its oversight role effectively. 
 
3.5.4 The governance of risk 
Corporate governance literature maintains that the board should develop a 
strategic plan, to achieve organisational performance objectives.  Management 
experts suggest that organisations need to identify, monitor and effectively 
manage all the risks pertaining to their businesses in long-term planning.  Since 
forward-looking is often hindered by uncertainty, the management of risk 
becomes crucial.  As the body charged with governance of an entity, the board 
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is responsible for governance of risk.  The researcher considered the 
effectiveness of risk governance principle, as vital. 
 
3.5.5 The governance of information technology 
Corporations operate in an information era where information technology (IT) is 
essential in deriving a competitive edge.  Companies have made huge 
investments in IT, which require effective management to sustain these entities.  
It is therefore, a business imperative that there is effective IT governance to 
achieve organisational objectives.  As the board is responsible and accountable 
for the overall operation, the King III Code recommends that the board is 
responsible for IT governance.  The testing of compliance with effective IT 
governance is therefore logical. 
 
3.5.6 Compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards 
Corporations are legislated as legal persona, separate from their owners and 
managers.  Grant (2003) maintains that, as companies grow, they generate 
profits to sustain themselves and thereby become legal owners of capital 
assets, entrusted to managers.  Corporations therefore, should comply with the 
legal and regulatory framework.  It is the duty of those charged with governance 
of the entity, to ensure such compliance.  As a result, the researcher included 
this principle in testing whether Unisa Council complies with the King III 
Code. 
 
3.5.7 Internal audit (IA) 
According to corporate governance theory, the board of directors serve to 
reduce the agency problem.  Friedman (1970) argued that business should be 
conducted according to the owners‟ desires.  Internal audit (IA) is one of the 
tools recommended by corporate governance theory to achieve this role.  As the 
audit committee is responsible for all assurance activities, the IA falls within its 
ambit.  It is therefore, important that an entity establish the internal audit 
function: Is there an effective IA function at Unisa. 
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3.5.8 Governing stakeholder relationships 
It is often suggested that managers focus on maximising shareholders‟ wealth 
at the expense of other stakeholders and the environment.  There are other 
parties affected by corporate activity with or without financial interest in the 
company.  The theory of corporate governance, recommends that these 
stakeholders must be considered in decision-making, (Mason et al, 2007).  The 
board of directors and managers are urged to communicate openly and 
honestly with the stakeholders and should be allowed to pursue stakeholders‟ 
interest effectively.  It is therefore, important to determine whether the Unisa 
Council manages relationships with stakeholder groups effectively.  
 
3.5.9 Integrated reporting and disclosure 
Sustainability issues are receiving increased attention around the world, as 
evidenced by various countries such as Germany, Sweden and Norway; 
requiring companies to disclose these issues in accordance to the Global 
reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 guidelines, (Institute of Directors, 2009).  The GRI 
provides a framework that can be used by companies to measure and report 
their economic, environmental and social performance, (GRI, 2006).  The 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) principles on environment, recommend 
the following:   
 Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges. 
 Businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental 
responsibility. 
 Businesses should encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies.  
(Source: Unisa Annual Report, 2009) 
Did Unisa council produce an annual sustainability report (Triple-bottom 
reporting)?   
  
45 
 
 
3.7 Limitations 
The use of secondary data meant that the study could not obtain the views of 
Council members regarding compliance of council decision-making and 
activities with the King III Code.  Although published reports on Unisa 
governance, represented communication by the Council, members‟ response 
would have provided invaluable information about their perspective of corporate 
governance in the institution.  In addition, the inability to obtain data from the 
internal sources at UKZN, limited the test of compliance somehow. Had the 
study included other stakeholders such as academic and non-academic staff, 
students and other interested parties, it could have benefitted from independent, 
yet relevant perspectives. The use of multiple sources of information (multi-
modal method) could have enhanced triangulation. 
  
The researcher discussed the research design and the methodology employed 
to solve the research problem.  The research design served as a conceptual 
framework and action plan that allowed conclusions to be linked to the research 
questions.  The checklist was developed based on good governance as 
advanced by existing literature and recommended corporate governance 
principles as set out in the King III Code.  Data representing the number of 
recommended practices performed by the Council and principles complied with, 
was presented and analysed in Chapter 3.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
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CHAPTER 4 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter three, the researcher discussed the research methodology and 
explained the research instrument.  In this chapter, the researcher presented 
the findings in terms of the research questions.  
 
The findings correspond to the King III Code and were presented in a tabulated 
form (Tables A and B), derived from a checklist (Annexure A and B).  The list 
showed whether the Unisa Council performed the recommended practices set 
out in the King III Code and thereby complied or did not, with the principles of 
good corporate governance, as per the Code.   
 
The table comprised six main columns: principles; a total number of 
recommended practices for each principle; percentage performance 
(number of practices performed / total number of practices).  The findings were 
then matched with each principle, to answer the research questions, as the 
questions were based on the main principles of the code.  
 
Compliance or non-compliance with the King III Code was considered in terms 
of the total number of principles complied with, with the principles viewed as a 
unit.  There were two sets of data, the Unisa set (Table A) and that of the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) (Table B) respectively. 
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4.2 Findings 
Table A: Unisa performance  
(Sources: Unisa Annual Report 2009; Unisa Strategic Plan 2015) 
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The board should provide effective leadership 
based on an ethical foundation. 
11 11 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that the company is and 
is seen to be a responsible corporate citizen. 
6 5 1 Yes No 
The board should ensure that the company's 
ethics are managed effectively 
8 7 1 Yes No 
The board should act as the focal point for and 
custodian of corporate governance 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should appreciate that strategy, risk, 
performance and sustainability are inseparable  
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board and its directors should act in the best 
interests of the company. 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should consider business rescue 
proceedings or other turnaround mechanisms as 
soon as the company is financially distressed as 
defined in the Act 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should elect a chairman of the board 
who is an independent non-executive director. 
The CEO of the company should not also fulfil the 
role of chairman of the board 
7 4 3 No No 
The board should appoint the chief executive 
officer and establish a framework for the 
delegation of authority 
5 5 0 Yes No 
The board should comprise a balance of power, 
with a majority of non-executive directors. The 
majority of non-executive directors should be 
independent 
9 9 0 Yes No 
Directors should be appointed through a formal 
process 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The induction of and ongoing training and 
development of directors should be conducted 
through formal processes 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should be assisted by a competent, 
suitably qualified and experienced company 
secretary 
13 13 0 Yes No 
The evaluation of the board, its committees and 
the individual directors should be performed every 
year 
5 4 1 Yes No 
The board should delegate certain functions to 9 9 0 Yes No 
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well-structured committees but without abdicating 
its own responsibilities 
Companies should remunerate directors and 
executives fairly and responsibly 
4 4 0 Yes No 
Companies should disclose the remuneration of 
each individual director and certain senior 
executives 
6 2 4 No Yes 
The board should ensure that the company has 
an effective and independent audit committee 
4 4 0 Yes No 
Audit committee members should be suitably 
skilled and experienced independent non-
executive directors 
7 7 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be chaired by an 
independent non-executive director 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should oversee integrated 
reporting 
7 2 5 No YeS 
The audit committee should ensure that a 
combined assurance model is applied to provide 
a coordinated approach to all assurance activities 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should satisfy itself of the 
expertise, resources and experience of the 
company‟s finance function 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be responsible for 
overseeing of internal audit 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be an integral 
component of the risk management process 
5 5 0 Yes No 
The audit committee is responsible for 
recommending the appointment of the external 
auditor and overseeing the external audit process 
6 6 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should report to the board 
and shareholders on how it has discharged its 
duties 
7 7 0 Yes No 
The board should be responsible for the 
governance of risk 
9 9 0 Yes No 
The board should determine the levels of risk 
tolerance 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The risk committee or audit committee should 
assist the board in carrying out its risk 
responsibilities 
6 6 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management the 
responsibility to design, implement and monitor 
the risk management plan 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that risk assessments 
are performed on a continual basis 
7 7 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that frameworks and 
methodologies are implemented to increase the 
probability of anticipating unpredictable risks 
1 1 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that management 
considers and implements appropriate risk 
responses 
2 1 1 No No 
The board should ensure continual risk monitoring 
by management 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should receive assurance regarding 
the effectiveness of the risk management process 
2 2 0 Yes No 
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The board should ensure that there are processes 
in place enabling complete, timely, relevant, 
accurate and accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders 
2 1 1 No No 
The board should be responsible for information 
technology (IT) governance 
5 5 0 Yes No 
IT should be aligned with the performance and 
sustainability objectives of the company 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management the 
responsibility for the implementation of an IT 
governance framework 
4 2 2 No No 
The board should monitor and evaluate significant 
IT investments and expenditure 
2 2 0 Yes No 
IT should form an integral part of the company‟s 
risk management 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that information assets 
are managed effectively 
4 4 0 Yes No 
A risk committee and audit committee should 
assist the board in carrying out its IT 
responsibilities 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that the company 
complies with applicable laws and considers 
adherence to non-binding rules, codes and 
standards 
8 8 0 Yes No 
The board and each individual director should 
have a working understanding of the effect of the 
applicable laws, rules, codes and standards on 
the company and its business 
2 2 0 Yes No 
Compliance risk should form an integral part of 
the company‟s risk management process 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management the 
implementation of an effective compliance 
framework and processes 
9 7 2 Yes No 
The board should ensure that there is an effective 
risk based internal audit 
7 7 0 Yes No 
Internal audit should follow a risk based approach 
to its plan 
5 5 0 Yes No 
Internal audit should provide a written 
assessment of the effectiveness of the company‟s 
system of internal controls and risk management 
6 6 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be responsible for 
overseeing internal audit 
7 6 1 Yes No 
Internal audit should be strategically positioned to 
achieve its objectives 
5 5 0 Yes No 
The board should appreciate that stakeholders‟ 
perceptions affect a company‟s reputation 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management to 
proactively deal with stakeholder relationships   
5 4 1 Yes No 
The board should strive to achieve the 
appropriate balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, in the best interests of the 
company 
1 1 0 Yes No 
Transparent and effective communication with 
stakeholders is essential for building and 
4 3 1 Yes No 
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maintaining their trust and confidence 
The board should ensure that disputes are 
resolved as effectively, efficiently and 
expeditiously as possible 
2 1 1 No No 
The board should ensure the integrity of the 
company‟s integrated report 
5 4 1 Yes No 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be 
integrated with the company‟s financial reporting 
4 3 1 Yes No 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be 
independently assured 
3 1 2 No Yes 
Aggregate (recommended practices)  289 260 29 0 0 
Total % Performance/non-performance 100 91 9 Yes:53 Yes:3 
    No:8 No:58 
Number of principles 61 100    
Compliance 53 87%    
Non-compliance 3 5%    
Neither compliance/non-compliance 5 8%    
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Table B: UKZN performance  
(Sources: UKZN Annual report 2009; UKZN Strategic Plan 2007 - 2016) 
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The board should provide effective 
leadership based on an ethical foundation. 
11 11 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that the company 
is and is seen to be a responsible corporate 
citizen. 
6 6 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that the company's 
ethics are managed effectively 
8 7 1 Yes No 
The board should act as the focal point for 
and custodian of corporate governance 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should appreciate that strategy, 
risk, performance and sustainability are 
inseparable  
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board and its directors should act in the 
best interests of the company. 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should consider business rescue 
proceedings or other turnaround 
mechanisms as soon as the company is 
financially distressed as defined in the Act 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should elect a chairman of the 
board who is an independent non-executive 
director. The CEO of the company should 
not also fulfil the role of chairman of the 
board 
7 4 3 No No 
The board should appoint the chief executive 
officer and establish a framework for the 
delegation of authority 
5 5 0 Yes No 
The board should comprise a balance of 
power, with a majority of non-executive 
directors. The majority of non-executive 
directors should be independent 
9 9 0 Yes No 
Directors should be appointed through a 
formal process 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The induction of and ongoing training and 
development of directors should be 
conducted through formal processes 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should be assisted by a 
competent, suitably qualified and 
experienced company secretary 
13 13 0 Yes No 
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The evaluation of the board, its committees 
and the individual directors should be 
performed every year 
5 4 1 Yes No 
The board should delegate certain functions 
to well-structured committees but without 
abdicating its own responsibilities 
9 9 0 Yes No 
Companies should remunerate directors and 
executives fairly and responsibly 
4 4 0 Yes No 
Companies should disclose the remuneration 
of each individual director and certain senior 
executives 
6 3 3 No No 
The board should ensure that the company 
has an effective and independent audit 
committee 
4 4 0 Yes No 
Audit committee members should be suitably 
skilled and experienced independent non-
executive directors 
7 7 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be chaired by an 
independent non-executive director 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should oversee 
integrated reporting 
7 2 5 No Yes 
The audit committee should ensure that a 
combined assurance model is applied to 
provide a coordinated approach to all 
assurance activities 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should satisfy itself of 
the expertise, resources and experience of 
the company‟s finance function 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be responsible 
for overseeing of internal audit 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be an integral 
component of the risk management process 
5 5 0 Yes No 
The audit committee is responsible for 
recommending the appointment of the 
external auditor and overseeing the external 
audit process 
6 6 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should report to the 
board and shareholders on how it has 
discharged its duties 
7 7 0 Yes No 
The board should be responsible for the 
governance of risk 
9 9 0 Yes No 
The board should determine the levels of risk 
tolerance 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The risk committee or audit committee 
should assist the board in carrying out its risk 
responsibilities 
6 6 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management 
the responsibility to design, implement and 
monitor the risk management plan 
3 3 0 Yes No 
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The board should ensure that risk 
assessments are performed on a continual 
basis 
7 7 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that frameworks 
and methodologies are implemented to 
increase the probability of anticipating 
unpredictable risks 
1 1 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that management 
considers and implements appropriate risk 
responses 
2 1 1 No No 
The board should ensure continual risk 
monitoring by management 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should receive assurance 
regarding the effectiveness of the risk 
management process 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that there are 
processes in place enabling complete, 
timely, relevant, accurate and accessible risk 
disclosure to stakeholders 
2 1 1 No No 
The board should be responsible for 
information technology (IT) governance 
5 5 0 Yes No 
IT should be aligned with the performance 
and sustainability objectives of the company 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management 
the responsibility for the implementation of 
an IT governance framework 
4 2 2 No No 
The board should monitor and evaluate 
significant IT investments and expenditure 
2 2 0 Yes No 
IT should form an integral part of the 
company‟s risk management 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that information 
assets are managed effectively 
4 4 0 Yes No 
A risk committee and audit committee should 
assist the board in carrying out its IT 
responsibilities 
4 4 0 Yes No 
The board should ensure that the company 
complies with applicable laws and considers 
adherence to non-binding rules, codes and 
standards 
8 8 0 Yes No 
The board and each individual director 
should have a working understanding of the 
effect of the applicable laws, rules, codes 
and standards on the company and its 
business 
2 2 0 Yes No 
Compliance risk should form an integral part 
of the company‟s risk management process 
2 2 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management 
the implementation of an effective 
compliance framework and processes 
9 8 1 Yes No 
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The board should ensure that there is an 
effective risk based internal audit 
7 7 0 Yes No 
Internal audit should follow a risk based 
approach to its plan 
5 5 0 Yes No 
Internal audit should provide a written 
assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company‟s system of internal controls and 
risk management 
6 6 0 Yes No 
The audit committee should be responsible 
for overseeing internal audit 
7 6 1 Yes No 
Internal audit should be strategically 
positioned to achieve its objectives 
5 5 0 Yes No 
The board should appreciate that 
stakeholders‟ perceptions affect a company‟s 
reputation 
3 3 0 Yes No 
The board should delegate to management 
to proactively deal with stakeholder 
relationships   
5 4 1 Yes No 
The board should strive to achieve the 
appropriate balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, in the best interests 
of the company 
1 1 0 Yes No 
Transparent and effective communication 
with stakeholders is essential for building 
and maintaining their trust and confidence 
4 3 1 Yes No 
The board should ensure that disputes are 
resolved as effectively, efficiently and 
expeditiously as possible 
2 1 1 No No 
The board should ensure the integrity of the 
company‟s integrated report 
5 4 1 Yes No 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure 
should be integrated with the company‟s 
financial reporting 
4 3 1 Yes No 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure 
should be independently assured 
3 1 2 No Yes 
Aggregate (recommended practices)  289 263 26 Yes:53 Yes:2 
Total % Performance/non-performance 100 91 9 No:8 No:59 
      
% Performance 100% 91% 9% No:8 No:59 
      
Number of principles 61 100    
Compliance 53 87%    
Non-compliance 2 3%    
Neither compliance/non-compliance 6 10%    
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4.3 Discussion of the findings 
 (i) Did the Unisa council comply with the principle of ethical leadership 
and corporate citizenship? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
The board should provide effective 
leadership based on an ethical  
foundation. 
11 100 (11/11) 
The board should ensure that the 
company is and is seen to be a 
responsible corporate citizen. 
6 83 (5/6) 
The board should ensure that the 
company's ethics are managed 
effectively. 
8 100 (7/8) 
 
(Sources: Unisa Annual report 2009; Unisa Strategic Plan 2015) 
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(i) Did the UKZN council comply with the principle of ethical leadership 
and corporate citizenship? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
The board should provide effective 
leadership based on an ethical 
foundation. 
11 100 (11/11) 
The board should ensure that the 
company is and is seen to be a 
responsible corporate citizen. 
6 100 (6/6) 
The board should ensure that the 
company's ethics are managed 
effectively 
8 88 (7/8) 
 
(Sources: UKZN Annual report 2009; Strategic Plan 2007 - 2016) 
 
There are three main principles under this heading with 25 recommended 
practices in total. Unisa Council performed 23 of these, achieving a percentage 
performance of 92. Though four practices were partial, this performance is 
above the threshold of 75%. There is therefore compliance with these 
principles. 
 
The counterpart - UKZN, performed 24 practices achieving 96% 
performance, which indicates compliance.  This means that the two 
institutions integrated ethics into their operations and decision-making. This is 
encouraged by existing literature to restore moral fibre in the corporate world 
(Young & Thyil, 2008). Though these institutions are not corporate, this practice 
shows their commitment to adopt corporate governance to achieve their 
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strategic objectives. This is no indication of deficient academic governance but 
rather, a reflection of the value systems of these universities.   
 
Areas of non-compliance 
The two universities did not practice the following: 
 Measuring the level of ethical performance in the university. 
 Disclose ethical performance annually to ensure strict adherence to ethical 
standards at all times.  
 Developing quantifiable corporate citizenship programmes. 
 
The above non-compliance does not reflect disapproval of corporate 
governance by these institutions.  This could be attributed to the lack of 
processes and not the will to make these disclosures.  UKZN is engaged in 
various social initiatives such as reducing poverty and building projects, food 
and clean water supply in Africa.  As with Unisa, there needs to be measurable 
formal programmes to strengthen their activities. 
(ii) Did the Unisa council comply with the principle of the role and function 
of the board and directors?  
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Role and function of the board 
The board should act as the focal point 
for and custodian of corporate 
governance 
4 100 (4/4) 
The board should appreciate that 
strategy, risk, performance and 
sustainability are inseparable  
4 e 
58 
 
 
The board and its directors should act in 
the best interests of the company. 
4 100 (4/4) 
The board should consider business 
rescue proceedings or other turnaround 
mechanisms as soon as the company is 
financially distressed as defined in the 
Act. 
4 100 (4/4) 
The board should elect a chairperson of 
the board who is an independent non-
executive director. The CEO of the 
company should not also fulfil the role of 
chairman of the board. 
7 57 (4/7) 
The board should appoint the chief 
executive officer and establish a 
framework for the delegation of 
authority. 
5 100 (5/5) 
Composition of the board 
The board should comprise a balance of 
power, with a majority of non-executive 
directors. The majority of non-executive 
directors should be independent. 
9 100 (9/9) 
Board appointment process 
Directors should be appointed through a 
formal process. 
3 100 (3/3) 
Director development 
The induction of and on-going training 
and development of directors should be 
conducted through formal processes. 
4 100 (4/4) 
Company secretary 
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The board should be assisted by a 
competent, suitably qualified and 
experienced company secretary. 
13 100 (13/13) 
Performance assessment 
The evaluation of the board, its 
committees and the individual directors 
should be performed every year. 
5 80 (4/5) 
Board committees 
The board should delegate certain 
functions to well-structured committees 
but without abdicating its own 
responsibilities. 
9 100 (9/9) 
Remuneration of directors and senior executives 
Companies should remunerate directors 
and executives fairly and responsibly. 
4 100 (4/4) 
Companies should disclose the 
remuneration of each individual director 
and certain senior executives. 
6 33 (2/6) 
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(ii) Did the UKZN council comply with the principle of the role and function 
of the board and directors?  
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Role and function of the board 
The board should act as the focal 
point for and custodian of corporate 
governance. 
4 100 (4/4) 
The board should appreciate that 
strategy, risk, performance and 
sustainability, are inseparable.  
4 100 (4/4) 
The board and its directors should act 
in the best interest of the company. 
4 100 (4/4) 
The board should consider business 
rescue proceedings or other 
turnaround mechanisms as soon as 
the company is financially distressed 
as defined in the Act. 
4 100 (4/4) 
The board should elect a chairperson 
of the board who is an independent 
non-executive director. The CEO of 
the company should not also fulfil the 
role of chairman of the board. 
7 57 (4/7) 
The board should appoint the chief 
executive officer and establish a 
framework for the delegation of 
authority. 
5 100 (5/5) 
Composition of the board 
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The board should comprise a balance 
of power, with a majority of non-
executive directors. The majority of 
non-executive directors should be 
independent. 
9 100 (9/9) 
Board appointment process 
Directors should be appointed through 
a formal process. 
3 100 (3/3) 
Director development 
The induction, on-going training and 
development of directors should be 
conducted through formal processes. 
4 100 (4/4) 
Company secretary 
The board should be assisted by a 
competent, suitably qualified and 
experienced company secretary 
13 100 (13/13) 
Performance assessment 
The evaluation of the board, its 
committees and the individual 
directors should be performed every 
year. 
5 80 (4/5) 
Board committees 
The board should delegate certain 
functions to well-structured 
committees, but without abdicating its 
own responsibilities. 
9 100 (9/9) 
Remuneration of directors and senior executives 
Companies should remunerate 
directors and executives fairly and 
responsibly. 
4 100 (4/4) 
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Companies should disclose the 
remuneration of each individual 
director and certain senior executives. 
6 50 (3/6) 
 
This heading comprises 14 principles with 81 recommended practices. Since 
the Council is responsible for the governance of the institution, the focus lies on 
the responsibilities and duties of the Council, its composition, council 
committees, remuneration and performance. All the practices but eight were 
performed, with twelve partially giving 90% performance. This indicated 
compliance with the principles. UKZN Council followed suit with a 91% 
performance from 74 recommended practices achieved. 
 
This compliance is consistent with the principles of good governance advanced 
in the existing literature. The councils at these universities assumed full 
responsibility and governance of the operations. The performance of these 
university councils shows that practicing good corporate governance do not 
detract from the primary activities of teaching, research and serving the 
community. This also proves the strength of academic governance because 
these councils first comply with the Higher Education Act, 1997 (as amended) 
and the respective Institutional Statutes. The role, composition and functioning 
of these councils are consistent with existing literature in corporate governance.  
 
Areas of non- compliance 
These universities did not evaluate the performance of individual members and 
council committees, simply because the council evaluates the performance of 
the council as a whole. The board of directors should act in unison in the pursuit 
of a common goal, (Taylor, 2007).  
 
Non-disclosure of sustainability issues in the integrated report could be 
attributed to the nature of universities, which makes it hard for these institutions 
to articulate such issues as they do not manufacture or produce any goods that 
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for instance could produce fumes, refuse or waste leading to pollution of the 
environment. There are, however, plans to develop an environmental policy 
framework in both these institutions to address sustainability issues. 
(iii) Did the Unisa audit committee perform its oversight role effectively? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Audit committees 
The board should ensure that the 
company has an effective and 
independent audit committee. 
4 100 (4/4) 
Membership and resources of the audit committee 
Audit committee members should be 
suitably skilled and experienced 
independent non-executive directors. 
7 100 (7/7) 
The audit committee should be chaired by 
an independent non-executive director 
2 100 (2/2) 
Responsibilities of the audit committee 
The audit committee should oversee 
integrated reporting. 
7 29 (2/7) 
The audit committee should ensure that a 
combined assurance model is applied to 
provide a coordinated approach to all 
assurance activities. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Internal assurance providers 
The audit committee should satisfy itself 
of the expertise, resources and 
experience of the company‟s finance 
2 100 (2/2) 
64 
 
 
function. 
The audit committee should be 
responsible for overseeing of internal 
audit. 
3 100 (3/3) 
The audit committee should be an 
integral component of the risk 
management process. 
5 100 (5/5) 
External assurance providers 
The audit committee is responsible for 
recommending the appointment of the 
external auditor and overseeing the 
external audit process. 
6 100 (6/6) 
Reporting 
The audit committee should report to the 
board and shareholders on how it has 
discharged its duties. 
7 100 (7/7) 
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(iii) Did the UKZN audit committee perform its oversight role effectively? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Audit committees 
The board should ensure that the 
company has an effective and 
independent audit committee. 
4 100 (4/4) 
Membership and resources of the audit committee 
Audit committee members should be 
suitably skilled and experienced 
independent non-executive directors. 
7 100 (7/7) 
The audit committee should be 
chaired by an independent non-
executive director 
2 100 (2/2) 
Responsibilities of the audit committee 
The audit committee should oversee 
integrated reporting. 
7 29 (2/7) 
The audit committee should ensure 
that a combined assurance model is 
applied to provide a coordinated 
approach to all assurance activities. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Internal assurance providers 
The audit committee should satisfy 
itself of the expertise, resources and 
experience of the company‟s finance 
function. 
2 100 (2/2) 
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The audit committee should be 
responsible for overseeing of internal 
audit. 
3 100 (3/3) 
The audit committee should be an 
integral component of the risk 
management process. 
5 100 (5/5) 
External assurance providers 
The audit committee is responsible for 
recommending the appointment of the 
external auditor and overseeing the 
external audit process. 
6 100 (6/6) 
Reporting 
The audit committee should report to 
the board and shareholders on how it 
has discharged its duties. 
7 100 (7/7) 
 
The ten principles of this heading focus on the combined assurance function 
that is the responsibility of the audit committee.  Unisa Council performed 40 out 
of 45 recommended practices, which translate to 89% performance and thus 
compliance.  This compliance shows the practice of corporate governance by 
Unisa.  The audit committee is a council committee established to help the 
council discharge its duties of governance and accountability. This 
demonstrates that academic institutions could emulate good corporate 
management practices.  
 
However, practices not performed in 2009, related to sustainability reporting. 
The Council therefore, does not comply with the principle that the audit 
committee should oversee sustainability reporting.  This topic received 
substantial attention internationally, as evidenced by certain European 
governments requiring their companies to disclose sustainability issues in terms 
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of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 Guidelines. The university realises 
the significance of disclosing sustainability issues as evidenced by its 
embracing of the ten universal principles of the United Nations Global compact 
principles, which include the environment. 
 
UKZN achieved exactly the same results at 89% performance, indicating 
compliance. This institution has undertaken various significant initiatives 
underlying its commitment to sustainability issues (see Annexure B).  Similarly, 
to Unisa, sustainability issues were not reported.  See the discussion under 
the role and function of the board above. 
 
Areas of non-compliance 
The members of the audit committees at these institutions are not all financially 
literate. The US Association of Governing Boards (AGB) of universities 
recommended that members should have verifiable experience in finance and 
social spheres to improve the quality and effectiveness of the board.  The lack 
of financial expertise in the audit committees does not reflect aversion to 
corporate governance.  This is evidenced by a declaration of the commitment to 
good corporate governance principles in the annual reports of these 
universities. These university councils have an abundance of skills in council 
members, management and experts and therefore are not hampered in any 
way.  This is underscored by the percentage performance of the recommended 
practices under this principle heading. 
 
The audit committees did not oversee the sustainability report in the integrated 
report because such report was not produced.  Again, refer to the discussion 
under the role and function of the board above. 
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(iv) Did the Unisa council comply with the principle of risk governance? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
The board’s responsibility for risk governance 
The board should be responsible for 
the governance of risk. 
9 100 (9/9) 
The board should determine the 
levels of risk tolerance. 
3 100 (3/3) 
The risk committee or audit 
committee should assist the board in 
carrying out its risk responsibilities. 
6 100 (6/6) 
Management‟s responsibility for risk management 
The board should delegate to 
management the responsibility to 
design, implement and monitor the 
risk management plan. 
3 100 (3/3) 
Risk assessment 
The board should ensure that risk 
assessments are performed on a 
continual basis. 
7 100 (7/7) 
The board should ensure that 
frameworks and methodologies are 
implemented to increase the 
probability of anticipating 
unpredictable risks. 
1 100 (1/1) 
Risk response 
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The board should ensure that 
management considers and 
implements appropriate risk 
responses. 
2 50 (1/2) 
Risk monitoring 
The board should ensure continual 
risk monitoring by management. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Risk assurance 
The board should receive assurance 
regarding the effectiveness of the 
risk management process. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Risk disclosure 
The board should ensure that there 
are processes in place enabling 
complete, timely, relevant, accurate 
and accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders. 
2 50 (1/2) 
(iv)  Did the UKZN council comply with the principle of risk governance? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
The board’s responsibility for risk governance 
The board should be responsible for 
the governance of risk. 
9 100 (9/9) 
The board should determine the levels 
of risk tolerance. 
3 100 (3/3) 
70 
 
 
The risk committee or audit committee 
should assist the board in carrying out 
its risk responsibilities. 
6 100 (6/6) 
Management‟s responsibility for risk management 
The board should delegate to 
management the responsibility to 
design, implement and monitor the risk 
management plan. 
3 100 (3/3) 
Risk assessment 
The board should ensure that risk 
assessments are performed on a 
continual basis. 
7 100 (7/7) 
The board should ensure that 
frameworks and methodologies are 
implemented to increase the 
probability of anticipating 
unpredictable risks. 
1 100 (1/1) 
Risk response 
The board should ensure that 
management considers and 
implements appropriate risk 
responses. 
2 50 (1/2) 
Risk monitoring 
The board should ensure continual risk 
monitoring by management. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Risk assurance 
The board should receive assurance 
regarding the effectiveness of the risk 
management process. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Risk disclosure 
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The board should ensure that there 
are processes in place enabling 
complete, timely, relevant, accurate 
and accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders. 
2 50 (1/2) 
 
There are ten principles, which recommend 37 practices to deal with the risk 
management process in the institution.  Unisa Council performed 35 of these 
practices achieving 95% performance.  There is therefore, compliance with 
these principles.  UKZN achieved compliance as well at 95% performance. 
Risk governance forms part of the operation‟s governance.  Proponents of 
corporate governance in academic institutions, blame the inability of academic 
governance to identify challenges in time and respond thereto swiftly.  In this 
area, corporations demonstrated deftness, to survive global competition. 
Increased competition, ever decreasing state funding and demanding societies 
caught universities off guard.  Corporate governance principles advise 
organisations to identify, monitor and manage risks that could negatively 
influence their strategies.  This compliance shows that academic institutions 
could benefit from this principle in responding to economic and political 
pressures, (Grant, 2003).  
 
Areas of non-compliance 
Both these institutions did not set an annual risk tolerance level.  They also did 
not disclose unusual or unexpected risks identified.  There are plans and 
activities to perform these recommended practices. 
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(v) Did the UNISA council comply with the principle of information 
technology (IT)? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
The governance of information technology 
The board should be responsible for 
information technology (IT) 
governance. 
5 100 (5/5) 
IT should be aligned with the 
performance and sustainability 
objectives of the company. 
2 100 (2/2) 
The board should delegate to 
management, the responsibility for the 
implementation of an IT governance 
framework. 
4 50 (2/4) 
The board should monitor and evaluate 
significant IT investments and 
expenditure. 
2 100 (2/2) 
IT should form an integral part of the 
company‟s risk management. 
2 100 (2/2) 
The board should ensure that 
information assets are managed 
effectively. 
4 100 (4/4) 
A risk committee and audit committee 
should assist the board in carrying out 
its IT responsibilities. 
4 100 (4/4) 
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(v) Did the UKZN council comply with the principle of the governance of 
information technology (IT)? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
The governance of information technology 
The board should be responsible for 
information technology (IT) 
governance. 
5 100 (5/5) 
IT should be aligned with the 
performance and sustainability 
objectives of the company. 
2 100 (2/2) 
The board should delegate to 
management the responsibility for the 
implementation of an IT governance 
framework. 
4 50 (2/4) 
The board should monitor and 
evaluate significant IT investments and 
expenditure. 
2 100 (2/2) 
IT should form an integral part of the 
company‟s risk management. 
2 100 (2/2) 
The board should ensure that 
information assets are managed 
effectively. 
4 100 (4/4) 
A risk committee and audit committee 
should assist the board in carrying out 
its IT responsibilities. 
4 100 (4/4) 
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This heading comprises seven principles embodying 23 recommended 
practices of which 21 was performed.  Unisa achieved a 91% performance 
and thus complied with the principles of governing IT.  UKZN performance 
mirrors that of Unisa at 91% performance. 
 
This compliance proves the commitment of the two institutions to corporate 
governance with no dire consequences to teaching and research.  These 
institutions are on course with their respective strategies.  
 
Areas of non-compliance are minimal and these universities are addressing 
these. 
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(vi) Did the Unisa council comply with laws, rules, codes and standards? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards 
The board should ensure that the 
company complies with applicable laws 
and considers adherence to non-binding 
rules, codes and standards. 
8 100 (8/8) 
The board and each individual director 
should have a working understanding of 
the effect of the applicable laws, rules, 
codes and standards on the company 
and its business. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Compliance risk should form an integral 
part of the company‟s risk management 
process. 
2 100 (2/2) 
The board should delegate to 
management, the implementation of an 
effective compliance framework and 
processes. 
9 78 (7/9) 
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(vi) Did the UKZN council comply with laws, rules, codes and standards? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards 
The board should ensure that the 
company complies with applicable 
laws and considers adherence to non-
binding rules, codes and standards. 
8 100 (8/8) 
The board and each individual director 
should have a working understanding 
of the effect of the applicable laws, 
rules, codes and standards on the 
company and its business. 
2 100 (2/2) 
Compliance risk should form an 
integral part of the company‟s risk 
management process. 
2 100 (2/2) 
The board should delegate to 
management the implementation of an 
effective compliance framework and 
processes. 
9 89 (8/9) 
 
The five principles under this heading have 21 recommended practices. There 
is compliance, as only two practices were not performed resulting in a 90% 
performance.  There was 95% performance at UKZN, derived from 20 
recommended practices.  The council therefore complied with the principles 
of compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards.  There are other 
mechanisms in place that achieve the effect of the five principles not complied 
with.  The discussion above under IT governance applies here as well. 
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(vii) Was there an effective audit function (IA) function at Unisa? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
The need for and role of internal audit 
The board should ensure that there is an 
effective, risk-based internal audit. 
7 100 (7/7) 
Internal audit‟s approach and plan 
Internal audit should follow a risk-based 
approach to its plan. 
5 100 (5/5) 
Internal audit should provide a written 
assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company‟s system of internal controls 
and risk management. 
6 100 (6/6) 
The audit committee should be 
responsible for overseeing internal audit. 
7 86 (6/7) 
Internal audit‟s status in the company 
Internal audit should be strategically 
positioned to achieve its objectives. 
5 100 (5/5) 
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(vii) Was there an effective audit function (IA) function at UKZN? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
The need for and role of internal audit 
The board should ensure that there is 
an effective risk based internal audit. 
7 100 (7/7) 
Internal audit‟s approach and plan 
Internal audit should follow a risk 
based approach to its plan. 
5 100 (5/5) 
Internal audit should provide a written 
assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company‟s system of internal controls 
and risk management. 
6 100 (6/6) 
The audit committee should be 
responsible for overseeing internal 
audit. 
7 86 (6/7) 
Internal audit‟s status in the company 
Internal audit should be strategically 
positioned to achieve its objectives. 
5 100 (5/5) 
 
The internal audit function, a component of the combined assurance, plays a 
key role in evaluating the institutional internal control system and risk 
management.  This function is controlled by five principles with 30 
recommended practices.  29 practices were performed, achieving 97% 
performance and compliance with the principles for the internal audit 
function.  There was 97% performance at UKZN as well. 
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Areas of non-compliance 
Despite the good result for the internal audit function, the two institutions did not 
subject this function to an independent review.  This is a very important practice 
in that it influences the effectiveness of the internal control system and risk 
management.  This failure reflects on the internal processes and structures, and 
not the inappropriateness of corporate governance as a model of governance 
for universities.  However, the 97% performance and compliance indicate the 
significance attached to the IA function by the two institutions. 
 
(viii) Did the Unisa council manage relationships with stakeholder 
groupings effectively?  
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Governing stakeholder relationships 
The board should appreciate that 
stakeholders‟ perceptions affect a 
company‟s reputation. 
3 100 (3/3) 
The board should delegate to 
management to proactively deal with 
stakeholder relationships.  
5 80 (4/5) 
The board should strive to achieve 
the appropriate balance between its 
various stakeholder groupings, in the 
best interests of the company. 
1 100 (1/1) 
Transparent and effective 
communication with stakeholders is 
essential for building and maintaining 
4 75 (3/4) 
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their trust and confidence. 
Dispute resolution 
The board should ensure that 
disputes are resolved as effectively, 
efficiently and expeditiously as 
possible. 
2 50 (1/2) 
 
 
(viii) Did the UKZN council manage relationships with stakeholder 
groupings effectively?  
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Governing stakeholder relationships 
The board should appreciate that 
stakeholders‟ perceptions affect a 
company‟s reputation. 
3 100 (3/3) 
The board should delegate to 
management to proactively deal with 
stakeholder relationships.  
5 80 (4/5) 
The board should strive to achieve the 
appropriate balance between its 
various stakeholder groupings, in the 
best interests of the company. 
1 100 (1/1) 
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Transparent and effective 
communication with stakeholders is 
essential for building and maintaining 
their trust and confidence. 
4 75 (3/4) 
Dispute resolution 
The board should ensure that disputes 
are resolved as effectively, efficiently 
and expeditiously as possible. 
2 50 (1/2) 
 
This principle encourages management to take cognisance of the impact of their 
decisions and business activities on all parties with an interest in an 
organisation.  There are five components of this principle with 15 practices 
recommended by the King III Code.  The Unisa Council performed all the 
practices but three, resulting in a percentage performance of 80% and 
therefore compliance.  UKZN performed 12 practices to achieve 
compliance. 
 
Existing literature strongly criticises the failure by organisations to consider the 
impact of their activities and decisions on other stakeholders (society and the 
environment), (Stohl et al (2007).  In addition, there are calls that academic 
institutions are embedded in society and should therefore serve their needs. 
Stakeholder theory bemoans the primacy of profit making in companies and 
describe it as capitalist short-term thinking.  Compliance here reflects the core 
activity of academic institutions to serve the community.  These two universities 
have gone beyond complying with board composition and regulatory framework, 
which is a source of criticism of corporate governance.  This also reflects the 
focus of the King III Code, which requires that entities manage stakeholder 
relationships effectively.  Corporate governance complements academic 
governance here, dispelling the notion of capitalist universities advanced by 
detractors of corporate forms of management in universities.  
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Areas of non-compliance 
Non-compliance relates to the non-inclusion of external disputes in the dispute 
resolution process of these two institutions.  King III promotes the alternate 
dispute resolution (ADR) which employs mediation in avoiding or resolving 
disputes effectively and efficiently.  UKZN should also develop an integrated 
communication and marketing strategy. 
 
(ix) Did the Unisa council produce a sustainability report (integrated 
reporting and disclosure)? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Transparency and accountability 
The board should ensure the integrity of 
the company‟s integrated report. 
5 80(4/5) 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure 
should be integrated with the 
company‟s financial reporting. 
4 75 (3/4) 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure 
should be independently assured. 
3 33 (1/3) 
Aggregate  284 258 
Total % Performance 100 91 
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(ix) Did the UKZN council produce a sustainability report (integrated 
reporting and disclosure)? 
Principle 
Total Number of 
recommended 
practices 
% Practiced 
Transparency and accountability 
The board should ensure the integrity 
of the company‟s integrated report. 
5 80 (4/5) 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure 
should be integrated with the 
company‟s financial reporting. 
4 75 (3/4) 
Sustainability reporting and disclosure 
should be independently assured. 
3 33 (1/3) 
Aggregate  284 258 
Total % Performance/non-
performance 
100 91 
 
As mentioned under the principle heading of Audit committees above, 
sustainability issues received enormous attention internationally.  Unisa did not 
produce a sustainability report in 2009, as the institution was still busy with its 
framework policy.  There are three principles with 12 recommended practices of 
which only five practices were performed, giving 66% performance.  Similarly, 
UKZN achieved 66% performance and therefore did not comply with the 
principles of sustainability issues. 
 
Areas of non-compliance 
Unisa Council did not take adequate steps to ensure the integrity of the 
sustainability report.  The council did not produce an integrated sustainability 
report in the year ended 31 December 2009.  Without the report, it was 
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impossible to examine steps taken to ascertain its integrity.  There was, 
however, evidence of existing plans to integrate sustainability issues with 
university operations.  The adoption of the UNGC principles indicates the 
willingness and movement towards dealing actively with environmental 
performance by the university.  Similarly, UKZN engaged in certain initiatives 
geared towards sustainability issues but did not develop an integrated 
sustainability report. 
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4.4 Holistic view 
This study evaluated Unisa council‟s decision and activity compliance with 
individual principles, based on the performance of recommended practices 
embodied in the principles, to answer the nine research questions.  The study 
could not stop there though, because the principles are all equally significant 
and as a unit, provide a holistic approach to governance, (Institute of Directors, 
2009).  Therefore, the researcher considered the total number of recommended 
practices performed and thereby the total number of principles complied with in 
relation to all the principles as in the King III Code.  Unisa substantially 
complied with all the principles but integrated reporting and disclosure.  
Substantial compliance means; where a principle is considered as a number 
of recommended practices, three quarters or 75% of such number (in total) is 
performed, whereas performance less than 75% indicated non-compliance.  
Partial compliance, recorded where a recommended practice‟s material aspects 
were not performed, was viewed as non-compliance.  Unisa council performed 
260 out of 289 recommended practices and complied with 53 out of 61 
principles of good governance as per the King III Code.  This constituted a 
total percentage performance of 91% and 87% total compliance with the 
principles (see Annexure C.) 
 
UKZN followed suit with 91% performance and 87% compliance (see Annexure 
D). 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 Summary, conclusion and recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The main aim of this study was to determine whether the Unisa Council adheres 
to the principles of corporate governance in their activities and decision- 
making, as set out in the King III Code on Corporate Governance.  This involved 
answering nine research questions formulated in terms of principles of good 
governance practice as set out in the code.  A checklist was employed to 
determine first, compliance with the principles of good governance based on the 
performance of recommended practices outlined by the principles and secondly, 
with the whole code.  The researcher collected data from university documents 
such as the 2009 Annual Report, Corporate Governance Manual and Strategic 
plan to determine compliance or non-compliance.  Corporate Governance in 
Unisa was also compared with University of KwaZulu-Natal, to have a balanced 
perspective.  
 
In this chapter, the researcher consolidated the main findings of the literature 
review and empirical research to draw conclusions of the study.  In addition, 
there was a discussion of recommendations to improve governance at Unisa. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Evolution of Corporate Governance 
 
In the literature study, the researcher discussed the origin and evolution of corporate 
governance, its raison d’être and principles, by examining the corporate form of 
business. Governance is described as “the responsibility and accountability for the 
overall operation”, (Taylor, 2000).  One, therefore, needs to understand the overall 
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operation in order to examine its governance.  Existing literature shows that 
corporations originated in England during the nineteenth century, (Grant, 2003).  
These corporations were accorded a legal persona status by law, thereby granting 
shareholders limited liability for the actions of corporations.  The industrial revolution 
In the United States of America gave impetus to the metamorphosis of these 
corporations into Berle-Means corporations, which brought about a power struggle 
between owner and management.  These companies now featured passive business 
owners, separate from executive management.  This disconnection resulted in agency 
problems, as corporate managers do not always act in the best interest of the owners 
(Cheffins, 2001).   
 
The twentieth century was marked by great activity to develop a corporate governance 
system to resolve agency issues (Grant, 2003).  Following stock market crashes and 
corporate failures in the United States of America, institutional investor vigilance 
strengthened and demanded effective protection for the investor from unethical 
practices by management.  Legislation (the Securities Act, 1933 & 1934) and regulatory 
framework (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act) were laid down, to make corporate managers 
responsible and align owner and management interests.  The researcher further 
examined significant reports, such as the Cadbury report (United Kingdom) and the 
King III Code (South Africa) to discuss the evolution of a corporate governance system 
in these countries.  These reports produced Codes of Best Practice, embodying 
recommended practices for corporate governance.  The codes were meant to detect 
and deter fraud in the business environment. 
 
The 1990 corporate failures in the global economy intensified public interest in the 
discourse of corporate governance.  There were calls for a new approach, which was to 
go beyond corporate laws and consider the impact of business activities and decisions 
on society and the environment.  The notion that a firm’s primary objective is to 
maximise profit for shareholders, as maintained by Friedman (1990), was rejected as 
88 
 
 
“short-term thinking” that disregards the impact of business activities and decisions on 
other stakeholders (society and environment) (Stohl, Stohl and Townsley, 2007).  The 
2008 global economy meltdown, which wreaked havoc in the United States of America 
economy and decimated Lehman Brothers, lends credence to calls for an inclusive 
approach. 
 
The researcher also mentioned that corporate governance research produced three 
theories to explain the concept of an organisation, viz. property, nexus-of-contracts 
and the third model, which views an organisation as a social institution (Mason, 
Kirkbride & Bryde, 2007:287).  The theories of property and nexus-of-contracts are 
consistent with Friedman’s contention in that, shareholders as capital providers and 
bearers of residual risk are ultimate beneficiaries in a corporate form of organisation 
(Mason et al).  The third view argues that there are other stakeholders (other than 
shareholders), that are affected by corporate activity, with or without financial interest 
in the company.  Therefore, there should be proper stakeholder management, as 
organisations exist as part of society (not isolated).  Critics bemoan the fact that 
corporate governance focuses largely on achieving financial goals and compliance with 
codes of practice, neglecting critical relationships with other stakeholders (Young and 
Thyil, 2008:95).  Companies are urged to include ethics in their culture, values and 
decision-making in order to restore the moral fibre in the business environment.  
 
5.2.2 Academic Governance 
 
The origin of an academic institution, academic freedom and academic governance 
were also discussed, to understand the need (if any) for these institutions to embrace 
corporate forms of management.  In South Africa, universities are regarded as public 
institutions, tasked primarily with providing higher education, (section 20 of the Higher 
Education Act 1997 [as amended]).  This means that these institutions are not revenue 
driven, but are expected to largely contribute to social welfare and general national 
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economic development.  Academic institutions have always enjoyed autonomy (rights 
of self-governance and non-intervention), which emanated from the value attached to 
knowledge produced and advanced (Henkel, 2007).  In United States of America higher 
education, there is relative academic autonomy, as institutions need to balance 
autonomy with public accountability (Toma, 2007).  These academic institutions have a 
shared governance tradition; faculties deal with academic decisions, while 
administration performs daily management activities, leaving accountability and 
stewardship to the governing board (Duderstadt, 2009:140).  Here in South Africa, 
governance was largely based on the British model, featuring governing boards (the 
Councils) that comprised members from the state and community (Ncayiyana and 
Hayward, 1999).  The broader university community, including faculties and 
administration, were not represented in the Council and were not part of decision-
making.  In contrast, the government controlled black academic institutions to restrict 
black education as engendered by the apartheid rule. 
 
The modern university faces a number of new challenges, such as economic and 
political pressures, which threaten its sustainability.  Worldwide, academic institutions 
are encouraged to generate income from the private sector, thereby reducing their 
financial dependency on the state (Henkel, 2007:92).  Universities have consequently 
undertaken strategic partnerships with the private sector in research, teaching and 
training, to derive financial sustainability.  These new challenges warranted that 
universities adopt a revenue-driven and market responsive approach in order to 
manage these partnerships.  Many commentators blame factors inherent in academic 
governance, such as the reliance of shared governance on broad consultation and 
consensus decision-making, for the inability of universities to cope with the fast-paced 
changes in their environments.  Burgan (2004) maintains that weaknesses in the 
current governance structures - faculties tend to waste time, guard turf or lack 
managerial expertise - render these institutions incapable to adapt. 
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Consequently, there are suggestions that a university should be managed in a similar 
fashion to a business, thereby managing the interplay with the external factors.  The 
rationale is that old forms of governance are ineffective and inefficient (Harman and 
Treadgold, 2007:14).  The advocates of corporate management in academic 
institutions argue that information era factors including, but not limited to increased 
adult education, reduced full-time enrolment, use of computers and online education, 
require complex management.  These suggestions should be considered with caution 
considering recent corporate failures, which have been attributed to poor governance 
practices.  Furthermore, there are concerns that the business model could relegate 
basic academic decisions to lower levels and put focus on revenue generation and 
market criteria - a phenomenon termed academic capitalism (Toma, 2007).  This 
implies that blindfold implementation of the corporate model of governance in 
academic institutions, could have unintended effects.  This study then proceeded to 
examine suggestions advanced in existing literature, to help ameliorate areas of 
weakness, while preserving important academic traditions and values (Duderstadt, 
2009):    
 Universities must have small governing boards (more or less 12 members), 
which comprise outsiders with diverse skills, not just business people and be 
encouraged to set an agenda independently (Toma, 2007).  
 The governing boards should embrace the principles of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation, written in response to corporate failures, (Toma, 2007).  
 A governing board should have freedom to set its agenda and determine 
strategic direction, as it is entrusted with the accountability and stewardship of 
the university, (Collis, 2009). 
 Faculties should have executive, rather than merely advisory authority to 
encourage the active participation of leading faculty members in university 
service (Duderstadt, 2009). 
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5.3 Empirical results 
 
(a) Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
Unisa has ethical leadership and good corporate citizenship.  It achieved 92% 
performance for this principle heading and compliance with the King III Code.  
The Council set a tone of ethical culture in the institution by adopting a Code of 
Conduct and Ethics that outlines high standards of integrity, behaviour and 
ethics.  This code will promote an ethical corporate culture because all 
university stakeholders have to adhere to the ethical standards in all business 
activities.  It was read and signed by all Council members, management and 
employees, to declare commitment to the university‟s ethical standards.  Unisa 
integrated social and environmental issues with the institution‟s activities and 
decision-making.  The upcoming Corporate Citizenship statement and an 
Environmental Sustainability Plan will help promote sustainability at the 
university.   
 
Areas of improvement: 
 The council needs to develop a mechanism to measure the level of ethical 
performance in the university and disclose such performance annually in the 
integrated report, to ensure strict adherence to ethical standards at all times.  
 In addition, it should develop measurable corporate citizenship programmes, 
continuously evaluate these programmes and report thereon in the 
Corporate Citizenship statement.  
 This effectively mirrors their counterpart, UKZN - which engaged in various 
social initiatives such as reducing poverty and building food and clean water 
supply in Africa.  
 As with Unisa, there has to be measurable formal programmes to strengthen 
these activities. 
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(b) Unisa Council performed its role and function effectively.  
Its 90% performance of the recommended practices indicated compliance with 
the Code (UKZN: 91%).  Unisa Council is the focal point of governance in the 
university as shown by the following: 
 Developed a strategy (Strategic plan 2015) and plan to achieve the strategic 
goals (Strategy and Planning Coordination Committee). 
 Inculcated an ethical culture in the university (Code of Ethics). 
 Integrated social and environmental issues in the university activities (an 
academic signatory of the UNGC). 
 Declared the institution‟s commitment to comply with the King Code on 
Corporate Governance, in the Annual Report 2009. 
 Created various sub-committees (Audit & Risk, IA, Remuneration & 
Selection) to help discharge the Council responsibilities.  
 Maintaining sound financial planning and reporting. 
 Publish a report on financial performance of the university as required by 
statute. 
 
Areas of improvement: 
Unisa should improve its compliance by practicing the following: 
 Evaluate the performance of the individual Council members and 
committees.   
 Produce a sustainability report in the integrated report. 
 
UKZN is in a similar position as Unisa regarding the role and function of the 
governing body. 
 
(c) The audit committee performed its oversight role effectively.  
 Compliance with King Code 
 89% performance of recommended practices (UKZN: 89%) 
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The audit committee reported on the performance of its duties in the integrated 
report, which included the following: 
 Overseeing financial reporting, the IA function and external auditors. 
 Evaluation and management of internal financial controls and IT risks. 
 Provides accurate and reliable information about the financial position of the 
university. 
 
Areas of improvement: 
 Audit committee members should all possess financial expertise as 
recommended by the King III Code.   
 The council should produce an annual integrated sustainability report. 
 The audit committee should oversee the sustainability report to ensure its 
integrity.   
 
The findings showed the same position at UKZN as well. 
 
(d) There is effective governance of risk at Unisa. 
 Compliance with King Code 
 Performance percentage of 95 
 
Risk management is integrated with daily management activities.  All potential 
risks are continuously identified, monitored and appropriate mitigating actions 
taken.   
 
Areas of improvement: 
 The Council should set an annual risk tolerance level.   
 The council should report unusual or unexpected risks identified in the 
university during the year.   
 
 UKZN had similar findings in this regard. 
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(e) There is effective IT governance at Unisa. 
 Compliance with King Code 
 91% performance (UKZN: 91%) 
There were adequate controls over IT systems and competent ICT staff 
managed data. 
   
Areas of improvement: 
 The council should develop a back-up system to facilitate data recovery in 
case of a disaster.   
 The council should obtain an annual independent review on compliance with 
applicable IT laws. 
 There should be an information system policy framework in place.   
 
UKZN is in a similar position. 
 
(f) There is effective compliance with all applicable laws, rules, codes and 
standards at Unisa. 
 Compliance with King Code 
 90% performance (UKZN: 95%) 
 
The Risk, Ethics and Control Committee (REC) ensured compliance with the 
regulatory framework.  The Internal Audit and the Risk management committee 
are responsible for identifying risks related to compliance.  The audit committee 
performed an assessment of the extent of compliance and reported on its 
effectiveness to the Council.   
 
Areas of improvement: 
The Council should enhance the mechanisms to update council members on 
latest developments in the legal/regulatory framework. 
 
 
95 
 
 
(g) There is an effective risk based internal audit function at Unisa.  
 Compliance with King Code 
 97% performance (UKZN: 97%) 
 
The IA committee evaluates the operation of the internal control and risk 
management system in the university in compliance with the IA Standards and 
the Code of Ethics.  This committee reports all its observations and 
recommendations to Management and Council.  The audit committee reported 
on the effectiveness assessment of the internal control and risk management 
system in the annual report.   
 
Areas of improvement: 
 The IA audit function should be subjected to an independent quality review. 
 
The above analysis also applies to UKZN. 
 
(h) Unisa Council manages relationships with stakeholder groupings 
effectively. 
 Compliance with King Code 
 80% performance (UKZN: 80%) 
 
The Council manages relationships with stakeholders through a representative 
stakeholder structure (Institutional Forum). There is an integrated 
communication plan involving various methods such as publications (annual 
report, research report) and media events (seminars, workshops etc.)  to 
communicate effectively with the stakeholders. 
 
Areas of improvement: 
 Though there is a dispute resolution process (ADR), the Council should 
extend this process to accommodate external disputes as well.   
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 UKZN should also develop an integrated communication and marketing plan 
to enhance communication with stakeholders. 
 
(i) Unisa Council did not take adequate steps to ensure the integrity of the 
sustainability report.  
 Non- compliance 
 66% performance (less than 75% threshold) 
 
Unisa did not produce an integrated sustainability report in the year ended 31 
December 2009.  Without the report, it was impossible to examine steps taken 
to ascertain its integrity.  There was however, evidence of existing plans to 
integrate sustainability issues with university operations.  The adoption of the 
UNGC principles, indicates the university‟s willingness and movement towards 
dealing actively with environmental performance. 
 
Similarly, UKZN engaged in certain initiatives geared towards sustainability 
issues but did not develop an integrated sustainability report. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
 
The study sought to determine whether Unisa Council adhered to the principles 
of good corporate governance as recommended in the King III Code on 
Corporate Governance.  The empirical study showed that the Council complied 
with all the Code principles except one, that of Integrated Reporting and 
Disclosure.  The Council performed 260 of 289 recommended practices (91%) 
and thereby complying with 53 out of 61 principles (87% compliance) of good 
governance as per the King III Code on Corporate Governance.  Unisa did not 
comply with three principles and neither complied nor not-complied with 
five principles, as the level of performance of the corresponding recommended 
practices was below the threshold of 75%.  
 
In addition, the comparison with another South African University, UKZN 
demonstrated similarities between the two institutions about their embracing of 
corporate governance in pursuit of their respective strategic goals.  This 
institution achieved 91% performance of the recommended practices and 
thereby obtained 87% compliance.   
 
The study also showed that practicing corporate forms of management to 
improve academic governance does not necessarily relegate academic 
interests to lower levels.  This means that these institutions delivered on their 
mandate from the Higher Education Act, 1997 (as amended).  Unisa and UKZN 
are first public institutions of higher education and not profit driven despite them 
embracing the corporate forms of management. 
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5.5 Areas for further research 
 
 Integrated Reporting and Disclosure for academic institutions 
 
The study showed that both Unisa and UKZN fell short in reporting on 
sustainability issues.  Further studies should be conducted to determine ways to 
improve the sustainability reporting in academic institutions.  
 
 Survey of Council members 
 
Council members‟ responses would have provided invaluable information about 
their perspective on corporate governance in the institution.  A further study can 
be conducted by interviewing all 12 Council members to determine whether 
Council activities and decisions comply with principles of good governance, as 
recommended by the King III Code.  The study could be expanded to include 
other stakeholders such as academic and non-academic staff, students and 
other interested parties.  This could provide independent, yet relevant 
perspectives.  
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ANNEXURE A - Unisa Council Checklist 
 
Checklist employed in testing adherence of Unisa Council to King III Code on Corporate Governance 
CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
     
1. Ethical 
leadership and 
corporate 
citizenship 
    
Responsible 
leadership 
1.1 The board should provide 
effective leadership based on 
an ethical foundation 
Ethical leaders should:     
   1.1.1. direct the strategy and 
operations to build a sustainable 
business; 
Yes The Council developed the Unisa Strategic Plan 
2015 which clearly outlines the institution's vision 
and mission statement, strategic goals and a 
vehicle to achieve these 
 
    1.1.2. consider the short- and long-
term impacts of the strategy on the 
economy, society and the environment; 
Partial Unisa is a signatory to the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC) which advocates ten universal 
principles based on human rights, labour 
standards, the environment and anti- corruption. 
In integrating these principles with its activities, 
Unisa identified necessary amendments in its 
procedures, processes and systems. This is in 
pursuit of its goal to build a sustainable future for 
next generations. 
    1.1.3. do business ethically; Yes In 2009, Unisa Council approved the Code of 
Ethics and Conduct which sets out high 
standards of integrity, behaviour and ethics that 
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
all university stakeholders should oblige with in all 
business activities.  During the year 2010, all 
Council members, management and employees 
read and signed the Code confirming their 
commitment to the university ethical standards.  
The university has introduced an anonymous 
ethics hotline to report unethical conduct.  
    1.1.4. do not compromise the natural 
environment; 
Partial Unisa has planned environmental initiatives to 
better manage energy, carbon, waste 
minimisation and recycling.  Though committed to 
sustainability (as the UNGC signatory), there are 
no concrete policies and steps taken to sustain 
the environment. 
    1.1.5. take account of the company‟s 
impact on 
internal and external stakeholders. 
Yes There is an independent and representative 
stakeholder structure, the Institutional Forum (IF) 
which provides a consultative platform that 
provides a platform for divergent views on topical 
matters and seeks to derive convergence and 
consensus in the general academic community. 
The board‟s 
responsibilities 
  1.1.6. be responsible for the strategic 
direction of the company and for the 
control of the company 
Yes The Council developed the Strategic Plan 2015 
and conducts regular review and evaluation 
thereof on an annual basis.  The Council as 
legislated by the Higher Education Act, governs 
the institution and is clearly separate from the 
executive management of the university. 
   1.1.7. set the values to which the 
company will adhere formulated in its 
code of conduct; 
Yes The Code of Ethics and Conduct entails values of 
high standards of integrity, behaviour and ethics 
which should be obliged with by stakeholders in 
all business activities. 
   1.1.8. ensure that its conduct and that 
of management aligns to the values 
Yes Adherence to the Code is monitored by 
governance and management processes of the 
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
and is adhered to in all aspects of its 
business; 
university. 
    1.1.9. promote the stakeholder-
inclusive approach of governance. 
Yes Employees are represented in the Bargaining 
Forum and other various institutional committees.  
Through the concept of Baithuti Pele (student is 
first), students are represented and participate in 
the governance processes of the university.  The 
Institutional Forum plays an advisory role to the 
Council on matters relating to race, gender and 
disability.     
Ethical foundation   The board should:     
    1.1.10. ensure that all deliberations, 
decisions and actions are based on the 
four values underpinning good 
governance; and 
Yes Unisa values of integrity, social justice and 
fairness and, excellence mirror the universal 
values of good governance, namely; fairness, 
accountability, responsibility and transparency. 
    1.1.11. ensure that each director 
adheres to the duties of a director 
Yes The Council organises Induction and Information 
workshops to ensure new and existing council 
members understand their roles and 
responsibilities.  Council members have to 
adhere to ethical standards of the university as 
well. 
  1.2. The board should ensure 
that the company is and is 
seen to be a responsible 
corporate citizen 
The board should:     
    1.2.1. consider not only on financial 
performance but also the impact of the 
company‟s operations on society and 
the environment; 
Partial Unisa is a signatory of the voluntary UNGC which 
focuses on building a sustainable future for the 
next generations. 
    1.2.2. protect, enhance and invest in 
the wellbeing of the economy, society 
Partial Unisa's mission statement alludes to responding 
to the diverse needs of the society by providing 
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
and the environment; quality academic and career-focused learning 
opportunities.  Also, to engage with stakeholders 
and other partners in contributing to the general 
welfare of society.  As indicated in 1.1.4 above, 
there are no concrete policies and steps 
regarding sustaining the environment. 
    1.2.3. ensure that the company‟s 
performance and interaction with its 
stakeholders is guided by the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights; 
Yes The institution's Code of Ethics and Conduct is 
based on the values of human dignity, integrity, 
social justice and fairness embodied in this 
country's Constitution. 
    1.2.4. ensure that collaborative efforts 
with stakeholders are embarked upon 
to promote ethical conduct and good 
corporate citizenship; 
Partial The Code of Ethics and Conduct is used to 
engender an ethical corporate culture.  
    1.2.5. ensure that measurable 
corporate citizenship programmes are 
implemented; and 
No See 1.2.6. below 
    1.2.6. ensure that management 
develops corporate citizenship policies. 
Yes Unisa is working on its corporate citizenship 
statement which will articulate intended 
programmes.  Also, it is integrating the UNGC 
principles and good corporate governance into its 
activities to become a good corporate citizen. 
  1.3. The board should ensure 
that the company's ethics are 
managed effectively 
The board should ensure that:     
     1.3.1. it builds and sustains an ethical 
corporate culture in the company; 
Yes The Code of Ethics and Conduct will help 
promote and engender an ethical corporate 
culture in the university. 
     1.3.2. it determines the ethical 
standards which should be clearly 
articulated and ensures that the 
Yes The Code of Conduct outlines the high standards 
of integrity, behaviour and ethics for all university 
stakeholders.  Compliance with these standards 
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
company takes measures to achieve 
adherence to them in all aspects of the 
business; 
is monitored by governance and management 
processes of the university. 
     1.3.3. adherence to ethical standards 
is measured; 
No Though compliance is monitored, the level of 
ethical performance is not measured. 
     1.3.4. internal and external ethics 
performance is aligned around the 
same ethical standards; 
Yes Stakeholders (internal and external groupings) 
have to adhere to the Code in all business 
activities. 
     1.3.5. ethical risks and opportunities 
are incorporated in the risk 
management process; 
Yes The Risk, Ethics and Controls Committee is 
responsible for the risk management process. 
     1.3.6. a code of conduct and ethics-
related policies are implemented; 
Yes Unisa has a Code of Ethics and Conduct in place. 
     1.3.7. compliance with the code of 
conduct is integrated in the operations 
of the company; and 
Yes Compliance with the Code is monitored by 
governance and management processes of the 
university. 
     1.3.8. the company‟s ethics 
performance should be assessed, 
monitored, reported and disclosed.  
Partial The level of ethical performance was not 
disclosed in the Annual Report 2009. 
      
2. Boards and 
directors 
     
Role and function 
of the board 
2.1. The board should act as 
the focal point for and 
custodian of corporate 
governance 
The board should:     
    2.1.1. have a charter setting out its 
responsibilities; 
Yes The Council is responsible for governance of 
Unisa as per the Higher Education Act (the Act).  
Also, it and its sub-committees have clear and 
specific terms of reference and roles and 
functions. 
6 
 
 
CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
     2.1.2. meet at least four times per 
year; 
Yes The Council met four times in 2009 (in March, 
June, November and December 2009). 
     2.1.3. monitor the relationship 
between management and the 
stakeholders of the company; and 
Yes The IF provides a platform for the wide university 
community to discuss pertinent issues.  The 
Council is represented in this body which plays 
an advisory role thereto. 
     2.1.4. ensure that the company 
survives and thrives. 
Yes Unisa is a going concern and exercises sound 
financial management.  This is evidenced by an 
operating surplus generated in 2008 and 2009 
successively. 
  2.2. The board should 
appreciate that strategy, risk, 
performance and sustainability 
are inseparable 
The board should:     
     2.2.1. inform and approve the 
strategy; 
Yes Unisa developed the Strategic Plan 2015 to move 
beyond the pre- 2006 merger. 
     2.2.2. ensure that the strategy is 
aligned with the purpose of the 
company, the value drivers of its 
business and the legitimate interests 
and expectations of its stakeholders; 
Yes The Unisa Strategic Plan 2015 is informed by the 
institution's mission and vision statements. 
     2.2.3. satisfy itself that the strategy 
and business plans are not 
encumbered by risks that have not 
been thoroughly examined by 
management; and 
Yes The risk management process is part of daily 
management activities.  The Risk, Ethics and 
Controls committee is responsible for managing 
risk and report to the Council. 
     2.2.4. ensure that the strategy will 
result in sustainable outcomes taking 
account of people, planet and profit. 
Partial The sustainability and transformation issues have 
been integrated into the Strategic Plan 2015.  
However, there is no formal policy framework on 
sustainability.  
  2.3. The board should provide Refer principle 1.1 Yes   
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
effective leadership based on 
an ethical foundation 
  2.4. The board should ensure 
that the company is and is 
seen to be a responsible 
corporate citizen 
Refer principle 1.2 Partial   
  2.5. The board should ensure 
that the company‟s ethics are 
managed effectively 
Refer principle 1.3 Yes   
  2.6. The board should ensure 
that the company has an 
effective and independent 
audit committee 
Refer to chapter 3 Yes   
  2.7. The board should be 
responsible for the 
governance of risk 
Refer to chapter 4 Yes   
  2.8. The board should be 
responsible for information 
technology (IT) governance 
Refer to chapter 5 Yes   
  2.9. The board should ensure 
that the company complies 
with applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-
binding rules, codes and 
standards 
Refer to chapter 6 Yes   
  2.10. The board should ensure 
that there is 
an effective risk-based internal 
audit 
Refer to chapter 7 Yes   
  2.11.The board should 
appreciate that stakeholders‟ 
Refer to chapter 8 Yes   
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
perceptions affect the 
company‟s reputation 
  2.12. The board should ensure 
the integrity 
of the company‟s integrated 
report 
Refer to chapter 9 Partial   
  2.13. The board should report 
on the effectiveness of the 
company‟s system of internal 
controls 
Refer to chapters 7 and 9 Yes   
  2.14. The board and its 
directors should act in the best 
interests of the company. 
2.14.1. The board must act in the best 
interests of the company. 
  
Yes The Council adheres to high standards of 
integrity, behaviour and ethics as prescribed in 
the university Code of Ethics and Conduct. 
     2.14.2. Directors must adhere to the 
legal standards of conduct. 
Yes Council members read and signed the university's 
Code of Ethics and Conduct, confirming their 
commitment thereto. 
    2.14.3. Directors or the board should 
be permitted to take independent 
advice connection with their duties 
following an agreed procedure. 
Partial Though there is no agreed procedure regarding 
independent advice, the Council organised 
meetings and workshops during which members 
were addressed by internal and external 
speakers on latest strategic developments. 
    2.14.4. Real or perceived conflicts 
should be disclosed to the board and 
managed. 
Yes The Code of Ethics and Conduct contains a 
declaration of interest which should be signed to 
manage potential conflicts. 
    2.14.5. Listed companies should have 
a policy regarding dealing in securities 
by directors, officers and selected 
employees. 
Not applicable   
  2.15. The board should 
consider business rescue 
proceedings or other 
The board should ensure that:     
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
turnaround mechanisms as 
soon as the company is 
financially distressed as 
defined in the Act 
    2.15.1. the solvency and liquidity of the 
company is continuously monitored; 
Yes The Council is required by the Act to report 
annually the financial position and performance to 
the Minister.  The Finance and Investment 
committee is responsible for monitoring the 
institution's financial health.  
    2.15.2. its consideration is fair to save 
a financially distressed company either 
by way of workouts, sale, merger, 
amalgamation, compromise with 
creditors or business rescue; 
  See 2.15.3. below 
     2.15.3. a suitable practitioner is 
appointed if business rescue is 
adopted; and 
  In terms of the Act, the Minister may in 
consultation with the Council, appoint an 
administrator to assume activities of the Council 
or appoint an independent assessor to investigate 
any financial irregularities or maladministration in 
the university. 
     2.15.4. the practitioner furnishes 
security for the value of the assets of 
the company. 
  See 2.15.3. above 
  2.16. The board should elect a 
chairman of the board who is 
an independent non-executive 
director. The CEO of the 
company should not also fulfil 
the role of chairman of the 
board 
2.16.1. The members of the board 
should elect a chairman on an annual 
basis. 
Partial The Institutional Statute (IS) authorises the 
Council to elect a chairperson every two years. 
    2.16.2. The chairman should be Yes The IS stipulates that the chairperson should be 
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CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
independent and free of conflict upon 
appointment. 
external to the university (may not be an 
employee or student of the university). 
    2.16.3. A lead independent director 
should be appointed in the case where 
an executive chairman is appointed or 
where the chairman is not independent 
or conflicted. 
Not applicable See 2.16.2 above 
    2.16.4. The appointment of a 
chairman, who is not independent, 
should be justified in the integrated 
report. 
Not applicable See 2.16.2 above 
    2.16.5. The role of the chairman should 
be formalised.  
Yes The chairman has a clear role and function and, 
terms of reference.  The chairman is responsible 
for the overall leadership and functioning of the 
Council. 
     2.16.6. The chairman‟s ability to add 
value, and his performance against 
what is expected of his role and 
function, should be assessed every 
year. 
Partial The performance of Council as a whole (and not 
individual members) is assessed. 
    2.16.7. The CEO should not become 
the chairman until 3 years have lapsed. 
No The Principal and Vice-Chancellor serves as the 
CEO and has its term of office.  It is therefore 
unlikely that the VC may become the chairman. 
    2.16.8. The chairman together with the 
board, should consider the number of 
outside chairmanships held. 
No There is no policy over outside chairmanships 
held. 
    2.16.9. The board should ensure a 
succession plan for the role of the 
chairman. 
No There lacks a formal succession plan 
  2.17. The board should 
appoint the chief executive 
The board should:     
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GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
officer and establish a 
framework for the delegation 
of authority 
     2.17.1. appoint the CEO; Yes The Principal and Vice-Chancellor is appointed 
by and accountable to the Council. 
     2.17.2. provide input regarding senior 
management appointments; 
Yes The Council has authority to appoint senior 
management. 
     2.17.3. define its own level of 
materiality and approve a delegation of 
authority framework; 
Yes The Council has authority to establish Council 
committees and determine composition and 
functions thereof. 
    2.17.4. ensure that the role and 
function of the CEO is formalised and 
the performance of the CEO is 
evaluated against the criteria specified; 
and 
Yes The institution's Integrated performance 
management system is linked to its strategic 
objectives.  The Principal's performance is 
assessed annually. 
    2.17.5. ensure succession planning for 
the CEO and other senior executives 
and officers is in place. 
Partial It is the Council's responsibility to provide for the 
succession of senior management.  However, 
there is no policy in place. 
Composition of the 
board 
2.18. The board should 
comprise a balance of power, 
with a majority of non-
executive directors. The 
majority of non-executive 
directors should be 
independent 
The board should:     
    2.18.1. The majority of board members 
should be non-executive directors. 
Yes 60% of the Council membership comprises 
persons external to the university, as prescribed 
by the Act.. 
    2.18.2. The majority of the non-
executive directors should be 
independent. 
Yes See 2.18.1. above 
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GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
    2.18.3. When determining the number 
of directors serving on the board, the 
knowledge, skills and resources 
required for conducting the business of 
the board should be considered.  
Yes The Act stipulates that Council members should 
have the necessary knowledge and experience to 
serve a public higher education institution and, 
act in its best interests.  The Council members 
possess expertise in the fields of higher 
education, governance, entrepreneurship, human 
capital and finance. 
    2.18.4. Every board should consider 
whether its size, diversity and 
demographics make it effective. 
Yes The Council composition represents race, gender 
and disability requirements as per the Act. 
    2.18.5. Every board should have a 
minimum of two executive directors of 
which one should be the CEO and the 
other the director responsible for 
finance. 
Partial The Principal and the deputy Vice-Chancellor are 
members of the Council as stipulated by the 
Institutional Statute. 
    2.18.6. At least one third of the non-
executive 
directors should rotate every year. 
Yes Non-executive members are rotated in a 
staggered fashion. 
    2.18.7. The board, through its 
nomination committee, should 
recommend the eligibility of 
prospective directors. 
Yes The Executive Committee, a Council sub-
committee make recommendations to the 
Council. 
    2.18.8. Any independent non-executive 
directors serving more than 9 years 
should be subjected to a rigorous 
review of his independence and 
performance by the board. 
Yes The Institutional Statute limits the term of non-
executive members to two terms. 
    2.18.9. The board should include a 
statement in the integrated report 
regarding the assessment of the 
independence of the independent non-
Yes Unisa, through the Statement on Corporate 
Governance, presented the composition of the 
Council and its committees and independence of 
non-executive members. 
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GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
executive directors. 
    2.18.10. The board should be 
permitted to remove any director 
without shareholder approval. 
Not applicable   
Board appointment 
process 
2.19 Directors should be 
appointed through a formal 
process 
2.19.1. A nomination committee should 
assist with the process of identifying 
suitable members of the board. 
Yes The Executive Committee performs this role.  It 
should be noted that some Council members are 
elected by academic and non- academic 
employees or nominated by the SRC.  
    2.19.2. Background and reference 
checks should be performed before the 
nomination and appointment of 
directors. 
Yes This forms part of the nomination process. 
    2.19.3. The appointment of non-
executive directors should be 
formalised through a letter of 
appointment. 
Partial There is no formal procedure 
    2.19.4. The board should make full 
disclosure regarding individual 
directors to enable shareholders to 
make their own assessment of 
directors. 
Not applicable   
Director 
development 
2.20. The induction of and on-
going training and 
development of directors 
should be conducted through 
formal processes 
The board should ensure that:     
    2.20.1. a formal induction programme 
is established for new directors; 
Yes There is a Council  Induction workshop.  
    2.20.2. inexperienced directors are 
developed 
through mentorship programmes; 
Partial The Information workshop is aimed at enhancing 
the members understanding of their roles and 
functions, the higher education landscape, Unisa 
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GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
internal structure and processes. 
    2.20.3. continuing professional 
development programmes are 
implemented; and 
Partial See 2.20.2 above 
    2.20.4. directors receive regular 
briefings on changes 
in risks, laws and the environment. 
Yes This is achieved through scheduled meetings and 
workshops at which internal and external 
speakers address members on issues such as 
transformation, economic sustainability and 
corporate governance. 
Company 
secretary 
2.21 The board should be 
assisted by a competent, 
suitably qualified and 
experienced company 
secretary 
                                                      
2.21.1. The board should appoint and 
remove the company secretary. 
Yes The Registrar performs the role of a company 
secretary and, is appointed by the Council. 
    2.21.2. The board should empower the 
individual 
to enable him to properly fulfil his 
duties. 
Yes The Principal has authority to assign assistance 
to the Secretary when necessary. 
    The company secretary should:     
    2.21.3. have an arms-length 
relationship with 
the board; 
Yes The Registrar is not a member of the Council. 
    2.21.4. not be a director of the 
company; 
Yes See 2.21.3. above 
    2.21.5. assist the nominations 
committee with the appointment of 
directors; 
Yes The Registrar serves as the secretary for all 
council committees. 
    2.21.6. assist with the director 
induction and 
training programmes; 
Yes The Secretary has a responsibility to assist with 
the administration of the Council. 
    2.21.7. provide guidance to the board Yes See 2.21.6. above 
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PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
on the duties of the directors and good 
governance; 
    2.21.8. ensure board and committee 
charters are kept up to date; 
Yes The terms of reference for all Unisa committees 
are reviewed annually. 
    2.21.9. prepare and circulate board 
papers; 
Yes The Secretary ensures that all Council members 
receive an agenda and relevant documentation at 
least seven days in advance of a meeting. 
    2.21.10. elicit responses, input, 
feedback for 
board and board committee meetings; 
Yes See 2.21.6 above 
    2.21.11. assist in drafting yearly work 
plans; 
Yes Assists the Chairperson 
    2.21.12. ensure preparation and 
circulation of minutes of board and 
committee meetings; and 
Yes See 2.21.9 above 
    2.21.13. assist with the evaluation of 
the board, committees and individual 
directors 
Yes See 2.21.6 above 
Performance 
assessment 
2.22 The evaluation of the 
board, its committees and the 
individual directors should be 
performed every year 
 2.22.1. The board should determine its 
own role, functions, duties and 
performance criteria as well as that for 
directors on the board and board 
committees to serve as a benchmark 
for the performance appraisal. 
Yes The Council is responsible for governance of the 
institution as stipulated by the Act.  The Council 
assesses its performance and committees 
annually. 
    2.22.2. Yearly evaluations should be 
performed by the chairman or an 
independent provider. 
Yes Evaluation of Council performance was 
performed by the Institute of Directors and the 
School of Business Leadership respectively. 
     2.22.3. The results of performance 
evaluations should identify training 
needs for directors. 
Yes There is a comprehensive programme of 
engagement with Council members to derive 
excellent governance at Unisa. 
    2.22.4. An overview of the appraisal No This was not done in 2009. 
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ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
process, results and action plans 
should be disclosed in the integrated 
report. 
    2.22.5. The nomination for the re-
appointment of a director should only 
occur after the evaluation of the 
performance and attendance of the 
director 
Yes Performance influences re-appointment of 
Council members. 
Board committees 2.23. The board should 
delegate certain functions to 
well-structured committees but 
without abdicating its own 
responsibilities 
 2.23.1. Formal terms of reference 
should be established and approved 
for each committee of the board. 
Yes The Council sets clear terms of reference and 
roles and functions for each sub-committee. 
    2.23.2. The committees‟ terms of 
reference should be reviewed yearly. 
Partial This forms part of the annual performance 
appraisal. 
    2.23.3. The committees should be 
appropriately constituted and the 
composition and the terms of reference 
should be disclosed in the integrated 
report. 
Partial Council committees have been constituted as 
specified by the Institutional statute.  The 
institution's Corporate Governance Manual sets 
out clearly the committees' terms of reference.  
The Annual Report 2009 broke down the 
composition of various Council committees and 
roles and functions thereof respectively. 
    2.23.4. Public and state-owned 
companies must appoint an audit 
committee. 
Yes There is an Audit and Risk Management  
Committee at Unisa.  There is a charter that 
spells out its terms of reference, role and function 
and composition. 
    2.23.5. All other companies should 
establish an 
audit committee and define its 
composition, purpose and duties in the 
memorandum of incorporation. 
Yes See 2.23.4. above 
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    2.23.6. Companies should establish 
risk, nomination and remuneration 
committees. 
Yes Audit and Risk management Committee; 
Remuneration Committee; Executive Committee 
(serves as the nomination committee). 
    2.23.7. Committees, other than the risk 
committee, should comprise a majority 
of non-executive directors of which the 
majority should be independent. 
Yes The Act stipulates that at least 50% of Council 
committees members should be independent and 
non-executive. 
    2.23.8. External advisers and 
executive directors should attend 
committee meetings by invitation. 
Yes The Council often invites internal and external 
speakers to address members on strategic 
developments. 
    2.23.9. Committees should be free to 
take independent outside professional 
advice at the cost of the company 
subject to an approved process being 
followed. 
Yes Normal procurement policy is followed in such 
cases. 
Group boards 2.24. A governance framework 
should be agreed between the 
group and its subsidiary 
boards 
2.24.1. Listed subsidiaries must 
comply with the rules of the relevant 
stock exchange in respect of insider 
trading. 
Not applicable   
    2.24.2. The holding company must 
respect the fiduciary duties of the 
director serving in a representative 
capacity on the board of the subsidiary. 
Not applicable   
    2.24.3. The implementation and 
adoption of policies, processes or 
procedures of the holding company 
should be considered and approved by 
the subsidiary company. 
Not applicable   
    2.24.4. Disclosure should be made on 
the adoption 
of the holding company‟s policies in the 
Not applicable   
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PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
integrated report of the subsidiary 
company. 
Remuneration of 
directors and 
senior executives 
2.25. Companies should 
remunerate directors and 
executives fairly and 
responsibly 
2.25.1. Companies should adopt 
remuneration policies aligned with the 
strategy of the company and linked to 
individual performance. 
Yes There is an Integrated Performance Management 
system linked to the institution's strategic 
objectives. 
    2.25.2. The remuneration committee 
should assist the board in setting and 
administering remuneration policies. 
Yes There is a set remuneration policy for Council 
members and senior executives. 
    2.25.3. The remuneration policy should 
address 
base pay and bonuses, employee 
contracts, severance and retirement 
benefits and share-based and other 
long-term incentive schemes. 
Yes As above.  However, there are no share-based 
payments and long-term incentives schemes. 
    2.25.4. Non-executive fees should 
comprise a 
base fee as well as an attendance fee 
per meeting. 
Yes Council members receive only an honorarium for 
meeting attendance. 
  2.26. Companies should 
disclose the remuneration of 
each individual director and 
certain senior executives 
The remuneration report, included in 
the integrated report, should include: 
    
    2.26.1. all benefits paid to directors; Partial The Annual Report 2009 included a disclosure of 
compensation paid to executive staff as a note to 
the annual financial statements.  The amounts 
paid to Council members were not disclosed. 
    2.26.2. the salaries of the three most 
highly-paid employees who are not 
directors; 
Yes See 2.26.1. above 
    2.26.3. the policy on base pay; No   
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    2.26.4. participation in share incentive 
schemes; 
Not applicable   
    2.26.5. the use of benchmarks; No   
    2.26.6. incentive schemes to 
encourage retention; 
Not applicable   
    2.26.7. justification of salaries above 
the median; 
No   
    2.26.8. material payments that are ex-
gratia in nature; 
Not applicable   
    2.26.9. policies regarding executive 
employment; 
and 
No Not disclosed in the Annual Report 2009. 
    2.26.10. the maximum expected 
potential dilution as a result of 
incentive awards. 
Not applicable   
  2.27. Shareholders should 
approve the company‟s 
remuneration policy 
2.27.1. Shareholders should pass a 
non-binding advisory vote on the 
company‟s yearly remuneration policy 
Not applicable   
     2.27.2. The board should determine 
the remuneration of executive directors 
in accordance with the remuneration 
policy put to shareholder‟s vote 
Not applicable   
        
3. Audit 
committees 
       
  3.1. The board should ensure 
that the company has an 
effective and independent 
audit committee 
3.1.1. Listed and state-owned 
companies must establish an audit 
committee. 
Not applicable   
     3.1.2. All other companies should Yes The Council approved the Audit and Risk 
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establish an audit committee and 
define its composition, purpose and 
duties in the memorandum of 
incorporation. 
Management Committee and defined its terms of 
reference and, its role and function. 
     3.1.3. The board should approve the 
terms of reference of the audit 
committee. 
Yes See 3.1.2. above 
     3.1.4. The audit committee should 
meet as often as is necessary to fulfil 
its functions but at least twice a year. 
Yes The Audit and Risk Management Committee met 
five times in 2009. 
     3.1.5. The audit committee should 
meet with internal and external 
auditors at least once a year without 
management being present. 
Partial The internal and external auditors attended all the 
committee's meetings. 
Membership and 
resources of the 
audit committee 
3.2. Audit committee members 
should be suitably skilled and 
experienced independent non-
executive directors 
3.2.1. All members of the audit 
committee should be independent non-
executive directors. 
Yes This is a statutory requirement 
     3.2.2. The audit committee should 
consist of at least three members. 
Yes Comprises at least seven members. 
     3.2.3. The chairman of the board 
should not be the chairman or member 
of the audit committee. 
Yes The chairperson is not a member of the audit 
committee. 
    3.2.4. The committee collectively 
should have sufficient qualifications 
and experience to fulfil its duties. 
Partial Though the members have skills and experience, 
they are not necessarily financial literate. 
     3.2.5. The audit committee members 
should keep up-to-date with 
developments affecting the required 
skill-set. 
Partial The Council Information workshops are aimed at 
keeping Council and committee members abreast 
of latest developments relevant to Council 
operations. 
     3.2.6. The committee should be Yes The committee's terms of reference provide for 
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permitted to consult with specialists or 
consultants subject to a board-
approved process. 
consultation in the expedition of its role and 
function. 
     3.2.7. The board must fill any 
vacancies on the audit committee. 
Yes The audit committee account to the Council. 
  3.3. The audit committee 
should be chaired by an 
independent non-executive 
director 
3.3.1. The board should elect the 
chairman of the audit committee. 
Yes It is the responsibility of the Council to appoint the 
chairman and deputy-chairperson from the 
independent non-executive members. 
     3.3.2. The chairman of the audit 
committee should participate in setting 
and agreeing the agenda of the 
committee 
Yes The chairperson is tasked with the effective 
functioning of the committee. 
     3.3.3. The chairman of the audit 
committee should be present at the 
AGM. 
Not applicable   
Responsibilities of 
the audit 
committee 
3.4. The audit committee 
should oversee integrated 
reporting 
3.4.1. The audit committee should 
have regard to all factors and risks that 
may impact on the integrity of the 
integrated report. 
Partial Unisa did not produce the sustainability report. 
     3.4.2. The audit committee should 
review and comment on the financial 
statements included in the integrated 
report. 
Yes The audit committee reviewed and approved the 
financial statements in the 2009 report.  
     3.4.3. The audit committee should 
review the disclosure of sustainability 
issues in the integrated report to 
ensure that it is reliable and does not 
conflict with the financial information. 
No See 3.4.1. above 
    3.4.4. The audit committee should 
recommend to the board to engage an 
No See 3.4.1. above 
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external assurance provider on 
material sustainability issues. 
     3.4.5. The audit committee should 
consider the need to issue interim 
results. 
No Interim results are not produced at Unisa. 
     3.4.6. The audit committee should 
review the content of the summarised 
information. 
No See 3.4.5. above 
     3.4.7. The audit committee should 
engage the external auditors to provide 
assurance on the summarised financial 
information. 
No See 3.4.5. above 
  3.5. The audit committee 
should ensure that a combined 
assurance model is applied to 
provide a coordinated 
approach to all assurance 
activities 
3.5.1. The audit committee should 
ensure that the combined assurance is 
received is appropriate to address all 
the significant risks facing the 
company. 
Yes The Internal audit function and external auditors 
provide the combined assurance over the risk 
management process. 
     3.5.2. The relationship between the 
external assurance providers and the 
company should be monitored by the 
audit committee. 
Yes The Audit and Risk Management Committee 
oversees the activities of the external auditors. 
Internal assurance 
providers 
3.6. The audit committee 
should satisfy itself of the 
expertise, resources and 
experience of the company‟s 
finance function 
 3.6.1. Every year a review of the 
finance function should be performed 
by the audit committee. 
Yes The annual financial review was performed by the 
Finance and Investment committee, a Council 
committee responsible for financial control and 
administration. 
    3.6.2. The results of the review should 
be disclosed in the integrated report. 
Yes The Annual Report 2009 included a financial 
review. 
  3.7. The audit committee 
should be responsible for 
 3.7.1. The audit committee should be 
responsible for the appointment, 
Partial The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee is responsible for overseeing the 
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overseeing of internal audit performance assessment and/or 
dismissal of the CAE. 
internal audit function and assessing its 
performance.  Appointment and dismissal of the 
CAE is handled by the selection committee. 
    3.7.2. The audit committee should 
approve the internal audit plan. 
Yes It is the role of the audit committee to review the 
scope, focus and effectiveness of the internal 
audit function. 
    3.7.3. The audit committee should 
ensure that the internal audit function 
is subject to an independent quality 
review as and when the committee 
determines it appropriate. 
Yes The internal audit function is subject to an 
independent review and the results thereof are 
reported to the audit committee. 
  3.8. The audit committee 
should be an integral 
component of the risk 
management process 
 3.8.1. The charter of the audit 
committee should set out its 
responsibilities regarding risk 
management. 
Yes The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee is responsible for monitoring and 
managing all areas of risks. 
     3.8.2. The audit committee should 
specifically have oversight of: 
  This requirement is specifically catered for in the 
terms of reference and role and function of the 
Audit and Enterprise Risk management 
committee. 
    3.8.2.1. financial reporting risks; Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.8.2.2. internal financial controls; Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.8.2.3. fraud risks as it relates to 
financial reporting; and 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.8.2.4. IT risks as it relates to financial 
reporting. 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
External assurance 
providers 
3.9. The audit committee is 
responsible for recommending 
the appointment of the 
external auditor and 
overseeing the external audit 
process 
The audit committee:     
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     3.9.1. must nominate the external 
auditor for appointment; 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
     3.9.2. must approve the terms of 
engagement and remuneration for the 
external audit engagement; 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.9.3. must monitor and report on the 
independence of the external auditor; 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.9.4. must define a policy for non-
audit services provided by the external 
auditor and must approve the contracts 
for non-audit services; 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.9.5. should be informed of any 
Reportable Irregularities identified and 
reported by the external auditor; and 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.9.6. should review the quality and 
effectiveness of the external audit 
process. 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
Reporting 3.10. The audit committee 
should report to the board and 
shareholders on how it has 
discharged its duties 
 3.10.1. The audit committee should 
report internally to the board on its 
statutory duties and duties assigned to 
it by the board. 
Yes The audit committee is accountable to the 
Council. 
     3.10.2. The audit committee must 
report to the shareholders on its 
statutory duties: 
Yes The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee reported on its role, function and 
performance in the Annual Report 2009. 
    3.10.2.1. how its duties were carried 
out; 
Yes  See 3.10.2. above 
    3.10.2.2. if the committee is satisfied 
with the independence of the external 
auditor; 
Yes  See 3.10.2. above 
    3.10.2.3. the committee‟s view on the 
financial statements and the 
Yes  See 3.10.2. above 
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accounting practices; and 
    3.10.2.4. whether the internal financial 
controls are effective. 
Yes  See 3.10.2. above 
     3.10.3. The audit committee should 
provide a summary of its role and 
details of its composition, number of 
meetings and activities, in the 
integrated report. 
 Yes See 3.10.2. above 
     3.10.4. The audit committee should 
recommend the integrated report for 
approval by the board. 
Yes  See 3.10.2. above 
        
4. The governance 
of risk 
       
The board‟s 
responsibility for 
risk governance 
4.1. The board should be 
responsible for the 
governance of risk 
 4.1.1. A policy and plan for a system 
and process of risk management 
should be developed. 
Yes There is an Enterprise Risk Management Policy 
Framework which integrates risk management 
into the daily activities of the institution. 
     4.1.2. The board should comment in 
the integrated report on the 
effectiveness of the system and 
process of risk management. 
Yes The effectiveness of the risk management 
process was reported in the Annual Report 2009 
through Report on assessment of exposure to 
risk and risk management.  
     4.1.3. The board‟s responsibility for 
risk governance should be expressed 
in the board charter. 
Yes Unisa Corporate Governance manual expressly 
states that the Council is responsible for risk 
management and internal control.  Also, in terms 
of the Institutional Statute the Council's terms of 
reference include risk governance. 
     4.1.4. The induction and on-going 
training programmes of the board 
should incorporate risk governance. 
Yes The emphasis of the Council Induction and 
Information Workshops is the due cognisance of 
various mandated responsibilities of Council. 
     4.1.5. The board‟s responsibility for 
risk governance should manifest in a 
Yes The Council approved the Enterprise Risk 
Management Policy Framework. 
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documented risk management policy 
and plan. 
     4.1.6. The board should approve the 
risk management policy and plan. 
Yes See 4.1.5. above 
     4.1.7. The risk management policy 
should be widely distributed throughout 
the company. 
Yes The policy is included in the institution's 
Corporate Governance manual and the intranet. 
     4.1.8. The board should review the 
implementation of the risk 
management plan at least once a year. 
Yes The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee continuously reviews the risk 
management reports and reports to the Council. 
     4.1.9. The board should ensure that 
the implementation of the risk 
management plan is monitored 
continually. 
Yes See 4.1.8. above 
  4.2. The board should 
determine the levels of risk 
tolerance 
 4.2.1. The board should set the levels 
of risk tolerance once a year. 
Partial Though there is no set tolerance level at Unisa, 
the Enterprise Risk Management Committee has 
the responsibility to identify and monitor all risks 
pertinent to the university in terms of a rating 
based on the quality of control, severity and 
probability of occurrence, thereby ranking risks 
and setting priorities.  
     4.2.2. The board may set limits for the 
risk appetite. 
Yes See 4.2.1. above 
     4.2.3. The board should monitor that 
risks taken are within the tolerance and 
appetite levels. 
Partial See 4.2.1. above 
  4.3. The risk committee or 
audit committee should assist 
the board in carrying out its 
risk responsibilities 
 4.3.1. The board should appoint a 
committee responsible for risk. 
Yes The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee. 
     4.3.2. The risk committee should:     
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    4.3.2.1. consider the risk management 
policy and plan and monitor the risk 
management process; 
Yes The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee is responsible for the risk 
management process. It reviews the risk 
management reports and reports on key risks 
facing the university and planned mitigation 
procedures to the Council. 
    4.3.2.2. have as its members executive 
and non-executive directors, members 
of senior management and 
independent risk management experts 
to be invited, if necessary; 
Yes As per the Institutional Statute, the committee 
comprises independent non-executive members.  
Certain senior management members and 
external auditors are invited to attend the 
meetings as advisors. 
    4.3.2.3. have a minimum of three 
members; and 
Yes It has seven members. 
    4.3.2.4. convene at least twice per 
year. 
Yes It met five times during 2009. 
    4.3.3. The performance of the 
committee should be evaluated once a 
year by the board. 
Yes The committee reports on its performance to the 
Council during Council meetings. 
Management‟s 
responsibility for 
risk management 
4.4. The board should 
delegate to management the 
responsibility to design, 
implement and monitor the risk 
management plan 
 4.4.1. The board‟s risk strategy should 
be executed by management by 
means of risk management systems 
and processes. 
Yes Management is tasked by Council to design, 
implement and monitor the risk management 
process and, integrate it into daily management 
activities of the institution. 
     4.4.2. Management is accountable for 
integrating risk in the day-to-day 
activities of the company 
Yes See 4.4.1 above 
     4.4.3. The CRO should be a suitably 
experienced person who should have 
access and interact regularly on 
strategic matters with the board and/or 
appropriate board committee and 
Yes The Director of Enterprise Risk Management 
interacts with executive management. 
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executive management. 
Risk assessment 4.5. The board should ensure 
that risk assessments are 
performed on a continual basis 
4.5.1. The board should ensure 
effective and on-going risk 
assessments are performed. 
Yes All risks pertinent to the university are identified 
and monitored in terms of a rating based on the 
quality of control, severity and probability of 
occurrence, thereby ranking risks and setting 
priorities.  The university has outlined all 
significant risks (safety, health, security and risk 
financing) in a key risk register and operational 
plan, and established management structures to 
focus thereon.     
     4.5.2. A systematic, documented, 
formal risk assessment should be 
conducted at least once a year. 
Yes See 4.5.1. above 
     4.5.3. Risks should be prioritised and 
ranked to focus responses and 
interventions. 
Yes See 4.5.1. above 
     4.5.4. The risk assessment process 
should involve the risks affecting the 
various income streams of the 
company, the critical dependencies of 
the business, the sustainability and the 
legitimate interests and expectations of 
stakeholders. 
Yes See 4.5.1. above 
     4.5.5. Risk assessments should adopt 
a top-down approach. 
Yes The Council approved the Enterprise Risk 
Management Policy Framework.  The Audit and 
Enterprise Risk Management Committee is 
responsible for the risk management process and 
accountable to the Council.  Management is 
tasked by Council to integrate the risk 
management process with daily management 
activities of the university and report thereon to 
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the Council. 
     4.5.6. The board should regularly 
receive and review a register of the 
company‟s key risks. 
Partial See 4.5.1. above 
    4.5.7. The board should ensure that 
key risks are quantified where 
practicable. 
Yes See 4.5.1. above 
  4.6. The board should ensure 
that frameworks and 
methodologies are 
implemented to increase the 
probability of anticipating 
unpredictable risks 
4.6.1. The board should ensure that a 
framework and processes are in place 
to anticipate unpredictable risks. 
Yes The integrated process of enterprise-wide risk 
management is geared for unpredictable risks. 
Risk response 4.7. The board should ensure 
that management considers 
and implements appropriate 
risk responses 
 4.7.1. Management should identify 
and note in the risk register the risk 
responses decided upon. 
Yes The risk register sets out major risks and 
approved action thereto. 
    4.7.2. Management should 
demonstrate to the board that the risk 
response provides for the identification 
and exploitation of opportunities to 
improve the performance of the 
company 
No The risk management process focuses only on 
identifying and responding to the risks. 
Risk monitoring 4.8. The board should ensure 
continual risk monitoring by 
management 
4.8.1. The board should ensure that 
effective and 
continual monitoring of risk 
management 
takes place.  
Yes The Council has delegated this function to 
Management     (management created the Risk, 
Ethics and Controls Committee) 
     4.8.2. The responsibility for monitoring 
should be defined in the risk 
management plan. 
Yes Outlined in the Enterprise Risk Management 
Policy Framework 
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Risk assurance 4.9. The board should receive 
assurance regarding the 
effectiveness of the risk 
management process 
 4.9.1. Management should provide 
assurance to the board that the risk 
management plan is integrated in the 
daily activities of the company. 
Yes The Director of Enterprise Management oversees 
this process and interacts with executive 
management. 
    4.9.2. Internal audit should provide a 
written assessment of the 
effectiveness of the system of internal 
controls and risk management to the 
board. 
Partial The Internal Audit reported its observations on 
the system of internal controls to the Council.  
The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee, through its report on exposure to risk 
and risk management, reported on the 
effectiveness of the risk management process in 
the Annual Report 2009. 
Risk disclosure 4.10. The board should ensure 
that there are processes in 
place enabling complete, 
timely, relevant, accurate and 
accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders 
4.10.1. Undue, unexpected or unusual 
risks should be disclosed in the 
integrated report 
No Such disclosure was not made in the Annual 
Report 2009. 
    4.10.2. The board should disclose its 
view on the effectiveness of the risk 
management process in the integrated 
report. 
Yes See 4.9.2 above 
         
5. The governance 
of information 
technology 
        
  5.1. The board should be 
responsible for information 
technology (IT) governance 
 5.1.1. The board should assume the 
responsibility for the governance of IT 
and place it on the board agenda. 
Yes The ICT Committee (a Council committee) 
oversees and monitors all strategic and 
governance matters related to IT operations.   
     5.1.2. The board should ensure that 
an IT charter and policies are 
established and implemented. 
Partial The development of IT policy is currently 
underway. 
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     5.1.3. The board should ensure 
promotion of an ethical IT governance 
culture and awareness and of a 
common IT language. 
Partial See 5.1.2. above 
     5.1.4. The board should ensure that 
an IT internal control framework is 
adopted and implemented . 
Partial There is in place an adequate system of internal 
controls that includes data privacy protection and 
optimal back-up systems that address IT risks. 
     5.1.5. The board should receive 
independent assurance on the 
effectiveness of the IT internal controls. 
Partial Independent assurance is provided by the 
internal audit function and the work of external 
auditors on general IT controls. 
  5.2. IT should be aligned with 
the performance and 
sustainability objectives of the 
company 
 5.2.1. The board should ensure that 
the IT strategy is integrated with the 
company‟s strategic and business 
processes. 
Partial The ICT Steering Committee was established in 
2009 with the aim to integrate IT strategy with the 
Strategic Plan 2015. 
     5.2.2. The board should ensure that 
there is a process in place to identity 
and exploit opportunities to improve 
the performance and sustainability of 
the company through the use of IT. 
Partial See 5.2.1. above 
  5.3. The board should 
delegate to management the 
responsibility for the 
implementation of an IT 
governance framework 
5.3.1 Management should be 
responsible for the implementation of 
the structures, processes and 
mechanisms for the IT governance 
framework. 
Partial The ICT Steering Committee will give effect to the 
IT governance framework. 
    5.3.2 The board may appoint an IT 
steering committee of similar function 
to assist with its governance of IT. 
Yes The ICT Committee is responsible for all strategic 
and governance matters related to IT operations.   
    5.3.3 The CEO should appoint a Chief 
Information Officer responsible for the 
management of IT. 
No There is no Chief Information Officer. 
    5.3.4 The CIO should be a suitably No See 5.3.3. above 
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qualified and experienced person who 
should have access and interact 
regularly on strategic IT matters with 
the board and/or appropriate board 
committee and executive 
management. 
  5.4. The board should monitor 
and evaluate significant IT 
investments and expenditure 
5.4.1 The board should oversee the 
value delivery of IT and monitor the 
return on investment from significant IT 
projects. 
Partial IT investments are subject to the strict university 
tender procedures and have to be approved by 
the Finance and Investment Committee (Council 
sub-committee). 
    5.4.2 The board should ensure that 
intellectual property contained in 
information systems are protected. 
Partial There are measures in place to ensure data 
privacy protection. 
    5.4.3 The board should obtain 
independent assurance on the IT 
governance and controls supporting 
outsourced IT services. 
Not applicable The university ICT department provides IT 
services in the institution. 
  5.5. IT should form an integral 
part of the company‟s risk 
management 
5.5.1 Management should regularly 
demonstrate to the board that the 
company has adequate business 
resilience arrangements in place for 
disaster recovery. 
Partial The ICT department runs full back-ups to 
facilitate disaster recovery. 
    5.5.2 The board should ensure that the 
company complies with IT laws and 
that IT related rules, codes and 
standards are considered. 
Partial All information systems have been designed and 
implemented in terms of Accepted Standards 
(defined and documented) to derive efficiency, 
effectiveness, reliability and adequate levels of 
security. 
  5.6. The board should ensure 
that information assets are 
managed effectively 
 5.6.1. The board should ensure that 
there are systems in place for the 
management of information which 
should include information security, 
Partial There exists a data privacy and information 
security policies.  
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information management and 
information privacy. 
     5.6.2. The board should ensure that all 
personal information is treated by the 
company as an important business 
asset and is identified. 
Partial Unisa has a system of internal control to minimise 
the risk of fraud and error when transacting with 
staff and third parties. 
     5.6.3. The board should ensure that 
an Information Security Management 
System is developed and 
implemented. 
Partial See 5.6.1. above 
     5.6.4. The board should approve the 
information security strategy and 
delegate and empower management to 
implement the strategy. 
Partial Though there exists no formal information 
security strategy, the ICT department implements 
data privacy and information security policies. 
  5.7. A risk committee and 
audit committee should assist 
the board in carrying out its IT 
responsibilities 
5.7.1. The risk committee should 
ensure that IT risks are adequately 
addressed. 
Partial The Audit and Enterprise Risk management 
Committee is responsible for identifying and 
managing all risks in the university.  However, IT 
risks are not adequately addressed until the IT 
governance policy framework is fully established. 
     5.7.2. The risk committee should 
obtain appropriate assurance that 
controls are in place and effective in 
addressing IT risks. 
Partial Independent assurance is provided by the 
internal audit function and the work of external 
auditors on general IT controls. 
     5.7.3. The audit committee should 
consider IT as it relates to financial 
reporting and the going concern of the 
company. 
Partial See 5.7.1. above 
     5.7.4. The audit committee should 
consider the use of technology to 
improve audit coverage and efficiency. 
Partial See 5.7.1. above 
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6. Compliance with 
laws, rules, codes 
and standards 
       
  6.1. The board should ensure 
that the company complies 
with applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-
binding rules, codes and 
standards 
 6.1.1. Companies must comply with all 
applicable laws. 
Yes Unisa has been legislated by the Higher 
Education Act and must comply with it.  As a 
juristic person, Unisa must comply with the 
applicable legal and regulatory framework. 
     6.1.2. Exceptions permitted in law, 
shortcomings and proposed changes 
expected should be handled ethically. 
Yes The Code of Conduct and Ethics sets out ethical 
standards to be complied with in all business 
activities. 
    6.1.3 Compliance should be an ethical 
imperative. 
Yes See 6.1.2. above 
    6.1.4 Compliance with applicable laws 
should be understood not only in terms 
of the obligations that they create, but 
also for the rights and protection that 
they afford. 
Yes Financial rules have been designed to ensure 
compliance with all applicable laws. 
    6.1.5 The board should understand the 
context of the law, and how other 
applicable laws interact with it. 
Yes The Council have available legal expertise from 
members and knowledgeable senior 
management members (as advisors). 
    6.1.6 The board should monitor the 
company‟s compliance with applicable 
laws, rules, codes and standards. 
Yes The Council has two committees which assist 
with compliance with all applicable laws, rules, 
codes and standards at Unisa: the  Risk, Ethics 
and Control Committee (REC) deals with  
compliance with the regulatory framework while, 
the Internal Audit and the Risk management are 
tasked with identifying risks related to 
compliance.  The audit committee performs 
assessment of the extent of compliance and 
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reports on its effectiveness to the Council. 
    6.1.7 Compliance should be a regular 
item on the agenda of the board. 
Partial The audit committee reports on the effectiveness 
of compliance to the Council. 
    6.1.8 The board should disclose details 
in the integrated report on how it 
discharged its responsibility to 
establish an effective compliance 
framework and processes. 
Partial The Council has disclosed in the Annual Report 
2009 a list of relevant laws that the university 
complies with 
  6.2. The board and each 
individual director should have 
a working understanding of the 
effect of the applicable laws, 
rules, codes and standards on 
the company and its business 
6.2.1 The induction and on-going 
training programmes of directors 
should incorporate an overview of and 
any changes to applicable laws, rules, 
codes and standards. 
Partial New Council members are familiarised with the 
higher education landscape, the institutional 
structure and their roles and responsibilities 
during the induction programme.  Also, the 
Registrar (serves as the Council Secretary) 
informs these members with the applicable legal 
and regulatory framework. 
    6.2.2 Directors should sufficiently 
familiarise themselves with the general 
content of applicable laws, rules, codes 
and standards to discharge their legal 
duties. 
Partial The Council set up Induction and Information 
workshops to ensure Council members are up to 
speed with all relevant matters. 
  6.3. Compliance risk should 
form an integral part of the 
company‟s risk management 
process 
6.3.1 The risk of non-compliance 
should be identified, assessed and 
responded to through the risk 
management processes. 
Partial The risk management process is overseen by the 
Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee which, reports on its effectiveness to 
the Council. 
    6.3.2 Companies should consider 
establishing a compliance function. 
Partial The Risk, Ethics and Controls Committee (REC), 
a management committee designs, implements 
and monitors the risk management process. 
  6.4. The board should 
delegate to management the 
implementation of an effective 
compliance framework and 
6.4.1 The board should ensure that a 
legal compliance policy, approved by 
the board, has been implemented by 
management. 
No A legal compliance policy does not exist. 
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processes 
    6.4.2 The board should receive 
assurance on the effectiveness of the 
controls around compliance with laws, 
rules, codes and standards. 
Partial See 6.3.1. above 
    6.4.3 Compliance with laws, rules, 
codes and standards should be 
incorporated in the code of conduct of 
the company. 
Partial The Code of Conduct and Ethics promotes an 
ethical corporate culture in the university. 
    6.4.4 Management should establish 
the appropriate structures, educate 
and train, and communicate and 
measure key performance indicators 
relevant to compliance. 
Partial Through the Risk, Ethics and Controls committee. 
    6.4.5 The integrated report should 
include details of material or often 
repeated instances of non-compliance 
by either the company or its directors 
in their capacity as such. 
No No disclosure of material instances of non-
compliance was made in the Annual Report 2009. 
    6.4.6 An independent, suitably skilled 
compliance officer may be appointed. 
Partial The Executive Director of Internal Audit performs 
this role. 
    6.4.7 The compliance officer should be 
a suitably skilled and experienced 
person who should have access and 
interact regularly on strategic 
compliance matters with the board 
and/or appropriate board committee 
and executive management. 
Partial See 6.4.6. above 
    6.4.8 The structuring of the compliance 
function, its role and its position in 
terms of reporting lines should be a 
Partial See 6.4.6. above 
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reflection of the company‟s decision on 
how compliance is to be integrated 
with its ethics and risk management. 
    6.4.9. The compliance function should 
have adequate resources to fulfil its 
function. 
Partial See 6.4.6. above 
        
7. Internal audit        
The need for and 
role of internal 
audit 
7.1. The board should ensure 
that there is an effective risk 
based internal audit 
 7.1.1. Companies should establish an 
internal audit function. 
Yes There is an independent internal audit that 
reports to the audit committee 
     7.1.2. Internal audit should perform 
the following functions: 
    
    7.1.2.1 evaluate the company‟s 
governance processes; 
Yes The IA evaluates the operation of the internal 
control and risk management system in the 
university and reports all its observations and 
recommendations to Management and Council.  
Internal audit performs its duties in compliance 
with the IIA Standards and the Code of Ethics.   
The IA is independent of management and 
reports its performance to the audit committee.   
    7.1.2.2. perform an objective 
assessment of the effectiveness of risk 
management and the internal control 
framework; 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.1.2.3. systematically analyse and 
evaluating business processes and 
associated controls; and 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.1.2.4. provide a source of information 
as appropriate, regarding instances of 
fraud, corruption, unethical behaviour 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
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and irregularities. 
     7.1.3. An internal audit charter should 
be defined and approved by the board. 
Yes The Internal Audit function is specified in the IA 
charter approved by the Council. 
     7.1.4. The internal audit function 
should adhere to the IIA Standards and 
code of ethics. 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
Internal audit‟s 
approach and plan 
7.2. Internal audit should 
follow a risk based approach 
to its plan 
 7.2.1. The internal audit plan and 
approach should be informed by the 
strategy and risks of the company. 
Yes The internal audit approach considers strategic 
objectives and risks, controls and assessment of 
its adequacy and efficiency. 
     7.2.2. Internal audit should be 
independent from management. 
Yes The internal audit function is independent of 
management and, reports to the Council. 
     7.2.3. Internal audit should be an 
objective provider of assurance that 
considers: 
    
    7.2.3.1. the risks that may prevent or 
slow down the realisation of strategic 
goals; 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.2.3.2. whether controls are in place 
and functioning effectively to mitigate 
these; and 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.2.3.3. the opportunities that will 
promote the realisation of strategic 
goals that are identified, assessed and 
effectively managed by the company‟s 
management team. 
Yes Management implements the IA 
recommendations to address any control 
deficiencies and take advantage of opportunities 
to improve the internal control system.   
  7.3. Internal audit should 
provide a written assessment 
of the effectiveness of the 
company‟s system of internal 
controls and risk management 
7.3.1 Internal audit should form an 
integral part of the combined 
assurance model as internal assurance 
provider. 
Yes The internal audit and external auditors provide 
the combined assurance. 
    7.3.2 Internal controls should be Partial External auditors consider and assess internal 
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established not only over financial 
matters, but also operational, 
compliance and sustainability issues. 
controls over non-financial matters as well. 
    7.3.3 Companies should maintain an 
effective governance, risk 
management and internal control 
framework. 
Partial The Enterprise Risk management framework 
employs an enterprise-wide risk management 
process.  The internal audit function focuses on 
the internal control system. 
    7.3.4 Management should specify the 
elements of the control framework. 
Partial The components have not been formally 
specified. 
    7.3.5 Internal audit should provide a 
written assessment of the system of 
internal controls and risk management 
to the board. 
Partial The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee included the Report on exposure to 
risk and risk management in the Annual Report 
2009. 
    7.3.6 Internal audit should provide a 
written assessment of internal financial 
controls to the audit committee. 
Partial This was done to the extent of specific issues 
raised by external auditors. 
  7.4. The audit committee 
should be responsible for 
overseeing internal audit 
7.4.1 The internal audit plan should be 
agreed and approved by the audit 
committee. 
Yes The internal audit plan was approved by the Audit 
and Enterprise Risk Management Committee. 
    7.4.2 The audit committee should 
evaluate the performance of the 
internal audit function. 
Partial The Audit and Enterprise Risk management 
Committee reviews the scope, focus and 
effectiveness of the internal audit function. 
    7.4.3 The audit committee should 
ensure that the internal audit function 
is subjected to an independent quality 
review. 
No See 7.4.2. above 
    7.4.4. The CAE should report 
functionally to the audit committee 
chairman. 
Yes Terms of reference of the Internal audit 
     7.4.5. The audit committee should be 
responsible for the appointment, 
Yes The Audit and Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee is responsible for overseeing the 
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performance assessment and 
dismissal of the CAE. 
internal audit function and assessing its 
performance.  Appointment and dismissal of the 
CAE is handled by the selection committee. 
     7.4.6. The audit committee should 
ensure that the internal audit function 
is appropriately resourced and has 
appropriate budget allocated to the 
function. 
Yes See 7.4.5. above 
     7.4.7. Internal audit should report at all 
audit committee meetings. 
Yes The IA reports to the audit committee. 
Internal audit‟s 
status in the 
company 
7.5. Internal audit should be 
strategically positioned to 
achieve its objectives 
7.5.1. The internal audit function 
should be independent and objective. 
Yes The IA charter specifies its independence and 
objectivity.  The internal audit is independent of 
management and reports to the audit committee. 
     7.5.2. The internal audit function 
should report functionally to the audit 
committee. 
Yes See 7.5.1. above 
     7.5.3. The CAE should have a 
standing invitation to attend executive 
committee meetings. 
Yes The CAE attends all the meetings of the 
Executive management Committee. 
     7.5.4. The internal audit function 
should be skilled and resourced as is 
appropriate for the complexity and 
volume of risk and assurance needs. 
Yes The IA staff have the necessary competence to 
carry out the internal audit function. 
     7.5.5. The CAE should develop and 
maintain a quality assurance and 
improvement programme. 
Yes The Internal Audit performs its duties in 
compliance with the IIA Standards and the Code 
of Ethics. 
        
8. Governing 
stakeholder 
relationships 
      
  8.1. The board should 8.1.1. The gap between stakeholder Yes Unisa engages all stakeholders through the 
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appreciate that stakeholders‟ 
perceptions affect a 
company‟s reputation 
perceptions and the performance of 
the company should be managed and 
measured to enhance or protect the 
company‟s reputation. 
Institutional Forum  to promote debate and 
consensus on topical issues in the general 
academic community.  Unisa also seeks 
feedback from the stakeholders through various 
mechanisms such as communication and 
marketing activities  to address their needs.   
    8.1.2 The company‟s reputation and its 
linkage with stakeholder relationships 
should be a regular board agenda 
item. 
Partial The Council recognises engagement with 
stakeholders as a strategic imperative.  This is 
underlined in its co-operative governance policy. 
    8.1.3 The board should identify 
important stakeholder groupings. 
Yes Stakeholders are broadly considered as internal 
and external groupings. 
  8.2. The board should 
delegate to management to 
proactively deal with 
stakeholder relationships   
8.2.1 Management should develop a 
strategy and formulate policies for the 
management of relationships with each 
stakeholder grouping. 
Partial There is no formal stakeholder policy on 
managing stakeholder relationships.  Unisa 
however, has developed an integrated 
communication plan involving various methods  to 
communicate effectively with the stakeholders: 
Publications (Annual Report, Research Report); 
Media events such as seminars, workshops, etc. 
    8.2.2 The board should consider 
whether it is appropriate to publish its 
stakeholder policies. 
No See 8.2.1. above 
    8.2.3 The board should oversee the 
establishment of mechanisms and 
processes that support stakeholders in 
constructive engagement with the 
company. 
Partial See 8.2.1. above 
    8.2.4 The board should encourage 
shareholders to attend AGM‟s. 
Not applicable   
    8.2.5 The board should consider not 
only formal, but also informal, 
Partial See 8.2.1. above 
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processes for interaction with the 
company‟s stakeholders. 
    8.2.6 The board should disclose in its 
integrated report the nature of the 
company‟s dealings with stakeholders 
and the outcomes of these dealings. 
Partial The Council has indirectly alluded to stakeholders 
relationships through the Report on the 
Institutional Forum in the Annual Report 2009. 
  8.3. The board should strive to 
achieve the appropriate 
balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, in the 
best interests of the company 
8.3.1 The board should take account of 
the legitimate interests and 
expectations of its stakeholders in its 
decision-making in the best interests of 
the company. 
Partial Practices such as the Institutional Forum and the 
integrated Communication Plan underscore the 
importance of stakeholder relationships to the 
Council 
  8.4. Companies should ensure 
the equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
8.4.1 There must be equitable 
treatment of all holders of the same 
class of shares issued. 
Not applicable   
    8.4.2. The board should ensure that 
minority shareholders are protected. 
Not applicable   
  8.5. Transparent and effective 
communication with 
stakeholders is essential for 
building and maintaining their 
trust and confidence 
8.5.1. Complete, timely, relevant, 
accurate, honest and accessible 
information should be provided by the 
company to its stakeholders whilst 
having regard to legal and strategic 
considerations. 
Partial Integrated communication plan 
     8.5.2. Communication with 
stakeholders should be in clear and 
understandable language. 
Partial See 8.2.1. above 
     8.5.3. The board should adopt 
communication guidelines that support 
a responsible communication 
programme. 
Partial See 8.2.1. above 
     8.5.4. The board should consider 
disclosing in the integrated report the 
No No such disclosure was made in the Annual 
Report 2009 
43 
 
 
CHECKLIST: UNISA 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
number and reasons for refusals of 
requests of information that were 
lodged with the company in terms of 
the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act, 2000. 
Dispute resolution 8.6. The board should ensure 
that disputes are resolved as 
effectively, efficiently and 
expeditiously as possible 
 8.6.1. The board should adopt formal 
dispute resolution processes for 
internal and external disputes. 
Partial The institution's mediation and resolution process 
does not extend to external disputes. 
     8.6.2. The board should select the 
appropriate individuals to represent the 
company in ADR. 
No The Institutional Forum advises the Council on 
mediation and dispute resolution. 
        
9. Integrated 
reporting and 
disclosure 
       
Transparency and 
accountability 
9.1. The board should ensure 
the integrity of the company‟s 
integrated report 
 9.1.1. A company should have 
controls to enable it to verify and 
safeguard the integrity of its integrated 
report. 
Partial There is a strong indication of controls over 
reporting of financial performance issues, the 
accounting and internal control system, and 
operational and administrative matters.  There is 
established policy framework over these matters.  
Reporting of social and sustainability issues is still 
inadequate. 
     9.1.2. The board should delegate to 
the audit committee to evaluate 
sustainability disclosures 
No No sustainability reporting yet. 
    The integrated report should:     
    9.1.3. be prepared every year; Yes Unisa prepares an Annual report 
    9.1.4. convey adequate information 
regarding the company‟s financial and 
sustainability performance; and 
Partial See 9.1.1. above 
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    9.1.5. focus on substance over form. Partial The financial issues that are covered in the 
integrated report comply with the International 
Financial Reporting standards. 
  9.2 Sustainability reporting 
and disclosure should be 
integrated with the company‟s 
financial reporting 
9.2.1. The board should include 
commentary on the company‟s 
financial results. 
Yes The annual report 2009 included the Financial 
review section. 
    9.2.2. The board must disclose if the 
company is a going concern. 
Yes This was covered in the financial review section. 
    9.2.3. The integrated report should 
describe how the company has made 
its money. 
Yes See 9.2.2. above 
    9.2.4. The board should ensure that 
the positive and negative impacts of 
the company‟s operations and plans to 
improve the positives and eradicate or 
ameliorate the negatives in the 
financial year ahead are conveyed in 
the integrated report. 
No Unisa did not produce the sustainability report. 
  9.3 Sustainability reporting 
and disclosure should be 
independently assured 
9.3.1. General oversight and reporting 
of sustainability should be delegated 
by the board to the audit committee. 
No See 9.2.4. above 
    9.3.2. The audit committee should 
assist the board by reviewing the 
integrated report to ensure that the 
information contained in it is reliable 
and that it does not contradict the 
financial aspects of the report. 
Partial The Council declared its responsibility of financial 
statements and other information in the Annual 
Report 2009. 
    9.3.3. The audit committee should 
oversee the provision of assurance 
over sustainability issues. 
No See 9.2.4. above 
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Checklist employed in testing adherence of UKZN Council to King III Code on Corporate Governance 
CHECKLIST : UKZN 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
     
1. Ethical 
leadership and 
corporate 
citizenship 
    
Responsible 
leadership 
1.1 The board should provide 
effective leadership based on 
an ethical foundation 
Ethical leaders should:     
    1.1.1. direct the strategy and 
operations to build a sustainable 
business; 
Yes In its statement on corporate governance in the 
Annual Report 2009, the Council declared its 
responsibility of the overall strategic direction of 
the institution.  The Council has established 
Strategic Plan 2007- 2016 in line with the 
university mission and vision. 
    1.1.2. consider the short- and long-
term impacts of the strategy on the 
economy, society and the environment; 
Partial UKZN has undertaken various sustainability 
initiatives: a programme to alleviate poverty and 
increase food and clean water supply in Africa; 
"Green" building to sustain rural livelihoods.  The 
institution has committed itself to redress the 
disadvantages, inequities and imbalances of the 
past.   
    1.1.3. do business ethically; Yes UKZN has pledged to abide by highest ethical 
standards and educate society about sound 
ethical practice.  The university has developed a 
Code of Ethics that controls the institution in 
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engagements with all its stakeholders (internal 
and external).  Council members and the 
Executive have signed declarations to 
acknowledge and uphold the Code at all times.  
This move will help engender an ethical culture in 
the institution. 
    1.1.4. do not compromise the natural 
environment; 
Partial UKZN has embraced sustainability development 
as shown by its "Green" initiatives ("Green" 
building).  There is however no clear policy 
framework on protecting the environment. 
    1.1.5. take account of the company‟s 
impact on 
internal and external stakeholders. 
Yes The university has created the Institutional Forum  
to engender a culture of debate and engagement 
in the institution.  UKZN set up a Governance and 
Academic Freedom Committee (GAFC) which 
welcomes all stakeholders‟ views in the debate 
about academic freedom in the university. 
The board‟s 
responsibilities 
  1.1.6. be responsible for the strategic 
direction of the company and for the 
control of the company 
Yes See 1.1.1 above.  The Council is in terms of the 
Higher Education Act (the Act) the supreme body 
of governance in the university. 
   1.1.7. set the values to which the 
company will adhere formulated in its 
code of conduct; 
Yes The Code of Ethics should be acknowledged and 
upheld at all times.  It controls the institution in 
engagements with all its stakeholders.  
   1.1.8. ensure that its conduct and that 
of management aligns to the values 
and is adhered to in all aspects of its 
business; 
Yes The Code of Conduct re-enforces the need to 
conduct the affairs of the university with integrity 
and ethically.  It should always be upheld. 
    1.1.9. promote the stakeholder-
inclusive approach of governance. 
Yes The university has adopted the values of broad 
and inclusive participation, democratic 
representation, accountability, and 
transparency  to entrench governance in the 
institutional culture. 
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Ethical foundation   The board should:     
    1.1.10. ensure that all deliberations, 
decisions and actions are based on the 
four values underpinning good 
governance; and 
Yes As mentioned in 1.1.9. above, UKZN values 
include the universal values of good governance, 
namely; fairness, accountability, responsibility 
and transparency. 
    1.1.11. ensure that each director 
adheres to the duties of a director 
Yes Council members have to act in good faith, serve 
the interests of the university, respect Council 
decisions and maintain confidentiality. 
  1.2. The board should ensure 
that the company is and is 
seen to be a responsible 
corporate citizen 
The board should:     
    1.2.1. consider not only on financial 
performance but also the impact of the 
company‟s operations on society and 
the environment; 
Partial UKZN has pledged to promote a culture of 
responsible, ethical and sustainable use of 
natural resources.  Also, to support and 
contribute to general development and welfare of 
the wider community by generating and 
disseminating knowledge and, produce socially-
responsible graduates. 
    1.2.2. protect, enhance and invest in 
the wellbeing of the economy, society 
and the environment; 
Yes See 1.2.1. above.  In 2009 the university raised R 
118 million for various society upliftment projects 
and in partnership with the US based Howard 
Medical institute, established a tuberculosis and 
HIV Institute in the Nelson Mandela Medical 
School which will involve a significant investment 
of US$  70 million in building and research 
studies. 
    1.2.3. ensure that the company‟s 
performance and interaction with its 
stakeholders is guided by the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights; 
Yes Strategic engagements are undertaken in the 
spirit of mutual respect, adding value and 
projecting a positive image.  UKZN is committed 
to the highest standards of integrity, behaviour 
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and ethics in dealing with its stakeholders. 
    1.2.4. ensure that collaborative efforts 
with stakeholders are embarked upon 
to promote ethical conduct and good 
corporate citizenship; 
Partial See 1.2.3. above.  UKZN's second strategic goal 
involves promoting and rewarding community 
engagement that adds value. 
    1.2.5. ensure that measurable 
corporate citizenship programmes are 
implemented; and 
Partial See 1.2.6. below 
    1.2.6. ensure that management 
develops corporate citizenship policies. 
Yes UKZN Strategic plan 2007- 2016 stipulates that 
the university will only engage in community 
initiatives that fall within its mission and vision, 
and local and national development imperatives; 
meet the interests and general welfare of the 
community; and finally, facilitate the generation 
and dissemination of knowledge by the university. 
  1.3. The board should ensure 
that the company's ethics are 
managed effectively 
The board should ensure that:     
     1.3.1. it builds and sustains an ethical 
corporate culture in the company; 
Yes The Code of Ethics and Conduct will help 
promote and engender an ethical corporate 
culture in the university. 
     1.3.2. it determines the ethical 
standards which should be clearly 
articulated and ensures that the 
company takes measures to achieve 
adherence to them in all aspects of the 
business; 
Yes The Code of Conduct outlines the high standards 
of integrity, behaviour and ethics for all university 
stakeholders.  The Code controls the university in 
its activities.  The audit committee is responsible 
for monitoring the ethical conduct of the 
university, the Council and executive 
management. 
     1.3.3. adherence to ethical standards 
is measured; 
No Though compliance is monitored, the level of 
ethical performance is not measured. 
     1.3.4. internal and external ethics Yes Stakeholders (internal and external groupings) 
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performance is aligned around the 
same ethical standards; 
have to adhere to the Code in all business 
activities. 
     1.3.5. ethical risks and opportunities 
are incorporated in the risk 
management process; 
Yes The Risk, Ethics and Controls Committee is 
responsible for the risk management process. 
     1.3.6. a code of conduct and ethics-
related policies are implemented; 
Yes There is a Code of Ethics and Conduct in place. 
     1.3.7. compliance with the code of 
conduct is integrated in the operations 
of the company; and 
Yes All business activities should be undertaken with 
integrity and ethically. 
     1.3.8. the company‟s ethics 
performance should be assessed, 
monitored, reported and disclosed.  
Partial The level of ethical performance was not 
disclosed in the Annual Report 2009. 
      
2. Boards and 
directors 
     
Role and function 
of the board 
2.1. The board should act as 
the focal point for and 
custodian of corporate 
governance 
The board should:     
    2.1.1. have a charter setting out its 
responsibilities; 
Yes The Council is responsible for governance of 
Unisa as per the Higher Education Act (the Act).  
Also, the Council and its standing committees 
have clear and specific terms of reference and 
roles and functions. 
     2.1.2. meet at least four times per 
year; 
Yes The Council met eight times (five scheduled and 
three special meetings in 2009. 
     2.1.3. monitor the relationship 
between management and the 
stakeholders of the company; and 
Yes The institution has inculcated an ethic of 
customer service  to establish sound working 
relationships within and between supporting 
divisions, academic community, the student body 
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and external stakeholders. 
     2.1.4. ensure that the company 
survives and thrives. 
Yes The institution is a going concern and exercises 
sound financial management.  It has generated 
an operating surplus in the past five years. 
  2.2. The board should 
appreciate that strategy, risk, 
performance and sustainability 
are inseparable 
The board should:     
     2.2.1. inform and approve the 
strategy; 
Yes UKZN has developed a Strategic Plan 2007- 
2016 to make it the Premier University of African 
Scholarship. 
     2.2.2. ensure that the strategy is 
aligned with the purpose of the 
company, the value drivers of its 
business and the legitimate interests 
and expectations of its stakeholders; 
Yes The Strategic Plan presents the mission and the 
vision of the university. 
     2.2.3. satisfy itself that the strategy 
and business plans are not 
encumbered by risks that have not 
been thoroughly examined by 
management; and 
Yes The risk management process has been 
incorporated into the normal course of operations. 
part of daily management activities.  Management 
has been tasked by Council to design, implement 
and monitor the risk management process. 
     2.2.4. ensure that the strategy will 
result in sustainable outcomes taking 
account of people, planet and profit. 
Partial The university value framework alludes to ethical 
and sustainable use of natural resources and 
responsible community engagement.  There is no 
formal policy framework on sustainability though. 
  2.3. The board should provide 
effective leadership based on 
an ethical foundation 
Refer principle 1.1 Yes   
  2.4. The board should ensure 
that the company is and is 
seen to be a responsible 
Refer principle 1.2 Yes   
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corporate citizen 
  2.5. The board should ensure 
that the company‟s ethics are 
managed effectively 
Refer principle 1.3 Yes   
  2.6. The board should ensure 
that the company has an 
effective and independent 
audit committee 
Refer to chapter 3 Yes   
  2.7. The board should be 
responsible for the 
governance of risk 
Refer to chapter 4 Yes   
  2.8. The board should be 
responsible for information 
technology (IT) governance 
Refer to chapter 5 Yes   
  2.9. The board should ensure 
that the company complies 
with applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-
binding rules, codes and 
standards 
Refer to chapter 6 Yes   
  2.10. The board should ensure 
that there is 
an effective risk-based internal 
audit 
Refer to chapter 7 Yes   
  2.11.The board should 
appreciate that stakeholders‟ 
perceptions affect the 
company‟s reputation 
Refer to chapter 8 Yes   
  2.12. The board should ensure 
the integrity 
of the company‟s integrated 
Refer to chapter 9 No   
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report 
  2.13. The board should report 
on the effectiveness of the 
company‟s system of internal 
controls 
Refer to chapters 7 and 9 Yes   
  2.14. The board and its 
directors should act in the best 
interests of the company. 
2.14.1. The board must act in the best 
interests of the company. 
  
Yes The Code of Conduct requires Council members 
to act in good faith and serve the interests of the 
university . 
     2.14.2. Directors must adhere to the 
legal standards of conduct. 
Yes Council members should (jointly and severally) 
observe the university ethical obligations when 
conducting business. 
    2.14.3. Directors or the board should 
be permitted to take independent 
advice connection with their duties 
following an agreed procedure. 
Partial There is no agreed procedure regarding 
independent advice. 
    2.14.4. Real or perceived conflicts 
should be disclosed to the board and 
managed. 
Yes The university ethical obligations require Council 
members and Executive management to disclose 
any significant interests in a register of contracts. 
    2.14.5. Listed companies should have 
a policy regarding dealing in securities 
by directors, officers and selected 
employees. 
Not applicable   
  2.15. The board should 
consider business rescue 
proceedings or other 
turnaround mechanisms as 
soon as the company is 
financially distressed as 
defined in the Act 
The board should ensure that:     
    2.15.1. the solvency and liquidity of the 
company is continuously monitored; 
Yes The Council is required by the Act to report 
annually the financial position and performance to 
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the Minister.  The Finance Committee is 
responsible for monitoring the University‟s 
financial position, 
the effectiveness of the treasury function and 
control systems. 
    2.15.2. its consideration is fair to save 
a financially distressed company either 
by way of workouts, sale, merger, 
amalgamation, compromise with 
creditors or business rescue; 
  See 2.15.3. below 
     2.15.3. a suitable practitioner is 
appointed if business rescue is 
adopted; and 
  In terms of the Act, the Minister may in 
consultation with the Council, appoint an 
administrator to assume activities of the Council 
or appoint an independent assessor to investigate 
any financial irregularities or maladministration in 
the university. 
     2.15.4. the practitioner furnishes 
security for the value of the assets of 
the company. 
  See 2.15.3. above 
  2.16. The board should elect a 
chairman of the board who is 
an independent non-executive 
director. The CEO of the 
company should not also fulfil 
the role of chairman of the 
board 
2.16.1. The members of the board 
should elect a chairman on an annual 
basis. 
Partial The Institutional Statute (IS) authorises the 
Council to elect a chairperson every two years. 
    2.16.2. The chairman should be 
independent and free of conflict upon 
appointment. 
Yes The IS stipulates that the chairperson should be 
external to the university (may not be an 
employee or student of the university). 
    2.16.3. A lead independent director 
should be appointed in the case where 
Not applicable See 2.16.2. above 
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an executive chairman is appointed or 
where the chairman is not independent 
or conflicted. 
    2.16.4. The appointment of a 
chairman, who is not independent, 
should be justified in the integrated 
report. 
Not applicable See 2.16.2. above 
    2.16.5. The role of the chairman should 
be formalised.  
Yes The chairman has a clear role and function and, 
terms of reference.  The chairman is responsible 
for the overall leadership and functioning of the 
Council. 
     2.16.6. The chairman‟s ability to add 
value, and his performance against 
what is expected of his role and 
function, should be assessed every 
year. 
Partial The performance of Council is assessed 
annually. 
    2.16.7. The CEO should not become 
the chairman until 3 years have lapsed. 
No The Principal and Vice-Chancellor serves as the 
CEO and has its term of office.  It is therefore 
unlikely that the VC may become the chairman. 
    2.16.8. The chairman together with the 
board, should consider the number of 
outside chairmanships held. 
No There is no policy over outside chairmanships 
held. 
    2.16.9. The board should ensure a 
succession plan for the role of the 
chairman. 
No There is no formal succession plan 
  2.17. The board should 
appoint the chief executive 
officer and establish a 
framework for the delegation 
of authority 
The board should:     
     2.17.1. appoint the CEO; Yes The Principal and Vice-Chancellor is appointed 
56 
 
 
CHECKLIST : UKZN 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
by and accountable to the Council. 
     2.17.2. provide input regarding senior 
management appointments; 
Yes The Senior Appointments committee selects 
suitable candidates to fill executive positions. 
     2.17.3. define its own level of 
materiality and approve a delegation of 
authority framework; 
Yes The Council has authority to establish Council 
committees and determine composition and 
functions thereof. 
    2.17.4. ensure that the role and 
function of the CEO is formalised and 
the performance of the CEO is 
evaluated against the criteria specified; 
and 
Yes The institution's Integrated performance 
management system is linked to its strategic 
objectives.  The Principal's performance is 
assessed annually. 
    2.17.5. ensure succession planning for 
the CEO and other senior executives 
and officers is in place. 
Partial It is the Council's responsibility to provide for the 
succession of senior management.  However, 
there is no policy in place. 
Composition of the 
board 
2.18. The board should 
comprise a balance of power, 
with a majority of non-
executive directors. The 
majority of non-executive 
directors should be 
independent 
The board should:     
    2.18.1. The majority of board members 
should be non-executive directors. 
Yes 63% of the Council membership comprises 
persons external to the university, as prescribed 
by the Act.. 
    2.18.2. The majority of the non-
executive directors should be 
independent. 
Yes See 2.18.1. above 
    2.18.3. When determining the number 
of directors serving on the board, the 
knowledge, skills and resources 
required for conducting the business of 
Partial The Act stipulates that Council members should 
have the necessary knowledge and experience to 
serve a public higher education institution and, 
act in its best interests.  The Council members 
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the board should be considered.  possess knowledge, skill and experience in the 
Higher education that will benefit the institution. 
    2.18.4. Every board should consider 
whether its size, diversity and 
demographics make it effective. 
Yes The Council composition represents race, gender 
and disability requirements as per the Act. 
    2.18.5. Every board should have a 
minimum of two executive directors of 
which one should be the CEO and the 
other the director responsible for 
finance. 
Partial There are three executive members in the 
Council (includes Principal and the deputy Vice-
Chancellor). 
    2.18.6. At least one third of the non-
executive 
directors should rotate every year. 
Partial There is no formal policy on rotation of members. 
    2.18.7. The board, through its 
nomination committee, should 
recommend the eligibility of 
prospective directors. 
Yes The Council membership Committee 
recommends suitable candidates for Council 
approval. 
    2.18.8. Any independent non-executive 
directors serving more than 9 years 
should be subjected to a rigorous 
review of his independence and 
performance by the board. 
Yes The Institutional Statute limits the term of non-
executive members to two terms. 
    2.18.9. The board should include a 
statement in the integrated report 
regarding the assessment of the 
independence of the independent non-
executive directors. 
Yes UKZN presented a statement of Analysis of 
Membership, Representation on Major 
Committees of Council and Attendance Statistics 
in the Annual report 2009. 
    2.18.10. The board should be 
permitted to remove any director 
without shareholder approval. 
Not applicable   
Board appointment 2.19 Directors should be 2.19.1. A nomination committee should Yes The Council membership Committee performs 
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process appointed through a formal 
process 
assist with the process of identifying 
suitable members of the board. 
this role.  It should be noted that some Council 
members are elected by academic and non- 
academic employees or nominated by the SRC.  
    2.19.2. Background and reference 
checks should be performed before the 
nomination and appointment of 
directors. 
Yes This forms part of the nomination process. 
    2.19.3. The appointment of non-
executive directors should be 
formalised through a letter of 
appointment. 
Partial There is no formal procedure 
    2.19.4. The board should make full 
disclosure regarding individual 
directors to enable shareholders to 
make their own assessment of 
directors. 
Not applicable   
Director 
development 
2.20. The induction of and on-
going training and 
development of directors 
should be conducted through 
formal processes 
The board should ensure that:     
    2.20.1. a formal induction programme 
is established for new directors; 
Yes There is a Council  Induction workshop.  
    2.20.2. inexperienced directors are 
developed 
through mentorship programmes; 
Partial The Registrar provides administrative, secretarial 
and legal  support to the Council to ensure 
effective and efficient operation. 
    2.20.3. continuing professional 
development programmes are 
implemented; and 
Partial See 2.20.2. above 
    2.20.4. directors receive regular 
briefings on changes 
Yes See 2.20.2. above 
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in risks, laws and the environment. 
Company 
secretary 
2.21 The board should be 
assisted by a competent, 
suitably qualified and 
experienced company 
secretary 
                                                      
2.21.1. The board should appoint and 
remove the company secretary. 
Yes The Registrar performs the role of a company 
secretary and, is appointed by the Council. 
    2.21.2. The board should empower the 
individual 
to enable him to properly fulfil his 
duties. 
Yes The Principal has authority to assign assistance 
to the Secretary when necessary. 
    The company secretary should:     
    2.21.3. have an arms-length 
relationship with 
the board; 
Yes The Registrar is not a member of the Council. 
    2.21.4. not be a director of the 
company; 
Yes See 2.21.3. above 
    2.21.5. assist the nominations 
committee with the appointment of 
directors; 
Yes The Registrar serves as the secretary for all 
council committees. 
    2.21.6. assist with the director 
induction and 
training programmes; 
Yes The Secretary has a responsibility to assist with 
the administration of the Council. 
    2.21.7. provide guidance to the board 
on the duties of the directors and good 
governance; 
Yes See 2.21.6. above 
    2.21.8. ensure board and committee 
charters are kept up to date; 
Yes The terms of reference for all Council committees 
are reviewed annually. 
    2.21.9. prepare and circulate board 
papers; 
Yes The Secretary ensures that all Council members 
receive an agenda and relevant documentation at 
least seven days in advance of a meeting. 
    2.21.10. elicit responses, input, Yes See 2.21.6 above 
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feedback for 
board and board committee meetings; 
    2.21.11. assist in drafting yearly work 
plans; 
Yes Assists the Chairperson 
    2.21.12. ensure preparation and 
circulation of minutes of board and 
committee meetings; and 
Yes See 2.21.9 above 
    2.21.13. assist with the evaluation of 
the board, committees and individual 
directors 
Yes See 2.21.6 above 
Performance 
assessment 
2.22 The evaluation of the 
board, its committees and the 
individual directors should be 
performed every year 
 2.22.1. The board should determine its 
own role, functions, duties and 
performance criteria as well as that for 
directors on the board and board 
committees to serve as a benchmark 
for the performance appraisal. 
Yes The Council is responsible for governance of the 
institution as stipulated by the Act.  The Council 
assesses its performance and committees 
annually. 
    2.22.2. Yearly evaluations should be 
performed by the chairman or an 
independent provider. 
Yes The Council performance is assessed annually. 
     2.22.3. The results of performance 
evaluations should identify training 
needs for directors. 
Partial The university performance management system 
is linked to training of staff. 
    2.22.4. An overview of the appraisal 
process, results and action plans 
should be disclosed in the integrated 
report. 
No This was not done in 2009. 
    2.22.5. The nomination for the re-
appointment of a director should only 
occur after the evaluation of the 
performance and attendance of the 
director 
Yes Performance influences re-appointment of 
Council members. 
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Board committees 2.23. The board should 
delegate certain functions to 
well-structured committees but 
without abdicating its own 
responsibilities 
 2.23.1. Formal terms of reference 
should be established and approved 
for each committee of the board. 
Yes The Council sets clear terms of reference and 
roles and functions for each council committee. 
    2.23.2. The committees‟ terms of 
reference should be reviewed yearly. 
Partial This forms part of the annual performance 
appraisal. 
    2.23.3. The committees should be 
appropriately constituted and the 
composition and the terms of reference 
should be disclosed in the integrated 
report. 
Yes This was done through the statement of Analysis 
of Membership, Representation on Major 
Committees of Council and Attendance Statistics 
and the Council's statement on Corporate 
governance in the Annual Report 2009. 
    2.23.4. Public and state-owned 
companies must appoint an audit 
committee. 
Yes There is an Audit and Risk Committee in the 
institution. 
    2.23.5. All other companies should 
establish an 
audit committee and define its 
composition, purpose and duties in the 
memorandum of incorporation. 
Yes See 2.23.4. above 
    2.23.6. Companies should establish 
risk, nomination and remuneration 
committees. 
Yes The Council has the Audit and Risk, 
Remuneration and Council membership 
committees. 
    2.23.7. Committees, other than the risk 
committee, should comprise a majority 
of non-executive directors of which the 
majority should be independent. 
Yes All Council committees are formally constituted 
with specified terms of reference and in all cases 
comprise a majority of external members of 
Council. 
    2.23.8. External advisers and 
executive directors should attend 
committee meetings by invitation. 
Yes The Council often invites internal and external 
speakers to address members on strategic 
developments. 
    2.23.9. Committees should be free to Yes Normal procurement policy is followed in such 
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take independent outside professional 
advice at the cost of the company 
subject to an approved process being 
followed. 
cases. 
Group boards 2.24. A governance framework 
should be agreed between the 
group and its subsidiary 
boards 
2.24.1. Listed subsidiaries must 
comply with the rules of the relevant 
stock exchange in respect of insider 
trading. 
Not applicable   
    2.24.2. The holding company must 
respect the fiduciary duties of the 
director serving in a representative 
capacity on the board of the subsidiary. 
Not applicable   
    2.24.3. The implementation and 
adoption of policies, processes or 
procedures of the holding company 
should be considered and approved by 
the subsidiary company. 
Not applicable   
    2.24.4. Disclosure should be made on 
the adoption 
of the holding company‟s policies in the 
integrated report of the subsidiary 
company. 
Not applicable   
Remuneration of 
directors and 
senior executives 
2.25. Companies should 
remunerate directors and 
executives fairly and 
responsibly 
2.25.1. Companies should adopt 
remuneration policies aligned with the 
strategy of the company and linked to 
individual performance. 
Yes There is an Integrated Performance Management 
system linked to the education and training. 
    2.25.2. The remuneration committee 
should assist the board in setting and 
administering remuneration policies. 
Yes The Remuneration Committee is responsible for 
setting and monitoring the implementation of the 
remuneration policy. 
    2.25.3. The remuneration policy should 
address 
Yes The remuneration committee has authority over 
service conditions as they relate to salaries and 
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base pay and bonuses, employee 
contracts, severance and retirement 
benefits and share-based and other 
long-term incentive schemes. 
benefits.  However, there are no share-based 
payments and long-term incentives schemes. 
    2.25.4. Non-executive fees should 
comprise a 
base fee as well as an attendance fee 
per meeting. 
Yes Council members receive only an honorarium for 
meeting attendance. 
  2.26. Companies should 
disclose the remuneration of 
each individual director and 
certain senior executives 
The remuneration report, included in 
the integrated report, should include: 
    
    2.26.1. all benefits paid to directors; Partial The Annual Report 2009 included a disclosure of 
amounts paid to members for council and 
committee meetings attendance as a note to the 
annual financial statements.   
    2.26.2. the salaries of the three most 
highly-paid employees who are not 
directors; 
Yes A disclosure relating to the remuneration of 
members of the Executive, Deans and other 
senior management staff as defined in the 
remuneration of members of the Executive, 
Deans and other senior management staff 
Statute of the University was made in the 
financial statements. 
    2.26.3. the policy on base pay; Yes The note to the financial statements described an 
Annualised gross pay in relation to the 
remuneration of members of the executive, 
Deans and other senior management staff.  
    2.26.4. participation in share incentive 
schemes; 
Not applicable   
    2.26.5. the use of benchmarks; No   
    2.26.6. incentive schemes to Not applicable   
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encourage retention; 
    2.26.7. justification of salaries above 
the median; 
No   
    2.26.8. material payments that are ex-
gratia in nature; 
Not applicable   
    2.26.9. policies regarding executive 
employment; 
and 
No Not disclosed in the Annual Report 2009. 
    2.26.10. the maximum expected 
potential dilution as a result of 
incentive awards. 
Not applicable   
  2.27. Shareholders should 
approve the company‟s 
remuneration policy 
2.27.1. Shareholders should pass a 
non-binding advisory vote on the 
company‟s yearly remuneration policy 
Not applicable   
     2.27.2. The board should determine 
the remuneration of executive directors 
in accordance with the remuneration 
policy put to shareholder‟s vote 
Not applicable   
        
3. Audit 
committees 
       
  3.1. The board should ensure 
that the company has an 
effective and independent 
audit committee 
3.1.1. Listed and state-owned 
companies must establish an audit 
committee. 
Not applicable   
     3.1.2. All other companies should 
establish an audit committee and 
define its composition, purpose and 
duties in the memorandum of 
incorporation. 
Yes The Council established the Audit and Risk 
Committee which operates 
in terms of a written charter, which spells out its 
terms of reference, role and  function. 
     3.1.3. The board should approve the Yes See 3.1.2. above 
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terms of reference of the audit 
committee. 
     3.1.4. The audit committee should 
meet as often as is necessary to fulfil 
its functions but at least twice a year. 
Yes The Audit and Risk Management Committee held 
four meetings in 2009 which were attended by 
internal and external auditors. 
     3.1.5. The audit committee should 
meet with internal and external 
auditors at least once a year without 
management being present. 
Partial The internal and external auditors attended all the 
committee's meetings. 
Membership and 
resources of the 
audit committee 
3.2. Audit committee members 
should be suitably skilled and 
experienced independent non-
executive directors 
3.2.1. All members of the audit 
committee should be independent non-
executive directors. 
Yes The audit committee comprises five members 
who are external to the university (neither 
employee or student). 
     3.2.2. The audit committee should 
consist of at least three members. 
Yes Comprises five members. 
     3.2.3. The chairman of the board 
should not be the chairman or member 
of the audit committee. 
Yes See 3.2.3. above 
    3.2.4. The committee collectively 
should have sufficient qualifications 
and experience to fulfil its duties. 
Partial All the members have adequate skills and 
experience, and two of them are financial literate. 
     3.2.5. The audit committee members 
should keep up-to-date with 
developments affecting the required 
skill-set. 
Partial The Registrar ensures that all council and 
committee members are updated on latest 
developments in matters pertinent to the Council 
operations. 
     3.2.6. The committee should be 
permitted to consult with specialists or 
consultants subject to a board-
approved process. 
Yes The committee's terms of reference provide for 
consultation in the expedition of its role and 
function. 
     3.2.7. The board must fill any 
vacancies on the audit committee. 
Yes The committees account to the Council. 
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  3.3. The audit committee 
should be chaired by an 
independent non-executive 
director 
3.3.1. The board should elect the 
chairman of the audit committee. 
Yes It is the responsibility of the Council to appoint the 
chairman and deputy-chairperson from the 
independent non-executive members. 
     3.3.2. The chairman of the audit 
committee should participate in setting 
and agreeing the agenda of the 
committee 
Yes The chairperson is tasked with the effective 
functioning of the committee. 
     3.3.3. The chairman of the audit 
committee should be present at the 
AGM. 
Not applicable   
Responsibilities of 
the audit 
committee 
3.4. The audit committee 
should oversee integrated 
reporting 
3.4.1. The audit committee should 
have regard to all factors and risks that 
may impact on the integrity of the 
integrated report. 
Partial Reporting and disclosure function falls within the 
scope of the audit committee.  The Annual Report 
2009 did not include the sustainability report. 
     3.4.2. The audit committee should 
review and comment on the financial 
statements included in the integrated 
report. 
Yes The audit committee reviewed and approved the 
financial statements in the 2009 report.  
     3.4.3. The audit committee should 
review the disclosure of sustainability 
issues in the integrated report to 
ensure that it is reliable and does not 
conflict with the financial information. 
No The university did not produce the sustainability 
report in 2009. 
    3.4.4. The audit committee should 
recommend to the board to engage an 
external assurance provider on 
material sustainability issues. 
No See 3.4.3. above 
     3.4.5. The audit committee should 
consider the need to issue interim 
results. 
No Interim results were not produced in 2009. 
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     3.4.6. The audit committee should 
review the content of the summarised 
information. 
Not applicable   
     3.4.7. The audit committee should 
engage the external auditors to provide 
assurance on the summarised financial 
information. 
No See 3.4.5. above 
  3.5. The audit committee 
should ensure that a combined 
assurance model is applied to 
provide a coordinated 
approach to all assurance 
activities 
3.5.1. The audit committee should 
ensure that the combined assurance is 
received is appropriate to address all 
the significant risks facing the 
company. 
Yes The Internal audit function and external auditors 
provide the combined assurance over the risk 
management process. 
     3.5.2. The relationship between the 
external assurance providers and the 
company should be monitored by the 
audit committee. 
Yes The Audit and Risk Committee oversees the 
activities of the external auditors. 
Internal assurance 
providers 
3.6. The audit committee 
should satisfy itself of the 
expertise, resources and 
experience of the company‟s 
finance function 
 3.6.1. Every year a review of the 
finance function should be performed 
by the audit committee. 
Yes The annual financial review was performed by the 
Finance and Investment committee, a council 
sub-committee responsible for financial control 
and administration. 
    3.6.2. The results of the review should 
be disclosed in the integrated report. 
Yes The Annual Report 2009 included a financial 
review. 
  3.7. The audit committee 
should be responsible for 
overseeing of internal audit 
 3.7.1. The audit committee should be 
responsible for the appointment, 
performance assessment and/or 
dismissal of the CAE. 
Partial The Audit and Risk Committee is responsible for 
overseeing the internal audit function and 
assessing its performance.  Appointment and 
dismissal of the CAE is handled by the Senior 
Appointments Committee. 
    3.7.2. The audit committee should 
approve the internal audit plan. 
Yes It is the role of the audit committee to review the 
scope, focus and effectiveness of the internal 
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audit function. 
    3.7.3. The audit committee should 
ensure that the internal audit function 
is subject to an independent quality 
review as and when the committee 
determines it appropriate. 
Partial The internal audit function is subject to an 
independent review and the results thereof are 
reported to the audit committee. 
  3.8. The audit committee 
should be an integral 
component of the risk 
management process 
 3.8.1. The charter of the audit 
committee should set out its 
responsibilities regarding risk 
management. 
Yes The Audit and Risk Committee is responsible for 
monitoring and managing all areas of risks. 
     3.8.2. The audit committee should 
specifically have oversight of: 
  This requirement is specifically catered for in the 
terms of reference and role and function of the 
Audit and Risk Committee. 
    3.8.2.1. financial reporting risks; Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.8.2.2. internal financial controls; Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.8.2.3. fraud risks as it relates to 
financial reporting; and 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.8.2.4. IT risks as it relates to financial 
reporting. 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
External assurance 
providers 
3.9. The audit committee is 
responsible for recommending 
the appointment of the 
external auditor and 
overseeing the external audit 
process 
The audit committee:   See 3.8.2. above 
     3.9.1. must nominate the external 
auditor for appointment; 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
     3.9.2. must approve the terms of 
engagement and remuneration for the 
external audit engagement; 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.9.3. must monitor and report on the Yes See 3.8.2. above 
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independence of the external auditor; 
    3.9.4. must define a policy for non-
audit services provided by the external 
auditor and must approve the contracts 
for non-audit services; 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.9.5. should be informed of any 
Reportable Irregularities identified and 
reported by the external auditor; and 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
    3.9.6. should review the quality and 
effectiveness of the external audit 
process. 
Yes See 3.8.2. above 
Reporting 3.10. The audit committee 
should report to the board and 
shareholders on how it has 
discharged its duties 
 3.10.1. The audit committee should 
report internally to the board on its 
statutory duties and duties assigned to 
it by the board. 
Yes The audit committee is accountable to the 
Council. 
     3.10.2. The audit committee must 
report to the shareholders on its 
statutory duties: 
Yes The Audit and Risk Committee reported on its 
role, function and performance in the Annual 
Report 2009. 
    3.10.2.1. how its duties were carried 
out; 
Yes See 3.10.2. above 
    3.10.2.2. if the committee is satisfied 
with the independence of the external 
auditor; 
Yes See 3.10.2. above 
    3.10.2.3. the committee‟s view on the 
financial statements and the 
accounting practices; and 
Yes See 3.10.2. above 
    3.10.2.4. whether the internal financial 
controls are effective. 
Yes See 3.10.2. above 
     3.10.3. The audit committee should 
provide a summary of its role and 
details of its composition, number of 
Yes See 3.10.2. above 
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meetings and activities, in the 
integrated report. 
     3.10.4. The audit committee should 
recommend the integrated report for 
approval by the board. 
Yes See 3.10.2. above 
        
4. The governance 
of risk 
       
The board‟s 
responsibility for 
risk governance 
4.1. The board should be 
responsible for the 
governance of risk 
 4.1.1. A policy and plan for a system 
and process of risk management 
should be developed. 
Yes There is a Risk and Compliance Function which 
integrates risk management into the daily 
activities of the institution. 
     4.1.2. The board should comment in 
the integrated report on the 
effectiveness of the system and 
process of risk management. 
Yes The effectiveness of the risk management 
process was reported in the Annual Report 2009 
through Report on Internal Controls and Risk 
management. 
     4.1.3. The board‟s responsibility for 
risk governance should be expressed 
in the board charter. 
Yes The Council's terms of reference include the 
responsibility for risk management and internal 
control.  The audit and risk committee is 
accountable to the Council for the oversight of the 
risk management process. 
     4.1.4. The induction and on-going 
training programmes of the board 
should incorporate risk governance. 
Yes The emphasis of the Induction is the due 
cognisance of all the mandated responsibilities of 
Council. 
     4.1.5. The board‟s responsibility for 
risk governance should manifest in a 
documented risk management policy 
and plan. 
Yes The Council approved the Enterprise Risk 
Management Framework as part of the risk and 
compliance function. 
     4.1.6. The board should approve the 
risk management policy and plan. 
Yes See 4.1.5. above 
     4.1.7. The risk management policy 
should be widely distributed throughout 
Yes The policy is included in the institution's intranet. 
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the company. 
     4.1.8. The board should review the 
implementation of the risk 
management plan at least once a year. 
Yes The Audit and Risk Committee reviews the risk 
management reports and reports to the Council. 
     4.1.9. The board should ensure that 
the implementation of the risk 
management plan is monitored 
continually. 
Yes See 4.1.8. above 
  4.2. The board should 
determine the levels of risk 
tolerance 
 4.2.1. The board should set the levels 
of risk tolerance once a year. 
Partial The university's Finance committee has set an 
acceptable level of financial risk against which 
risks are assessed and quantified.   
     4.2.2. The board may set limits for the 
risk appetite. 
Yes The Council has established a Risk and 
Compliance function to ensure that all risks are 
identified and mitigated against. 
     4.2.3. The board should monitor that 
risks taken are within the tolerance and 
appetite levels. 
Partial See 4.2.1. above 
  4.3. The risk committee or 
audit committee should assist 
the board in carrying out its 
risk responsibilities 
 4.3.1. The board should appoint a 
committee responsible for risk. 
Yes The Audit and Risk  Committee is responsible for 
the risk management process. 
     4.3.2. The risk committee should:     
    4.3.2.1. consider the risk management 
policy and plan and monitor the risk 
management process; 
Yes The Audit and Risk  Committee is responsible for 
the risk management process. It reviews the risk 
management reports and reports on key risks 
facing the university and planned mitigation 
procedures to the Council. 
    4.3.2.2. have as its members executive 
and non-executive directors, members 
of senior management and 
independent risk management experts 
Yes The committee comprises non-executive 
members and its meetings are attended by 
external and internal auditors and by 
appropriate members of executive and senior 
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to be invited, if necessary; operational management. 
    4.3.2.3. have a minimum of three 
members; and 
Yes It has seven members. 
    4.3.2.4. convene at least twice per 
year. 
Yes It met four times during 2009. 
    4.3.3. The performance of the 
committee should be evaluated once a 
year by the board. 
Yes The committee reports on its performance to the 
Council during Council meetings. 
Management‟s 
responsibility for 
risk management 
4.4. The board should 
delegate to management the 
responsibility to design, 
implement and monitor the risk 
management plan 
 4.4.1. The board‟s risk strategy should 
be executed by management by 
means of risk management systems 
and processes. 
Yes Management is tasked by Council to design, 
implement and monitor the risk management 
process and, integrate it into daily management 
activities of the institution. 
     4.4.2. Management is accountable for 
integrating risk in the day-to-day 
activities of the company 
Yes See 4.4.1 above 
     4.4.3. The CRO should be a suitably 
experienced person who should have 
access and interact regularly on 
strategic matters with the board and/or 
appropriate board committee and 
executive management. 
Yes The Director of Corporate Governance (currently 
serves the role) has direct access to the Council 
and the audit and Risk committee. 
Risk assessment 4.5. The board should ensure 
that risk assessments are 
performed on a continual basis 
4.5.1. The board should ensure 
effective and on-going risk 
assessments are performed. 
Yes The risk management process has been 
incorporated into normal business activities.  The 
risk and compliance function has established an 
Enterprise risk management framework to 
monitor the process and provide the audit and 
risk committee with regular and independent 
assurance on the effectiveness of the university 
risk management process.     
     4.5.2. A systematic, documented, Yes See 4.5.1. above 
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formal risk assessment should be 
conducted at least once a year. 
     4.5.3. Risks should be prioritised and 
ranked to focus responses and 
interventions. 
Yes The level of risk exposure and mitigating 
measures are based on established limits to the 
extent that risks can be assessed and quantified. 
     4.5.4. The risk assessment process 
should involve the risks affecting the 
various income streams of the 
company, the critical dependencies of 
the business, the sustainability and the 
legitimate interests and expectations of 
stakeholders. 
Yes The university risk management process is 
embedded in the business and ensures that risk 
registers are maintained at Corporate level and 
for all academic and support sectors with a risk 
champion for each sector, and provide education 
and training on risk management throughout the 
organisation. 
     4.5.5. Risk assessments should adopt 
a top-down approach. 
Yes The Council approved the Risk and Compliance 
function monitored by the Audit and Risk 
committee which, is responsible for the university 
risk management process and accountable to the 
Council.  Management is tasked by Council to 
integrate the risk management process with daily 
management activities of the university and report 
thereon to the Council. 
     4.5.6. The board should regularly 
receive and review a register of the 
company‟s key risks. 
Partial The Risk and Compliance function ensures that 
risk registers are maintained at the corporate 
level and for each of the academic and support 
sectors. 
    4.5.7. The board should ensure that 
key risks are quantified where 
practicable. 
Yes Risks are assessed and quantified to determine 
the level of risk exposure where practical. 
  4.6. The board should ensure 
that frameworks and 
methodologies are 
implemented to increase the 
4.6.1. The board should ensure that a 
framework and processes are in place 
to anticipate unpredictable risks. 
Yes The integrated process of enterprise-wide risk 
management is aimed at all risks. 
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probability of anticipating 
unpredictable risks 
Risk response 4.7. The board should ensure 
that management considers 
and implements appropriate 
risk responses 
 4.7.1. Management should identify 
and note in the risk register the risk 
responses decided upon. 
Yes The risk register sets out key risks and approved 
action thereto. 
    4.7.2. Management should 
demonstrate to the board that the risk 
response provides for the identification 
and exploitation of opportunities to 
improve the performance of the 
company 
No The risk management process focuses on 
identifying and responding to the risks. 
Risk monitoring 4.8. The board should ensure 
continual risk monitoring by 
management 
4.8.1. The board should ensure that 
effective and 
continual monitoring of risk 
management 
takes place.  
Yes The audit and risk committee receives 
regular and independent assurance on the 
effectiveness of the risk management process. 
     4.8.2. The responsibility for monitoring 
should be defined in the risk 
management plan. 
Yes Outlined in the Enterprise Risk Management 
Framework 
Risk assurance 4.9. The board should receive 
assurance regarding the 
effectiveness of the risk 
management process 
 4.9.1. Management should provide 
assurance to the board that the risk 
management plan is integrated in the 
daily activities of the company. 
Yes Management is responsible to the Council for 
designing, implementing and monitoring the risk 
management process. 
    4.9.2. Internal audit should provide a 
written assessment of the 
effectiveness of the system of internal 
controls and risk management to the 
board. 
Partial The Internal Audit made representations on the 
system of internal controls and risk management 
to the Audit and Risk Committee, which through 
its report on internal control and risk 
management, reported on the effectiveness of the 
risk management process in the Annual Report 
2009.  
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Risk disclosure 4.10. The board should ensure 
that there are processes in 
place enabling complete, 
timely, relevant, accurate and 
accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders 
4.10.1. Undue, unexpected or unusual 
risks should be disclosed in the 
integrated report 
No This disclosure was not made in the Annual 
Report 2009. 
    4.10.2. The board should disclose its 
view on the effectiveness of the risk 
management process in the integrated 
report. 
Yes See 4.9.2 above 
         
5. The governance 
of information 
technology 
        
  5.1. The board should be 
responsible for information 
technology (IT) governance 
 5.1.1. The board should assume the 
responsibility for the governance of IT 
and place it on the board agenda. 
Yes The audit and risk committee oversees and 
monitors all strategic and governance matters 
related to IT operations.   
     5.1.2. The board should ensure that 
an IT charter and policies are 
established and implemented. 
Partial There are established policies and procedures to 
protect university assets from unauthorised 
access or misappropriation and maintain proper 
accounting records. 
     5.1.3. The board should ensure 
promotion of an ethical IT governance 
culture and awareness and of a 
common IT language. 
Partial See 5.1.2. above 
     5.1.4. The board should ensure that 
an IT internal control framework is 
adopted and implemented . 
Partial There exists relevant controls and procedures to 
adequately address IT risks. 
     5.1.5. The board should receive 
independent assurance on the 
effectiveness of the IT internal controls. 
Partial Independent assurance is provided by the 
internal audit function and the work of external 
auditors on general IT controls. 
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  5.2. IT should be aligned with 
the performance and 
sustainability objectives of the 
company 
 5.2.1. The board should ensure that 
the IT strategy is integrated with the 
company‟s strategic and business 
processes. 
Yes The ICT aligned its infrastructure and hardware 
with the Strategic Plan objectives  to provide 
innovative and high quality solutions and 
services. 
     5.2.2. The board should ensure that 
there is a process in place to identity 
and exploit opportunities to improve 
the performance and sustainability of 
the company through the use of IT. 
Yes This is evidenced by achievements such as 
upgrade of voice over internet protocols (VOIP), 
provision of wireless network across lecture 
venues and increased bandwidth capacity which 
will result in innovative teaching, learning and 
research. 
  5.3. The board should 
delegate to management the 
responsibility for the 
implementation of an IT 
governance framework 
5.3.1 Management should be 
responsible for the implementation of 
the structures, processes and 
mechanisms for the IT governance 
framework. 
Partial The ICT division is responsible for implementing 
IT standards and procedures. 
    5.3.2 The board may appoint an IT 
steering committee of similar function 
to assist with its governance of IT. 
Partial IT governance is part of the scope of the Audit 
and Risk committee. 
    5.3.3 The CEO should appoint a Chief 
Information Officer responsible for the 
management of IT. 
No There is no Chief Information Officer. 
    5.3.4 The CIO should be a suitably 
qualified and experienced person who 
should have access and interact 
regularly on strategic IT matters with 
the board and/or appropriate board 
committee and executive 
management. 
No See 5.3.3. above 
  5.4. The board should monitor 
and evaluate significant IT 
investments and expenditure 
5.4.1 The board should oversee the 
value delivery of IT and monitor the 
return on investment from significant IT 
Partial IT investments are subject to the strict university 
tender procedures and have to be approved by 
the Finance committee. 
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projects. 
    5.4.2 The board should ensure that 
intellectual property  contained in 
information systems are protected. 
Partial There are accepted standards that are applied to 
control and guard the privacy of all data. 
    5.4.3 The board should obtain 
independent assurance on the IT 
governance and controls supporting 
outsourced IT services. 
Not applicable The university ICT division provides IT services. 
  5.5. IT should form an integral 
part of the company‟s risk 
management 
5.5.1 Management should regularly 
demonstrate to the board that the 
company has adequate business 
resilience arrangements in place for 
disaster recovery. 
Partial The ICT department runs full back-ups to 
facilitate disaster recovery. 
    5.5.2 The board should ensure that the 
company complies with IT laws and 
that IT related rules, codes and 
standards are considered. 
Partial This forms part of the mandate of the audit and 
risk committee.  Also, the university has 
developed and documented accepted standards 
to control and manage the use of IT systems and 
information privacy.  
  5.6. The board should ensure 
that information assets are 
managed effectively 
 5.6.1. The board should ensure that 
there are systems in place for the 
management of information which 
should include information security, 
information management and 
information privacy. 
Partial There exists the data privacy and information 
security policies.  
     5.6.2. The board should ensure that all 
personal information is treated by the 
company as an important business 
asset and is identified. 
Yes See 5.6.1 above 
     5.6.3. The board should ensure that 
an Information Security Management 
System is developed and 
Partial See 5.6.1 above 
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implemented. 
     5.6.4. The board should approve the 
information security strategy and 
delegate and empower management to 
implement the strategy. 
Partial The ICT division is responsible for implementing 
data privacy and information security policies. 
  5.7. A risk committee and 
audit committee should assist 
the board in carrying out its IT 
responsibilities 
5.7.1. The risk committee should 
ensure that IT risks are adequately 
addressed. 
Partial The Audit and Risk Committee is responsible for 
identifying and managing all risks in the 
university.  However, UKZN needs to establish an 
IT governance policy framework to adequately 
address all IT risks. 
     5.7.2. The risk committee should 
obtain appropriate assurance that 
controls are in place and effective in 
addressing IT risks. 
Partial Independent assurance is provided by the 
internal audit function and the work of external 
auditors on general IT controls. 
     5.7.3. The audit committee should 
consider IT as it relates to financial 
reporting and the going concern of the 
company. 
Partial See 5.7.1. above 
     5.7.4. The audit committee should 
consider the use of technology to 
improve audit coverage and efficiency. 
Partial See 5.7.1. above 
        
6. Compliance with 
laws, rules, codes 
and standards 
       
  6.1. The board should ensure 
that the company complies 
with applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-
binding rules, codes and 
standards 
 6.1.1. Companies must comply with all 
applicable laws. 
Yes UKZN is a public institution of higher education in 
terms of  the Higher Education Act and, must 
comply with it.  As a juristic person, UKZN  must 
comply with the applicable legal and regulatory 
framework. 
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     6.1.2. Exceptions permitted in law, 
shortcomings and proposed changes 
expected should be handled ethically. 
Yes The Code of Conduct spells out ethical standards 
to be complied with in all business activities. 
    6.1.3 Compliance should be an ethical 
imperative. 
Yes See 6.1.2. above 
    6.1.4 Compliance with applicable laws 
should be understood not only in terms 
of the obligations that they create, but 
also for the rights and protection that 
they afford. 
Yes Financial rules have been designed to ensure 
compliance with all applicable laws. 
    6.1.5 The board should understand the 
context of the law, and how other 
applicable laws interact with it. 
Yes The Council have available legal expertise from 
members, the Registrar and knowledgeable 
senior management members (as advisors). 
    6.1.6 The board should monitor the 
company‟s compliance with applicable 
laws, rules, codes and standards. 
Yes The Council has two committees which assist 
with compliance with all applicable laws, rules, 
codes and standards at Unisa: the  Risk, Ethics 
and Control Committee (REC) deals with  
compliance with the regulatory framework while, 
the Internal Audit and the Risk management are 
tasked with identifying risks related to 
compliance.  The audit committee performs 
assessment of the extent of compliance and 
reports on its effectiveness to the Council. 
    6.1.7 Compliance should be a regular 
item on the agenda of the board. 
Partial The audit committee reports on the effectiveness 
of compliance to the Council. 
    6.1.8 The board should disclose details 
in the integrated report on how it 
discharged its responsibility to 
establish an effective compliance 
framework and processes. 
Yes The Council has through the statement on 
internal control and risk management  disclosed 
in the Annual Report 2009, reported on the 
effectiveness of the compliance function. 
  6.2. The board and each 6.2.1 The induction and on-going Partial New Council members are familiarised with the 
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individual director should have 
a working understanding of the 
effect of the applicable laws, 
rules, codes and standards on 
the company and its business 
training programmes of directors 
should incorporate an overview of and 
any changes to applicable laws, rules, 
codes and standards. 
higher education landscape, the institutional 
structure and their roles and responsibilities 
during the induction programme.  The Registrar 
(serves as the Council Secretary) ensures that 
Council members have an understanding of the 
applicable legal and regulatory framework. 
    6.2.2 Directors should sufficiently 
familiarise themselves with the general 
content of applicable laws, rules, codes 
and standards to discharge their legal 
duties. 
Partial See 6.2.1. above 
  6.3. Compliance risk should 
form an integral part of the 
company‟s risk management 
process 
6.3.1 The risk of non-compliance 
should be identified, assessed and 
responded to through the risk 
management processes. 
Partial The Audit and  Risk Committee oversees the risk 
management process in the university and 
reports on its effectiveness to the Council. 
    6.3.2 Companies should consider 
establishing a compliance function. 
Yes The Corporate Governance monitors the 
compliance function which inter alia, educates 
and trains the whole institution in risk 
management. 
  6.4. The board should 
delegate to management the 
implementation of an effective 
compliance framework and 
processes 
6.4.1 The board should ensure that a 
legal compliance policy, approved by 
the board, has been implemented by 
management. 
Partial Part of the university risk management process. 
    6.4.2 The board should receive 
assurance on the effectiveness of the 
controls around compliance with laws, 
rules, codes and standards. 
Partial See 6.3.1. above 
    6.4.3 Compliance with laws, rules, 
codes and standards should be 
incorporated in the code of conduct of 
Yes The Code of Conduct (embodies ethical 
standards) promotes an ethical corporate culture 
in the university. 
81 
 
 
CHECKLIST : UKZN 
GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
PRINCIPLE(S) RECOMMENDED PRACTICE COMPLIANCE EXPLANATION 
the company. 
    6.4.4 Management should establish 
the appropriate structures, educate 
and train, and communicate and 
measure key performance indicators 
relevant to compliance. 
Partial This is  achieved through the enterprise risk 
management framework. 
    6.4.5 The integrated report should 
include details of material or often 
repeated instances of non-compliance 
by either the company or its directors 
in their capacity as such. 
No No disclosure of material instances of non-
compliance was made in the Annual Report 2009. 
    6.4.6 An independent, suitably skilled 
compliance officer may be appointed. 
Partial The Director of corporate governance performs 
this role. 
    6.4.7 The compliance officer should be 
a suitably skilled and experienced 
person who should have access and 
interact regularly on strategic 
compliance matters with the board 
and/or appropriate board committee 
and executive management. 
Partial See 6.4.6. above 
    6.4.8 The structuring of the compliance 
function, its role and its position in 
terms of reporting lines should be a 
reflection of the company‟s decision on 
how compliance is to be integrated 
with its ethics and risk management. 
Partial See 6.4.6. above 
    6.4.9. The compliance function should 
have adequate resources to fulfil its 
function. 
Partial See 6.4.6. above 
        
7. Internal audit        
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The need for and 
role of internal 
audit 
7.1. The board should ensure 
that there is an effective risk 
based internal audit 
 7.1.1. Companies should establish an 
internal audit function. 
Yes There is an independent internal audit that 
reports to the audit committee 
     7.1.2. Internal audit should perform 
the following functions: 
    
    7.1.2.1 evaluate the company‟s 
governance processes; 
Yes The IA evaluates the operation of the internal 
control and risk management system in the 
university and reports all its observations and 
recommendations to management, the Audit and 
Risk Committee and Council.  Internal audit 
performs its duties in compliance with the 
acceptable standards and the institutional Code 
of Conduct.   The IA is independent of 
management and reports its performance to the 
audit committee.   
    7.1.2.2. perform an objective 
assessment of the effectiveness of risk 
management and the internal control 
framework; 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.1.2.3. systematically analyse and 
evaluating business processes and 
associated controls; and 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.1.2.4. provide a source of information 
as appropriate, regarding instances of 
fraud, corruption, unethical behaviour 
and irregularities. 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
     7.1.3. An internal audit charter should 
be defined and approved by the board. 
Yes The Internal Audit function is specified in the IA 
charter approved by the Council. 
     7.1.4. The internal audit function 
should adhere to the IIA Standards and 
code of ethics. 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
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Internal audit‟s 
approach and plan 
7.2. Internal audit should 
follow a risk based approach 
to its plan 
 7.2.1. The internal audit plan and 
approach should be informed by the 
strategy and risks of the company. 
Yes The internal audit approach considers strategic 
objectives and risks, controls and assessment of 
its adequacy and efficiency. 
     7.2.2. Internal audit should be 
independent from management. 
Yes The internal audit function is independent of 
management and, reports to the Council. 
     7.2.3. Internal audit should be an 
objective provider of assurance that 
considers: 
    
    7.2.3.1. the risks that may prevent or 
slow down the realisation of strategic 
goals; 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.2.3.2. whether controls are in place 
and functioning effectively to mitigate 
these; and 
Yes See 7.1.2.1. above 
    7.2.3.3. the opportunities that will 
promote the realisation of strategic 
goals that are identified, assessed and 
effectively managed by the company‟s 
management team. 
Yes Management implements the IA 
recommendations to address any control 
deficiencies and take advantage of opportunities 
to improve the internal control system.   
  7.3. Internal audit should 
provide a written assessment 
of the effectiveness of the 
company‟s system of internal 
controls and risk management 
7.3.1 Internal audit should form an 
integral part of the combined 
assurance model as internal assurance 
provider. 
Yes The internal audit and external auditors provide 
the combined assurance. 
    7.3.2 Internal controls should be 
established not only over financial 
matters, but also operational, 
compliance and sustainability issues. 
Partial External auditors consider and assess internal 
controls over non-financial matters as well. 
    7.3.3 Companies should maintain an 
effective governance, risk 
management and internal control 
Partial The Enterprise Risk management framework 
employs an enterprise-wide risk management 
process.  The internal audit function focuses on 
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framework. the internal control system. 
    7.3.4 Management should specify the 
elements of the control framework. 
Partial The components have not been formally 
specified. 
    7.3.5 Internal audit should provide a 
written assessment of the system of 
internal controls and risk management 
to the board. 
Partial The Audit and Risk Committee provided the 
Report on internal control and risk management 
in the Annual Report 2009. 
    7.3.6 Internal audit should provide a 
written assessment of internal financial 
controls to the audit committee. 
Yes In 2009 the IA reported a number of deficiencies 
in key financial controls to management and the 
audit committee. 
  7.4. The audit committee 
should be responsible for 
overseeing internal audit 
7.4.1 The internal audit plan should be 
agreed and approved by the audit 
committee. 
Yes The internal audit plan was approved by the Audit 
and Risk Committee. 
    7.4.2 The audit committee should 
evaluate the performance of the 
internal audit function. 
Yes The Internal Audit reports on its performance to 
the Audit and Risk Committee monitors the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function. 
    7.4.3 The audit committee should 
ensure that the internal audit function 
is subjected to an independent quality 
review. 
No See 7.4.2. above 
    7.4.4. The CAE should report 
functionally to the audit committee 
chairman. 
Yes Terms of reference of the Internal audit 
     7.4.5. The audit committee should be 
responsible for the appointment, 
performance assessment and 
dismissal of the CAE. 
Partial The Audit and Risk Committee is responsible for 
overseeing the internal audit function and 
assessing its performance.  Appointment and 
dismissal of the CAE is handled by the senior 
appointments committee. 
     7.4.6. The audit committee should 
ensure that the internal audit function 
is appropriately resourced and has 
Yes See 7.4.5. above 
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appropriate budget allocated to the 
function. 
     7.4.7. Internal audit should report at all 
audit committee meetings. 
Yes The IA attends the audit committee meetings. 
Internal audit‟s 
status in the 
company 
7.5. Internal audit should be 
strategically positioned to 
achieve its objectives 
7.5.1. The internal audit function 
should be independent and objective. 
Yes The IA charter specifies its independence and 
objectivity.  The internal audit is independent of 
management and reports to the audit committee. 
     7.5.2. The internal audit function 
should report functionally to the audit 
committee. 
Yes See 7.5.1. above 
     7.5.3. The CAE should have a 
standing invitation to attend executive 
committee meetings. 
Yes The CAE attends all the meetings of the 
Executive management Committee. 
     7.5.4. The internal audit function 
should be skilled and resourced as is 
appropriate for the complexity and 
volume of risk and assurance needs. 
Yes The IA staff have the necessary competence to 
carry out the internal audit function. 
     7.5.5. The CAE should develop and 
maintain a quality assurance and 
improvement programme. 
Yes The Internal Audit performs its duties in 
compliance with the IIA Standards and the Code 
of Ethics. 
        
8. Governing 
stakeholder 
relationships 
       
  8.1. The board should 
appreciate that stakeholders‟ 
perceptions affect a 
company‟s reputation 
8.1.1. The gap between stakeholder 
perceptions and the performance of 
the company should be managed and 
measured to enhance or protect the 
company‟s reputation. 
Partial The university has created the Institutional Forum 
to facilitate and support the functioning of various 
groupings of the university community.  UKZN set 
up a Governance and Academic Freedom 
Committee (GAFC) which welcomes all 
stakeholders‟ views in the debate about academic 
freedom in the university.  The expectation gap is 
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however not measured. 
    8.1.2 The company‟s reputation and its 
linkage with stakeholder relationships 
should be a regular board agenda 
item. 
Partial In terms of the strategic plan values, UKZN wants 
to build sustainable in-depth relationships with its 
stakeholders. 
    8.1.3 The board should identify 
important stakeholder groupings. 
Yes Stakeholders are broadly considered as internal 
and external groupings. 
  8.2. The board should 
delegate to management to 
proactively deal with 
stakeholder relationships   
8.2.1 Management should develop a 
strategy and formulate policies for the 
management of relationships with each 
stakeholder grouping. 
Partial There is no formal stakeholder policy on 
managing stakeholder relationships.  There are 
however initiatives such as the Joint Consultative 
Forum (which focuses on employer-employee 
relationships), the Joint Bargaining Forum and 
the ADR (alternative dispute resolution).   
    8.2.2 The board should consider 
whether it is appropriate to publish its 
stakeholder policies. 
No See 8.2.1. above 
    8.2.3 The board should oversee the 
establishment of mechanisms and 
processes that support stakeholders in 
constructive engagement with the 
company. 
Partial The Joint Consultative Forum works on the 
relationship between the university and 
recognised unions and the staff.  The Joint 
bargaining forum provides a platform for 
collective bargaining on salary increases and 
conditions of service. The SRC partakes in 
student governance.  the Institutional forum is a 
platform for all stakeholders to engage with the 
institution.  
    8.2.4 The board should encourage 
shareholders to attend AGM‟s. 
Not applicable   
    8.2.5 The board should consider not 
only formal, but also informal, 
processes for interaction with the 
company‟s stakeholders. 
Partial See 8.1.1. above 
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    8.2.6 The board should disclose in its 
integrated report the nature of the 
company‟s dealings with stakeholders 
and the outcomes of these dealings. 
Partial The Council has discussed university 
engagements with all stakeholders in the Report 
on the Institutional Forum in the Annual Report 
2009. 
  8.3. The board should strive to 
achieve the appropriate 
balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, in the 
best interests of the company 
8.3.1 The board should take account of 
the legitimate interests and 
expectations of its stakeholders in its 
decision-making in the best interests of 
the company. 
Partial Practices such as the university Collective 
Leadership concept and the Institutional forum 
underscore the importance of stakeholder 
relationships to the Council 
  8.4. Companies should ensure 
the equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
8.4.1 There must be equitable 
treatment of all holders of the same 
class of shares issued. 
Not applicable   
    8.4.2. The board should ensure that 
minority shareholders are protected. 
Not applicable   
  8.5. Transparent and effective 
communication with 
stakeholders is essential for 
building and maintaining their 
trust and confidence 
8.5.1. Complete, timely, relevant, 
accurate, honest and accessible 
information should be provided by the 
company to its stakeholders whilst 
having regard to legal and strategic 
considerations. 
Partial Integrated communication plan 
     8.5.2. Communication with 
stakeholders should be in clear and 
understandable language. 
Partial See 8.2.1. above 
     8.5.3. The board should adopt 
communication guidelines that support 
a responsible communication 
programme. 
Partial See 8.2.1. above 
     8.5.4. The board should consider 
disclosing in the integrated report the 
number and reasons for refusals of 
requests of information that were 
No No such disclosure was made in the Annual 
Report 2009 
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lodged with the company in terms of 
the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act, 2000. 
Dispute resolution 8.6. The board should ensure 
that disputes are resolved as 
effectively, efficiently and 
expeditiously as possible 
 8.6.1. The board should adopt formal 
dispute resolution processes for 
internal and external disputes. 
Partial The institution established the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution to implement effective and non-
adversarial dispute resolution methods.  
However, this process does not extend to 
external disputes. 
     8.6.2. The board should select the 
appropriate individuals to represent the 
company in ADR. 
No The Institutional Forum advises the Council on 
mediation and dispute resolution. 
        
9. Integrated 
reporting and 
disclosure 
       
Transparency and 
accountability 
9.1. The board should ensure 
the integrity of the company‟s 
integrated report 
 9.1.1. A company should have 
controls to enable it to verify and 
safeguard the integrity of its integrated 
report. 
Partial There is a strong indication of controls over 
reporting of financial performance issues, the 
accounting and internal control system, and 
operational and administrative matters.  There is 
established policy framework over these matters.  
Reporting of social and sustainability issues is still 
inadequate. 
     9.1.2. The board should delegate to 
the audit committee to evaluate 
sustainability disclosures 
No No sustainability reporting yet. 
    The integrated report should:     
    9.1.3. be prepared every year; Yes The institution prepares an Annual report 
    9.1.4. convey adequate information 
regarding the company‟s financial and 
sustainability performance; and 
Partial See 9.1.1. above 
    9.1.5. focus on substance over form. Partial The financial issues reported in the integrated 
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report comply with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards. 
  9.2 Sustainability reporting 
and disclosure should be 
integrated with the company‟s 
financial reporting 
9.2.1. The board should include 
commentary on the company‟s 
financial results. 
Yes The annual report 2009 included the Financial 
review which conveyed information on the 
university's financial operations, performance, 
cash flows and position as at year end. 
    9.2.2. The board must disclose if the 
company is a going concern. 
Yes See 9.2.1. above 
    9.2.3. The integrated report should 
describe how the company has made 
its money. 
Yes See 9.2.1. above 
    9.2.4. The board should ensure that 
the positive and negative impacts of 
the company‟s operations and plans to 
improve the positives and eradicate or 
ameliorate the negatives in the 
financial year ahead are conveyed in 
the integrated report. 
No The university did not produce the sustainability 
report. 
  9.3 Sustainability reporting 
and disclosure should be 
independently assured 
9.3.1. General oversight and reporting 
of sustain-ability should be delegated 
by the board to the audit committee. 
No See 9.2.4. above 
    9.3.2. The audit committee should 
assist the board by reviewing the 
integrated report to ensure that the 
information contained in it is reliable 
and that it does not contradict the 
financial aspects of the report. 
No See 9.2.4. above 
    9.3.3. The audit committee should 
oversee the provision of assurance 
over sustainability issues. 
No See 9.2.4. above 
 
